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Abstract 
 
 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a key option for economic growth in most, if not 
all, developing countries.  However, not all developing countries are equally open to 
foreign investment.  Some restrict foreign equity, while others encourage multinational 
corporations to enter their markets.  Because FDI involves outsiders entering national 
markets and profits, it is very political.  FDI can bring economic benefits, such as jobs 
and new technology, but it may also entail economic costs, such as increased 
competition for national businesses.  FDI may also bring political costs, as governments 
that open to foreign equity may see a popular backlash. 
Most governments have policies to control FDI’s entry into their markets.  These 
policies have been inadequately explored in quantitative studies of FDI because of a 
lack of available data.  This study seeks to rectify that problem by introducing a new set 
of data: The Foreign Equity Index.  I develop a theory and model of FDI in developing 
countries framed by the logic of two-level games.  FDI requires agreement between 
developing states and international firms, and therefore agreements are reached with 
influence from domestic-level political and economic factors, as well as international-
level factors.  FDI policies are an indication of developing countries win-sets, or range of 
agreements they are willing to accept when dealing with foreign multinational 
corporations.   
I test this theory quantitatively using the Foreign Equity Index, which covers 55 
developing countries from 1976-2004.  I first estimate the international and domestic 
factors that influence the degree of openness to FDI indicated by FDI equity policies in 
developing countries.  I then test the effect these policies have on FDI inflows.  I find 
that both domestic and international factors affect developing countries’ FDI policies, 
and in turn, policies are a significant factor determining the flow of FDI into national 
markets.  I also explore the ways in which FDI policies have played a role in economic 
development strategies of El Salvador and Nicaragua.  This research and the Foreign 
Equity Index should aid in a better understanding of foreign direct investment and 
growth in developing countries in general. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: foreign direct investment, FDI, policy, policies, developing countries, 
Foreign Equity Index, development, modernization, dependency, 
corporation, multinational
 vii
Chapter One 
Introduction 
Since 1976, Niger, Gabon and Swaziland appeared to be doing the right thing to 
attract foreign direct investment.  Niger, one of the poorest countries in the world, has 
maintained a very open policy toward foreign equity, and puts few restrictions on the 
entrance of foreign investment into its market.  This developing country has participated 
in workshops and talks on investment agreements in the international arena, and has 
highlighted its efforts to improve education and literacy and create jobs for its population 
(States News Service 2007, US Fed News 2007).  Yet this country has gained very little 
for its efforts.  From 1976 to 2004, Niger has only averaged about $22 million a year in 
foreign investment, or 0.59 percent of its GDP.  Compare this to its neighbor, Nigeria, 
which averaged $1.07 billion, or 2.64 percent of its GDP, a year in foreign investment 
during that same time.  Yet Nigeria had more restrictive FDI equity policies.  Similarly, 
Chad has maintained more restrictive policies, but FDI flows have been greater and FDI 
makes up 5.33 percent of its GDP.  Even Algeria and Cameroon have gained more FDI 
inflows, though it makes up a smaller share of the GDP in those countries than in 
Niger.1
Gabon had limited restrictions until 1998, when it opened up its economy almost 
completely to foreign equity.  Yet Gabon only averaged about $26 million a year in 
foreign direct investment between 1976 and 2004, despite the fact that India has 
invested over $100 million in oil development projects there (Walker 2007).  Gabon has 
                                                 
1 The main source of statistics on foreign direct investment throughout this dissertation is the World Development Indicators, 
compiled by the World Bank.  Both the subscription version and the online version of these statistics were used.  The online version 
can be found at http://www.worldbank.org. 
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averaged less in the past thirty years than Cameroon ($64 million per year, 0.49 percent 
of GDP) and even the war-torn Democratic Republic of Congo ($61million dollars, 0.39 
percent of GDP). 
Swaziland, nestled between Mozambique and economic giant South Africa, 
should be doing well with foreign investment by all accounts.  From 1976 to 2004, it 
maintained an open foreign equity policy with very few restrictions.  Yet Swaziland only 
averages about $56 million (5.06 percent of GDP) a year in foreign direct investment 
inflows.  Lesotho averaged more than Swaziland over that period, pulling in $69 million 
dollars (7.48 percent of GDP) in FDI even while maintaining more restrictions on foreign 
investment.  Even South Africa, despite a flight of investment during the apartheid 
years, still managed to average ten times as much investment than Swaziland during 
those years, though FDI’s percent of GDP in South Africa was a miniscule 0.49 percent. 
On the other side of the coin, Brazil, China and Mexico appear to acting contrary 
to conventional wisdom, and yet for all intents and purposes they are better off for it.  
They all receive large amounts of foreign investment despite the fact that they have 
relatively restrictive policies on foreign investment equity.  Brazil allows 100 percent 
foreign ownership, but it restricts a large number of industries to national investment, 
thus limiting the industries in which foreign investment can take part.  From 1976 – 2004 
it has a more restrictive attitude toward foreign investment when compared with other 
countries in its region, and yet it managed to pull in an average of almost $9 billion (1.55 
percent of GDP) in foreign investment yearly during that time. 
China’s record toward foreign investment has been even worse, comparatively.  
From 1976 to 1984 China did not allow foreign investors to fully own a company.  
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Foreign investors had to find local partners, and take a minority position.  In 1985 it 
opened its markets to 100% foreign ownership, but on a very restricted level.  Yet China 
has averaged $19 billion dollars a year (2.09 percent of GDP) in foreign investment 
between 1976 and 2004 despite its restrictive policies. 
Among these three countries, Mexico’s attitude toward foreign investment was 
probably the most restrictive.  Mexico allowed foreign investment only in partnership 
with local capital in its national markets in the period from 1976 to 1988.  Companies 
that could be 100% owned by foreign interests were restricted to special border zones.  
In 1989, Mexico opened its markets to 100% ownership while reserving significant 
chunks of its industrial sectors for national capital.  Yet Mexico has managed to pull in 
$7.7 billion (1.77 percent of GDP) yearly in foreign investment equity despite these 
restrictions. 
At first glance, one could classify these countries and their different situations on 
size and region.  After all, Niger, Gabon and Swaziland are located in Africa and are 
small.  Mexico is located next to the United States, China is in the booming Asian 
economic zone, and Brazil is the largest country in the economically vibrant Latin 
American region.  These facts probably play a part in explaining their contrasting 
situations, but the main point still stands out.  In the game of globalization, Niger, 
Gabon, and Swaziland appear to be doing what is expected of them.  They have 
maintained few restrictions on foreign direct investment equity in their markets, but they 
are not rewarded by the international economic community for their efforts.  On the 
other hand, China, Brazil and Mexico flaunt restrictions on foreign equity, and yet 
investment keeps pouring in. 
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What is the explanation for these apparent contradictions?  Why do developing 
countries want foreign investment?  Why should some developing countries maintain 
open policies toward FDI if they do not get rewarded?  Why shouldn’t developing 
countries simply restrict FDI as they see fit – after all, if China, Mexico and Brazil can do 
it and receive billions of dollars in investment, while other countries go out of their way 
to make themselves attractive to potential investors and get very little, what is the point?  
Why do countries bother with policies on foreign direct investment?  What influences the 
attitudes on foreign investment that are reflected in policies?  Do these policies make 
any difference at all when it comes to FDI inflows? 
I will explore these questions by investigating this phenomenon of globalization – 
foreign direct investment (FDI).2  In particular, I examine the creation of foreign direct 
investment policies in developing countries and how those policies affect actual foreign 
direct investment inflows.  I develop a multi-level model of FDI policies and inflows in 
which a combination of international and domestic politics intertwine to not only 
influence FDI policies in developing countries, but also influence the eventual 
agreements between developing states and foreign investors.  I test this model using 
two time-series cross-sectional quantitative analysis of 55 developing countries over a 
period of twenty-nine years, from 1976 to 2004.  In the first analysis, I develop a model 
of FDI policy based on domestic and international political factors, demand for FDI, and 
anticipated FDI inflows.  In addition, I evaluate the relationship between policy and FDI 
inflows through a second analysis based on policy outcomes and international and 
domestic economic factors.  Finally, I follow up these two quantitative analyses with a 
                                                 
2 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) defines foreign direct investment as “a category of 
international investment made by a resident entity in one economy (direct investor) with the objective of establishing a lasting 
interest in an enterprise resident in an economy other than that of the investor (direct investment enterprise).” 
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separate qualitative study of policymaking and FDI outcomes in two Caribbean Basin 
states: El Salvador and Nicaragua 
Globalization is a concept that sparks fierce debates among politicians, 
academics and even the general public.  Business leaders and policymakers, the 
practitioners of globalization, argue that open markets and free trade will create new 
economic opportunities for all.  In truth, developed countries in the global North have 
benefited for decades from globalization in all its forms and account for the lion’s share 
of the world’s economic trade and investment.  Their message to the developing 
countries in the global South has taken the following form:  Open your economies to 
market forces, and you will achieve greater development than is possible on your own.  
Developing countries, after trying and then rejecting liberalization in the 1960s, 
embarked on campaigns of economic self-sufficiency.  They were initially slow to 
embrace the new message of globalization.  However, eager to advance their 
economies and afraid of being left out of the promised economic boom, developing 
countries have lined up to liberalize their trade and open their markets in the 1990s and 
the early 21st century. 
 Attracting investment from foreign companies has been an important economic 
strategy amongst developing countries. They have seen the continued growth of the 
developed economies and have come to believe that such interconnecting economic 
links can bring greater development.  They have watched international firms from the 
United States invest in Europe and Japan throughout the last half of the 20th century, 
and European and Japanese firms invest in the United States in turn.  In particular, 
developing countries look to such foreign direct investment (FDI) from developed 
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nations because it promises jobs, technology, management skills, infrastructure and a 
host of other improvements.  Many developing countries also believe that FDI will 
increase their foreign exchange holdings, tax receipts and boost their international 
economic standing by improving their balance of trade and payments. 
 To set the stage for FDI in their markets, developing countries create policies 
establishing their level of openness to foreign firms and their activities.  These policies 
are delineated by three types.  The first category of policies governs foreign firms’ entry 
into the market.  These policies generally outline what restrictions, if any, foreign firms 
face when they set up business in the country.  The second category of policies is 
incentives – the types of fiscal and financial inducements offered directly to the firm if it 
decides to set up business.  The third category is regulation, or what laws foreign firms 
will have to obey in order to continue doing legal business in the country.  Altogether, 
these three types of policies serve an important function for developing economies.  
They allow developing countries to control the flow of FDI into their markets, they allow 
for developing countries to compete against other developing countries for FDI, and 
they allow the state to maintain control over and set boundaries for foreign firm activity 
once the firms are establishing themselves in the market.  These sets of policies also 
serve as signals to foreign firms.  They indicate how open a country is to new FDI, what 
kinds of agreements they may be willing to make to beat out the competition, and what 
kind of freedoms firms will or will not have if they set up business there. 
 At first glance, these policies seem very important in the process that makes FDI 
an integral facet of globalization.  As one of the manifestations and engines of 
globalization, FDI is an accepted, and popular, means for economic development.  FDI 
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has seen tremendous growth in the last half century.  Since the 1970s, developing 
countries have increasingly courted multinational corporations (MNCs) in efforts to 
attract more FDI within their borders.  On a larger level, FDI is a tangible symbol of 
interpenetration that attracts both praise and criticism from politicians and academics 
alike.  However, the story of FDI policy and its contribution to the FDI process has not 
been adequately told, in large part because there have been no adequate and reliable 
indicators of FDI policy that can be used in systematic large-scale research.  Theories 
about FDI policy have thus been inadequately tested except in case studies which give 
us a limited picture on how they relate to the overall FDI process.3  Research has been 
able to bridge this gap by focusing on other indicators of FDI – most often FDI flows and 
stocks.4  However, these indicators only indirectly, if at all, illuminate the role of policies, 
which in turn illuminate the key role of the state in the FDI process. 
 Why are developing states’ policies relating to FDI so important?  First, in an era 
of global integration, where some see an erosion of economic boundaries and the 
decline of the nation-state relative to non-governmental entities in the international 
marketplace, I argue that nation-states still have means to control their economic 
destinies.  Perhaps a future world will make the nation-state obsolete, but for the 
present, nation-states still make choices that restrict or enhance the flow of investment 
into their markets.  Second, these choices may be dictated in part by characteristics of 
the host polity, and in part by the international system.  These choices are inherently 
political, actively chosen by nation-states in the process that leads to the creation of 
their policies.  Third, I argue that these policies may have ramifications on the 
                                                 
3 For example, see Fletcher (2002), Besley (1995) and Laney (1991). 
4 For some recent examples utilizing flows, see Egger and Winner (2006), Jensen (2003), Li and Resnick (2003), Bandelj (2002).  
For a recent example utilizing FDI stocks, see Kentor and Boswell (2003). 
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investment that flows into the host state, and on the gains that accrue to the host state.  
Fourth, the inadequate amount of rigorous study on developing states’ FDI policies has 
meant that some important research questions have not been answered satisfactorily.  
Why do developing states set their policies as they do?  Why have some developing 
countries chosen to promote FDI with few restrictions, while others regulate and restrict 
it to a greater extent?  Through research, we have gained a good understanding of the 
effects of FDI on states’ political and economic processes, and we have made strides in 
understanding some effects of FDI inflows, but there is very little systematic and 
quantitative research that explores why developing countries are more or less open 
toward FDI and whether this level of openness has any effect on their FDI inflows.  This 
dissertation fills the gap in research by developing a model of foreign direct investment 
that includes FDI policymaking, and tests it through quantitative and case study 
analysis.  The tests will answer questions about the determinants of FDI policies and 
the effectiveness of FDI policies on FDI inflows. 
 This study focuses on the political and economic factors that lie at the heart of 
FDI policy and its role in the FDI process by presenting and testing three main 
hypotheses.  First, I argue that FDI follows the same framework of two-level games 
established by Putnam (1988).  In this since, FDI ultimately involves an agreement 
between two entities: developing states and international firms.  States develop their 
policies on FDI in order to control the flow of FDI into their markets, and these policies 
are influenced by domestic politics and the realities of the domestic market.  However, 
international factors introduced by the globalization of trade and investment also 
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influence policymaking, and these factors are usually more friendly to international 
firms. 
Secondly, the creation of FDI policy is only part of the full story of FDI.  These 
policies become the basis for future agreements between states and firms, with 
domestic factors influencing how states can bargain with firms and whether firms will 
invest in developing markets, and international political and economic factors providing 
further influences on decisions by firms to invest.  Once FDI policies have been 
completed and the stage is set for FDI, I argue that those policies in turn influence 
actual FDI inflows into each developing country’s domestic market because they set a 
level of openness to FDI.  Combined with characteristics of the investment market in 
each country, and the economic characteristics that are unique to each state, FDI 
policies should exert a profound influence over the actual flows of FDI. 
 In general, I argue that FDI policies follow a pattern generally as depicted in 
Table 1-1: with policies and outcomes relating from low openness to FDI and low 
inflows to high openness to FDI and high inflows.  While my model predicts that most 
developing countries’ FDI policies and inflows follow a direct and positive relationship, 
indicating that policy is important in the FDI bargaining process, there are some 
countries that will fall outside these expectations. 
Those countries that fall in cells II and III of the table will be interesting to 
examine, because they will help determine whether policy really matters or whether 
there are other factors that are more important to FDI inflows.  Unfortunately, prior to 
this research no reliable and direct measure of FDI policy appears to exist, which is an 
extreme obstacle to these arguments.  To test these hypotheses, this dissertation  
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Table 1-1:  Predicted Relationships Between FDI Policies and Flows 
Policies: FDI Openness  
Low High 
Low I II 
Outcomes: FDI Flows 
High III IV 
therefore develops an important new measure of FDI policy.  This new index will be a 
valuable addition and resource to future researchers of FDI and FDI policy. 
 Why does this dissertation only concentrate on developing state policies, and not 
generalize to all states?  First, FDI involving firms investing in developed states may be 
very different than FDI involving firms in developing states.  Enough key factors differ 
between the developed nations and the developing nations, as well as the fact that FDI 
to developed states is still greater than FDI to developing nations, that addition of 
developed nations to the sample may cause a loss of significance in those factors that 
truly affect developing states’ FDI processes. 
 Second, until recently a lack of available data from developing nations has 
hampered the study of FDI in the developing world.  While some research has been 
done with developing nations, more studies have been performed on FDI in the 
developed world.5  However, greater amounts of data coming from developing nations 
and compiled by world institutional bodies have made greater  
study involving developing nations possible. 
 Third and foremost, developing countries contain the bulk of the world’s 
population, and the bulk of the world’s poverty.  The developing world, for the most part,  
                                                 
5 This has been true from Hymer’s (1976) first research on foreign direct investment in the 1960s to today.  For more examples, see 
Vernon (1966), Kindleberger (1974), Barrell and Pain (1997). 
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has, for better or for worse, chosen to utilize FDI as a cornerstone of their development 
strategies.  Since the struggles of developing states to achieve greater living standards 
for their citizens has been a key concern of the developing and developed world alike, 
any research that helps shed light on their development processes is extremely 
important and may serve not only as an academic exercise, but also as a policymaking 
aid. 
Recent Trends in Foreign Direct Investment 
The amount of FDI capital inflows and outflows around the world rose sharply 
starting in the early 1980s, peaked in the year 2000, and since has suffered a 
precipitous decline.  Table 1-2, reproduced from UNCTAD, illustrates these trends. 
Figure 1-1 graphs the trends for FDI inflows and outflows of capital.  The reason 
for the recent decline was blamed by the World Investment Report on slow economic 
growth around the world and a decline in cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
(UNCTAD 2003).  Despite the declines, the amount of foreign direct investment in 2002 
throughout the world, both inflows and outflows, remained over 200 times greater than 
in 1970, and around 4.5 times greater than in 1992. 
Where does this foreign investment go?  By and large one characteristic of 
foreign investment is that the bulk flows to and from the developed world.  From 1970 to 
2002, the developed world has received an average of 72 percent of the inflows of FDI 
capital.  Developing countries, on the other hand, that have made foreign direct 
investment a key part of their development strategies, have averaged far less.  Figure 
1-2 gives a graphical representation of developing countries’ inflows, and their share of  
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Table 1-2: Selected World Indictors of FDI, 1982-2002 
Item Value at 2000 prices (billions of US dollars Annual growth rate (Percent) 
 1982 1990 2002 1988-90 1990-95 1995-00 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Inflows 33 159 677 18.5 15.4 36.7 60.6 33.1 -39.1 -20.2 
Outflows 16 184 673 23.1 12.7 31.4 63.9 21.9 -39.0 -8.1 
Source:  World Investment Report 2003 (http://www.unctad.org) 
world inflows (UNCTAD 2003).  In 1982, developing countries hit their highest percent 
of world FDI inflows, at nearly 46 percent.  Developing countries captured over 40 
percent of world inflows two other times, in 1994 and 1997.  In 2002, they captured only 
about 25 percent, over a percentage point less than their share at the beginning of the 
1970s.6   
Nor is FDI distributed evenly among the developing nations.  A number of 
researchers single out Brazil, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico and Singapore as those 
developing countries that capture a large percentage of FDI from the developed world 
(Moran 1986, Cable and Mukherjee 1986, Cable and Persaud 1987, Page 1987).  
Recently, China has grabbed more and more of the FDI available from the developed 
world.  In 2003, among the top 20 recipients of FDI, China ranked second to 
Luxembourg with receipt of $53 billion, Singapore grabbed about $16 billion for 14th 
place, Mexico ranked 15th with receipts of about $15 billion, and Brazil ranked 16th with 
receipts of about $13 billion.7  China and India also stand out as desirable locations for 
new investment.  In 2004, one survey showed that for the first time, global company 
                                                 
6 Data gathered from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).  Their website, http://www.unctad.org, 
contains statistics on FDI available for viewing and downloading. 
7 World Development Report, 2004. 
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Figure 1-1:  World Foreign Direct Investment (1970-2003)
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 executives ranked China higher than the United States as a destination for investment, 
with India as the third most attractive location.  The report states that “…China and India 
dominate the top two positions for most positive investor outlook, likely first-time 
investments, and most preferred offshore investment locations for business processing 
functions and IT services.”8
Brief Outline of the Dissertation 
 Having introduced a rationale for a new study of FDI, the remainder of this 
chapter will discuss the structure of the rest of this dissertation.  Chapter Two will draw 
specific elements of economic and political science literature together to create a model 
of FDI.  I first revisit these questions:  What accounts for the variation of FDI policies in 
developing countries?  Do policies have an effect on FDI flows?  I argue that individual 
developing countries policies are indicative of a blend of wariness and openness toward 
FDI, partly due to economic outlooks at various points in time that reflected pessimistic 
or optimistic views of industrialization.  Modernization theory and dependency theory 
are discussed as emblematic of these two viewpoints.  I then introduce the main actors 
in the FDI story, multinational firms and developing states, and discuss their motivations 
for participating in the FDI process by reviewing a number of theories on FDI from both 
the firm and state perspective.  Following that discussion, I introduce the logic of two-
level games.  I argue that it best explains the FDI process because it incorporates both 
the international and domestic level influences on policymaking and agreements 
between firms and states. 
                                                 
8 AT Kearney.  2004.  http://www.atkearney.com/main.taf?p=1,5,1,151. 
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At the end of Chapter Two I develop a model of FDI.  FDI policy is theorized to 
be influenced by both domestic and international political and economic factors in a 
larger multi-level process.  FDI policy establishes each country’s openness or 
restrictiveness to FDI.  These policies are subject to domestic level political factors such 
as regime type, nationalism, ideology, and domestic economic realities, such as the 
availability of alternatives to FDI.  However, international political and economic factors, 
such as pressure from international institutions and proximity to developed countries, 
also have an effect on domestic FDI policies. 
Once the level of openness to FDI is determined through policy, it becomes a 
factor in determining FDI inflows.  Policies establish a baseline for agreement between 
developing states and firms.  Developing states with open policies have a larger range 
of agreement possibilities, whereas those with restrictive policies have a smaller range 
of agreement.  These policies combine with other domestic and international economic 
and political factors, such as international and domestic political stability, characteristics 
of the investment market, wage structure, presence of corruption, and property rights, to 
create an environment in which international firms decide whether or not to invest.  The 
type of investment opportunity (sectoral) will be particular to each state.  I further argue 
that FDI policies and FDI inflows have mutual dependence on each other, with each 
exerting influence over the other. 
 Chapter Three subjects the theory presented in Chapter Two to empirical 
statistical tests.  Drawing on publicly available data published by international 
institutions, I created a paneled time series dataset encompassing 55 countries and 29 
years (1975-2004). In addition, I drew on the Exporter’s Encyclopedia, published by Dun 
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and Bradstreet, to create an important new indicator of FDI policy: a 4-point index which 
measures the relative openness and restrictiveness of each developing country toward 
FDI.  This indicator is the first of its kind, and should create opportunities for additional 
research on FDI policy per se.  I test the influences on FDI policy by using a general 
linear, latent, and mixed model process and discuss the results.  I find positive 
associations between developing countries’ openness to FDI and democracy, 
membership in international institutions, proximity to developed countries, external debt, 
and past experience with FDI.  I find negative associations between FDI policies and 
nationalism and savings rates.   Chapter Four extends the model to FDI inflows.  I 
specifically propose that FDI inflows are positively associated with open FDI policies, 
and I find that is the case.  FDI inflows are also positively associated with degree of 
democracy.   
 Chapter Five presents case studies of two developing countries:  El Salvador and 
Nicaragua.  El Salvador and Nicaragua offer interesting similarities and differences for 
comparison.  Each country has had a similar history in Spanish colonialization and 
independence, and each has had a history of political and economic dominance from a 
handful of elites.  In El Salvador, a small coterie of influential land-owning families has 
virtually controlled the political and economic landscape of that country.  In Nicaragua, 
most of the 20th century political and economic history of the country was dominated by 
the Somoza family.  However, many differences remain.  El Salvador maintained a 
nominal democratic government, dominated by right-wing groups, while Nicaragua was 
ruled by the Somoza family dictatorship.  Both countries faced violence and repression, 
and both suffered from civil conflict.  In El Salvador, the conflict ended in stalemate, 
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leaving the country ruled by centrist and then rightist forces.   In Nicaragua, however, 
the conflict turned into a victory for leftist forces, followed by a continued and protracted 
civil war. 
In addition, both countries have had differing relations with the United States.  In 
Nicaragua, the Somoza regime largely retained the support of the United States, with 
some exceptions when the dictatorship went too far with human rights abuses and 
corrupt practices.  The later success of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua led to increased 
U.S. involvement in military efforts to overturn the government, which helped culminate 
in the 1990 election that turned out the Sandinistas and ushered in the Chamorro 
government.  In El Salvador, U.S. military support for the government helped keep the 
country from turning left politically, though at the cost of civil unrest.  Economically, both 
countries have also had differing histories in the 20th century.  While El Salvador’s 
governments embraced free-market capitalism and experienced some growth in the 
industrial sectors in the 1970s, largely due to foreign investment, the 1980s brought an 
economic downturn due to the ongoing civil conflict.  In contrast, Nicaragua’s small 
industrial sector was geared toward domestic consumption and never really competed 
with coffee and other agro-industrial exports.  The Chamorro government brought in 
economic reforms in the 1990s hoping to attract further aid and investment, but these 
never really materialized. 
 To test the theory of FDI offered in this dissertation, I will examine their histories 
of domestic and international politics and their economic openness.  I will also pay close 
attention to FDI and FDI policies.  I include interviews with El Salvadoran government 
and academic elites who know the policy process relating to FDI and its ultimate effects 
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on the FDI bottom line.  These interviews will help complete the overall picture that I 
establish with my theory and model. 
 I will follow the case study chapters with a short review in Chapter Six of the 
research presented in this dissertation, and some conclusions.  I will also provide some 
possible directions for future research based upon my findings.  I hope that the addition 
of a new measure for FDI policy, a quantitative test using that measure, and 
comprehensive case studies will significantly add to the previous valuable research on 
foreign direct investment. 
The Path to a New Model of Foreign Direct Investment 
In the following chapter I will begin by focusing on attitudes toward foreign 
investment established by modernization and dependency theories and then 
concentrate on the relationship between states and firms.  While the multinational 
corporation pursues strategies toward greater profit, the state or groups within the state 
pursue strategies toward greater development.  These development strategies are 
represented by state policies including those dealing with foreign direct investment.  I 
argue that developing states create policies that constitute a basis for eventual 
agreement with international firms.  These policies can be classified as incentives or 
restrictions.  The more open (restrictive) the policies, the easier (harder) the bargain the 
state will drive.  In turn these FDI policies influence the level of FDI inflows that enter 
developing countries, since along with other factors they provide some level of 
inducement for international firms to invest.  The entire dance of FDI takes place within 
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a complex web of interactions between domestic political and economic activities and 
the international political and economic environment, which I will discuss further. 
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Chapter Two 
Toward a Theory of Foreign Direct Investment Policy 
Arriving at a theory of foreign direct investment (FDI) policy is a bit like staging a 
play.  There are actors, both primary and secondary, encounters among those actors, 
and outcomes from those encounters.  However, there are also motivations, desires 
and strategies that drive the actions of each of the actors.  These characteristics are 
specified in an overall narrative, which creates the conditions for what happens on the 
stage.  In this chapter, I will lay out the narrative, identify the actors, especially the main 
actor or actors, highlight their characteristics and describe their encounters and the 
outcomes of those encounters.  The following pages will illuminate the drama that is 
being played out in the foreign direct investment story.  The goal is to identify why 
developing countries pass policies on FDI, and why those policies vary from more 
restrictive to more open.  A second goal is to determine if developing countries’ FDI 
policies have an effect on the amount of FDI that flows into their markets. 
The first part of the chapter will set the stage for why developing countries restrict 
or demonstrate openness to FDI.  I will examine two main theoretical frameworks which 
I argue have influenced developing countries’ attitudes toward FDI over the past half 
century.  I will then introduce our main actors of interests, developing states, and their 
motivations.  I will also introduce and briefly touch on another primary actor, 
multinational corporations, without which the FDI story would not occur.  I will explain 
the web of domestic and international factors that influence agreements, and tie 
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everything back to the main goal of explaining FDI policies and their effects on FDI 
flows.  I will conclude the chapter by defining a model of FDI that includes FDI policy. 
I assume, throughout this dissertation, that all developing states have a desire to 
better their economic development at various points in time.  Regardless of whether 
they put their development plans on hold for a period of time, they will have pursued or 
will pursue development at other points in their history.  I believe this is a reasonable 
assumption because the history of states is dynamic, not static.  Governments, 
economic situations, world politics and other aspects of states change, and so do their 
goals. 
I also assume, for the sake of simplicity, that investment agreements are 
between one firm and one state.   Of course, developing states most likely engage 
multiple firms and also compete against other states.  However, I argue that each 
agreement process between a developing state and multinational corporation follows 
similar dynamics, and therefore simplification to a one-state, one-firm scenario helps 
explain all such situations. 
Setting the Scene 
As explained in Chapter One, FDI has been a growing and important part of the 
globalization of the international economy.  In the latter half of the twentieth century, FDI 
has been a vital component in the development strategies of underdeveloped countries.  
FDI has been at the center of a convergence of desires between the developed and the 
developing world.  By and large, the developing world has desperately wanted to 
industrialize to enjoy the benefits experienced by the already industrialized developed 
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world.  However, industrialization not only provides benefits, but also costs.  For this 
reason, I will argue that developing countries are of two minds about FDI.  On one hand, 
they want investment, capital, job opportunities, managerial and technological 
advances, and additional revenues.  On the other hand, allowing foreign investment 
potentially brings about a whole host of problems for host governments, including partial 
loss of economic decision-making control, local opposition by interest groups, and 
greater international scrutiny of their policies toward business and the economy in 
general.  Thus, each developing country weighs the benefits against the costs of FDI, 
and decides how wide to open its doors to foreign capital.  Some countries will be more 
wary about this path to development and restrict foreign investment to a greater degree 
based on a multitude of factors such as their internal political situation, their position in 
the international community, the availability of alternative ways to development, and 
their own past history with FDI.  Other developing countries, based on the same factors, 
will take a more positive view of foreign direct investment, and open the door wider. 
  For those in the developed world, the benefits of industrializing the 
underdeveloped countries have largely outweighed the costs.  At the very least, 
developing countries hold the potential of new markets, cheap labor and manufacturing, 
and can possibly serve as a new source of profits for multinational firms.  For the more 
utopian-minded, the prospect of a fully modernized and industrialized world creates the 
prospect for a high standard of living for all, harmony and peace among nations, and an 
opportunity for humanity to engage in higher pursuits.  The idea that humanity can rise 
above its petty conflicts, harmonize its interests in the pursuit of rational ideas, and live 
in prosperity was first proposed during the Enlightenment in Europe.  Over the 
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centuries, various incarnations of this philosophy have flourished and waned.  The hope 
of a more rationalized, modernized world influences the narrative I am constructing in 
the 1950s, just after the bloodiest war in history and in the middle of the Cold War 
between the United States and the Soviet Union.  Modernization theory emerged from 
academia in the United States partly as a way to entice developing and newly liberated 
states away from the umbrella of the Soviets (Latham 2003). The message was simple.  
The industrialized countries in Europe and the United States were all once developing 
states themselves.  Through a progression from agriculturally-based societies to 
industrialized societies, each of the industrialized nations advanced until they reached 
modernity.  The developing countries are on the same path, modernization theory 
argued, maybe starting at a later point in time or moving at a slower pace but all 
advancing inexorably forward.  In order to help the process, the acceptance of Western 
values such as capitalism and democracy was seen as key to leaping ahead of the 
countries (the Soviet Union and its allies) that had turned their back on Western 
modernity to pursue a socialist form of industrialization. 
One widely accepted version of this theory was proposed by Walt Rostow (1960).  
Rostow argued that modernization proceeded in a linear set of stages.  Basing his 
arguments on observations of European cases, Rostow contended that all countries first 
begin in what he labeled the traditional stage.  At this stage, the state is rudimentary or 
non-existent, and the market consists of low-technology production and subsistence 
agriculture.  As the nation-state begins to centralize, the preconditions for take-off begin 
to appear.  The growing nation-state fosters private entrepreneurship, which in turn 
leads to advances in technology and the beginnings of industrial production.  These 
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advances create changes in the economic, political and social environment.  The state 
pushes greater development by passing laws favoring production over agriculture.  The 
overcoming of obstacles and groups opposed to economic development puts the 
nation-state in the takeoff stage. 
Rostow maintains that nation-states that continue a long process of economic 
development by extending modern industrial production techniques throughout society 
advance through a stage called the drive to maturity.  After about 40 years, the stage of 
high mass consumption occurs, in which a state’s economy has become sufficiently 
diversified and more service-oriented.  Industrial production concentrates on durable 
goods rather than non-durables. 
Another articulation of modernization theory was provided by Lipset (1959), who 
proposed that various socioeconomic factors, such as education, industrialization, 
urbanization and wealth, along with the effectiveness and legitimacy of the political 
systems, were the keys to political and economic modernization, particularly sustaining 
democracy. 
This linear and somewhat deterministic theory seemed to not only explain how 
the European nations developed, but how other nations, particularly the developing 
countries in the global South, could develop as well.  State actions that promoted 
private entrepreneurship and free markets assumed primary importance.  However, 
many developing nations that followed U.S. prescriptions for development, regardless of 
what types of policies they put together, did not seem to develop as predicted through 
the 1950s and 1960s.  From the modernization viewpoint, this lack of development was 
explained by inadequate investment in the local economy and bad government policies.  
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Modernization theorists, particularly Rostow, proposed advancing foreign aid from the 
industrialized world, most notably the United States, to help finance development in 
underdeveloped regions.  They argued that such aid would create appreciation for 
capitalism, and create aspirations for democracy in recipient countries (Haefele 2003).  
Most notably, it was argued that such aid would keep such states from falling into the 
Soviet orbit, which was advancing its own form of modernization with its command 
economy model.  More recently, Boix and Stokes (2003) find, statistically, that economic 
development leads to democracy, especially when per capita income exceeds $12,000 
per year. 
Modernization theory has been under scrutiny since it was articulated.  Some 
critiques have to do with the factors that push modernization.  For example, does 
modernization in developing countries arise from endogenous factors or exogenous 
factors?  Migdal (1974) looks at what he calls “culture contact” or exposure to a wider 
cultural environment (perhaps akin to globalization), and finds it insufficient to explain 
modernization.  He argues that the breakdown of old traditions and institutions within 
societies, if they occur, is another explanation for modernization.  Similarly, Pye (1979), 
in a critique of the development of modernization theory, points to local cultural factors 
and its effects on the pace of economic and political development within different 
societies. 
Other criticisms arise from modernization theorists’ predictions of democracy 
given greater economic development.  Some theorists, such as Barrington Moore 
(1966), though sympathetic to the idea that development of a middle class could allow a 
country to politically modernize, disputed that the Western model would lead to one 
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outcome.  He argued that differences in class development could easily lead to 
modernization under non-democratic conditions.  More recently, Przeworski and 
Limongi (1997) challenged the prediction that countries that economically develop 
become democratic, citing data that show that some dictatorships are wealthy and 
reach stability under greater development.  In their view, democracies thrive due to 
political actors, and because they are modern.  Similarly, a study of the military-led 
modernization efforts in Latin America found that increased military spending thwarts 
modernization (DeRouen, Jr. and Heo 2001).  Since many Latin American countries 
have histories of military rule during modernization attempts, modernization may not 
have been the impetus behind their recent political development into democracies.  In 
that vein, modernization may not have contributed to democracy in Thailand (Englehart 
2003). 
Other theorists took aim at the argument that modernization was inevitable.  
Notably the dependency school, beginning with Andre Gunder Frank and continuing 
with Immanuel Wallerstein, argued that the results of industrialization on the Western 
model were conditioned by the structure of the world economy, which was based on 
colonization and exploitation (Gilman 2003).  Developed nations and their former 
colonies were locked in a relationship of dependency, where developing countries 
gained somewhat, but the core developed countries gained more because the world 
economic system limited the economic capacities of the developing world. 
Different approaches to dependency theory developed, all concentrating on the 
systemic nature of the international economic environment (Fry 1983).  One, Marxist in 
character, focuses on the effects of socio-economic class and investment on national 
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welfare.  It argues that the capitalist class in industrial countries uses FDI to dominate 
the lesser-developed countries.  Investments are made in commodities and raw 
materials, which are exported out of the host country and manufactured into industrial 
products that are imported back to the developing countries.  Thus, developing 
countries are victims of a type of economic colonialism, continually dependent on the 
industrialized countries for consumer goods, made from developing states’ own 
resources, at high prices. 
A non-Marxist strain of the theory softens the language of economic colonialism, 
but argues that the net effect of the dependent relationship over time is a continued loss 
of economic ground to developed countries.  In other words, this softer dependency 
theory does not necessarily accept the thesis of economic colonialism, but argues that 
the inherent bias of the international economic system leads to similar effects. 
In both strains of dependency theory, the world is seen in dichotomous terms.  
The international arena is divided into areas called the “core” and the “periphery.”  The 
core is made up of industrial states concentrated mostly in the global north.  These 
states have set up a system based on economic openness, especially with each other.  
Trade and investment pass relatively easily between them.  Because they are 
industrialized, they have a wide variety of materials that can be used to trade with other 
nations for comparative advantage.  The periphery is made up of all other nations.  
These nations range from some industrialization to little industrialization.  They have 
relatively few resources or products to trade for comparative advantage.   
Some periphery countries, like Mexico, Brazil and the newly industrializing 
countries of Asia, managed to make some advances in industrialization that was not 
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accounted for in dependency theory.  To explain these countries, Peter Evans (1979) 
advanced a version of dependency theory that he labeled dependent development.  In 
his formulation of dependency theory, some countries were able to advance from the 
periphery to a semi-peripheral state based on a tripartite alliance of international capital, 
local capital and the developing state.  These countries are able to industrialize to a 
point, and even gain control over some non-critical sectors of the economy.  However, 
conditions always dictated that local capital would be at a disadvantage.  The 
developing state plays local capital against foreign capital, and left out of the process is 
the mass population of the developing country which is not allowed to participate or 
make decisions about economic growth. 
Resources that developing countries offer are raw materials and abundant labor.  
Because they are under-industrialized, however, they lack the ability to exploit these 
resources efficiently and must choose to try to industrialize by themselves, or to invite 
help from outside.  The first choice is often economically more expensive than they can 
handle, but may be popular socially and politically.  The second choice may be less 
expensive economically and gain developing countries’ world credibility, but 
governments opening up to the global system and inviting agents of industrialization 
from outside to enter their economies may pay a political and social price.  Once there 
is a leak in the economic dike, the flow of outside capital, including foreign direct 
investment, becomes difficult to stop. 
Developing nations are affected by their reliance on the world economic system 
to develop through FDI, argues dependency theory.  While this is not the main focus of 
this dissertation, it is interesting to review because it foreshadows later arguments on 
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the agreement process between states and firms.  In general, industrialized countries 
and their agents, the multinational corporations (MNCs), continue to draw upon 
resources primarily from the developing host countries, leaving developing countries in 
a permanent state of under-development. 
The costs of industrialization are painstakingly tallied by dependency theory.  
First, it is argued that MNCs do not bring much new capital into host countries; instead 
they borrow locally and spirit capital back to the industrialized countries through transfer 
pricing and profit repatriation (Fry 1983, Moran 1986, Billet 1993).  Second, FDI allows 
MNCs to maintain a monopolistic advantage in developing countries’ markets, stifling 
local competition, creating technology dependence, stripping resources from the country 
and leading to MNC domination of key sectors (Evans 1979).   Third, MNCs bring 
inappropriate, capital intensive technology into host developing countries which do not 
make the best use of their abundant labor resources.  Inequality problems are 
exacerbated by the formation of a labor elite and the development of enclave 
economies (Evans 1979, Moran 1986, Grieco 1986).  Fourth, FDI brings inappropriate 
products into host country markets, which can be of little social value and in turn, 
exacerbate social inequalities by fostering a consumer culture (Vernon 1977, Fry 1983).  
Fifth, the penetration of developing countries by MNCs leads to dependent and 
asymmetric relationships with the industrialized countries, increasing the power of 
MNCs (Fry 1983) and possibly leading to MNC interference in host state politics and 
policy (Apter 1976). 
In many ways, classical dependency theory is as deterministic as modernization 
theory.  It points to world capitalism as the main cause of underdevelopment in 
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developing countries (Bratton 1982).  For our purposes, the importance of dependency 
theory lies not in its arguments about the potential effects of capitalism and FDI on 
political and economic development prospects.  Instead, the theory is important 
because of its view on state roles and state policy.  Dependency theory argues strongly 
that states should be active participants in the economy, and it had a significant impact 
on the way that many nations approached FDI and FDI policy, especially in the 1960s 
and 1970s.  Many developing nations, following the tenets of dependency theory, 
severely restricted the amount of FDI unless it nurtured home-grown industries with an 
emphasis on greater exports and replacing expensive imports.  Foreign firms were 
required to localize production, to varying degrees of success, in many countries 
including Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia (Doner 1992).  The 
primary goal for many developing nations was to become less dependent on foreign-
made products by encouraging local manufactures, and to gain greater economic 
wealth by exporting these manufactures abroad.  Many developing countries took a 
direct role in their economies by establishing and strengthening state-owned 
corporations and parastatals (Evans 1979).   
The 1970s saw a number of developing countries adopt policies based on the 
tenets of dependency theories.  Export-oriented industrialization policies, combined with 
greater regulations on foreign corporations, restriction on the participation of foreign 
corporations in developing markets, and import substitution polices to reduce reliance 
on foreign products were supposed to allow developing states to drive a harder bargain 
with foreign companies.  Such policies were not without their critics.  Mahler (1981) 
made an early argument against dependency theorists’ tendency to blame all 
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developing country ills on capitalism in his study of the world sugar agreement.  Rather 
than quit cultivating sugar because of perceptions that the market is controlled by firms 
and advanced countries, he suggested more coordinated strategies among developing 
countries.  Ahiakpor’s (1985, 546) case study of Ghana showed how policies influenced 
by dependency theories could go wrong.  He argued that such policies led to “poverty 
and misery.”  By the 1990s, after disappointing economic results and many economic 
crises, many developing countries began to reduce government participation in the 
economy, loosen regulations and restrictions, and privatize government-owned 
industries.  In 2002, one critic declared dependency theory dead (Velasco 2002).   
Ideas of modernization began, in one way or another, to gain credence again.  
Neoliberal economics argued that developing states had meddled too much in the 
economy, and must scale back and allow free market policies in order to modernize.  
Western neoconservatives, on the other hand, merely hoped for stability and order 
among developing countries, rather than modernity (Gilman 2003, 71).   They criticized 
previous neoliberal views that modernization could be imposed or encouraged, but 
backed invasion of an autocratic, developing Iraq in an attempt to introduce democracy 
to the Middle East, arguing that toppling the Iraqi government would bring the Middle 
East eventually closer to modern Western values. This cyclical movement of 
development prescription is noted by Paul Krugman (1995), who describes the 
movement from free-market and state privatization policy recommendations in the 
1930s to those of state intervention and activism in the markets in the 1960s and 1970s, 
and back to Washington Consensus recommendations of free-markets and privatization 
in the 1980s and 1990s.   
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I argue that the result, for developing countries, is a mixture of acceptance of the 
international economy and its promise, and a wariness of the methods of the 
international economy.  Many developing countries implemented import-substitution-
industrialization policies in the 1970s, hoping to reduce their reliance on imports from 
the developed world and to foster their own industrial capabilities.  Many countries 
allowed restricted foreign investment, and regulated it.  Massive state spending and 
establishment of state-owned-industries, fueled by recycled petro-dollars, led to equally 
massive debt-crises in the 1980s, and prescriptions of structural readjustment by 
international lending institutions as a remedy to put developing countries back on the 
right track.  FDI policies in many developing countries become less restrictive, though 
some countries, such as China, were able to restrict investment more than others. 
FDI policies serve as one indication to firms of the investment climate in 
developing markets, and their potential of profitability.  Therefore, policies directly affect 
the amount of FDI that flows into the developing market.  Developing countries’ 
attitudes, reflected in their policies, consist of unique combinations of acceptance and 
wariness based on past experiences and future promises. 
Foreign Direct Investment Defined 
To this point, we have discussed the environment which allows developing 
countries to set policies of foreign direct investment.  What is FDI and why do 
developing countries, on one hand, look to it as a path of development and on the other 
hand, treat it cautiously? 
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Foreign direct investment occurs when a firm in one country invests directly in 
facilities in another country for the purpose of producing a product, buys an enterprise in 
a another country, or sets up a direct subsidiary.  While this concept is relatively 
straightforward, it still creates difficulties for researchers that wish to measure FDI and 
use it for study.  A comprehensive FDI glossary compiled by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
defines direct investment as “a category of international investment made by a resident 
entity in one economy (direct investor) with the objective of establishing a lasting 
interest in an enterprise resident in an economy other than that of the investor (direct 
investment enterprise).”9  In addition, both the IMF and the OECD define a direct 
investment enterprise as one “in which a foreign investor owns 10 percent or more of 
the ordinary shares or voting power for an incorporated enterprise or an unincorporated 
enterprise in which a foreign investor has equivalent ownership.”10  Direct investment, 
according to these definitions, can include subsidiaries, branches, and associate 
companies in which non-resident investors own 10 percent or more of the enterprise.  
The World Bank follows a similar guideline when categorizing FDI. 
The main agents of foreign direct investment are firms investing abroad.  Labeled 
as transnational corporations (TNCs), multinational corporations (MNCs), or 
multinational enterprises (MNEs), such firms share common attributes.  MNCs tend to 
be large and diverse, both geographically and in the products they offer.  They are 
controlled from a central point in a home country with subsidiaries in various host 
nations (Vernon 1977).  Home countries for MNCs are predominantly in industrialized 
                                                 
9 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.  www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/1/2487495.pdf 
10 Ibid. 
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countries, though the number of MNCs based in developing countries has been rising.  
MNCs treat the entire world as their operational area, and all units of MNCs have the 
same objective as communicated from the center operations.  The most commonly 
assumed objective of MNCs are continued profits. 
FDI should be distinguished from other types of foreign capital that flow around 
the world.  Capital can flow into countries through foreign investment, foreign aid, or by 
borrowing from international financial institutions.  The utility of the different types of 
flows has undergone an evolutionary process.  FDI replaced foreign aid as the most 
dominant form of capital flow in the 1960s and 1970s.  The late 1970s and early 1980s 
saw the recycling of petrodollars, in which oil money from the Middle East flooded into 
financial institutions in developed countries and then became loans to the developing 
world.  A ballooning of external debt forced many developing nations to undergo fiscal 
belt-tightening, and FDI has come back into prominence in the 1990s as the capital-
generation mechanism of choice for developing countries (Billet 1993).  
FDI must also be distinguished from portfolio investment, which is conducted 
through economic transactions in the securities markets.    Hymer (1976), in a seminal 
study of FDI, called for a theory of FDI separate from portfolio investment because 
examination into the behavior of each revealed more differences than similarities, 
sometimes in contradiction to each other.  Unlike portfolio investment, FDI is conducted 
specifically by firms usually over a longer term.   Hymer felt that applying existing 
theories of portfolio investment to FDI did not make sense, and argued that the missing 
factor separating FDI from portfolio investment is the concept of control.  Firms investing 
in foreign countries want control of the investment in order to maximize profits, ensure 
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investment security, remove competition from other international or local competitors, 
and appropriate full returns on skills and capabilities in the host economy.  In contrast, 
portfolio investment tends to be of shorter duration and concentrates on quick profits.  
While portfolio investors in corporations with subsidiaries in foreign countries can often 
vote on company direction, voting does not necessarily allow control.  Direct investment 
is, in other words, controlling investment, where the parent corporation directly controls 
what the subsidiary does. 
This idea of control emerges from various definitions as “lasting interest” and the 
idea that 10 percent or more ownership constitutes an “effective voice” in the operations 
of the firm.  However, the 10 percent floor has been challenged by some researchers 
who question its accuracy despite widespread acceptance (Graham and Krugman 
1993).  What truly constitutes a controlling interest?  Lall and Streeten (1977) argue that 
control can be exercised with relatively low equity share, and can be exerted without 
direct management.  Regardless of the debates about control, this concept separates 
FDI from other forms of international investment.  However, Moosa (2002) points out 
that 10 percent interest does not constitute an actual controlling interest but a potential 
controlling interest, and that control is more evident when firms have a substantial 
amount of shares, and shift part of their assets, production and/or sales to the host 
country.   
FDI creates many measurement issues as well.  One of the greatest problems is 
the lack of available or complete data.  Some countries do not publish FDI data on a 
frequent basis.  Others employ differing standards to delineate FDI. One section of the 
World Investment Report 2003 is devoted to individual country reports regarding their 
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FDI, and parts of those reports consist of explaining each country’s unique standard of 
FDI.  Two commonly used forms of measurement for FDI are flows and stocks of 
capital.  FDI flows are amounts invested over a set period of time, and stocks are the 
cumulative amounts invested over time in a country.  Furthermore, flows and stocks of 
FDI are often divided into inward FDI and outward FDI, each measuring differing 
aspects of FDI.  Inward FDI is stocks or capital of FDI that enters a host country from 
abroad.  Negative inflows indicate capital leaving a host country because of government 
policy, profit or capital repatriation or export of goods.  Outward FDI, on the other hand, 
consists of resources that are sent overseas by firms in the home country – outflows 
can also be negative for the same reasons as inflows.  Researchers investigating FDI 
use either inflows or outflows of stock or capital depending on their research questions. 
The Developing State 
With this understanding of FDI, we must now define the main actors in this 
drama.  In the world of FDI, the state is one of many actors that influences where the 
current of FDI flows.  However, the focus of this dissertation is on the eventual action of 
developing states as revealed through their policies.  In the narrative of this story I am 
describing, the developing state has a blend of openness and wariness about FDI.  
Therefore, it is incumbent that we appreciate the state and learn why it is important, and 
what motivates its actions in the FDI story. 
There are a number of perspectives on the state and foreign direct investment, 
as well as the development of policy in general.  The state can be viewed as an arena in 
which various societal and economic groups cooperate and compete and where policy 
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is created that predominantly reflects the interest of the most dominant groups.  It is 
important to acknowledge that various groups and classes may have some effect on the 
creation of policies for foreign direct investment in developing countries.  At the same 
time, the creation of FDI policy regularly pits the interests of multinational corporations 
against the interests of a “state” which may or may not reflect the interests of economic 
or social groups within it.  When a developing country passes laws that restrict or 
enhance investment entry, or establishes regulations on MNC activity within its borders, 
it sends a signal to potential investors about its “friendliness” towards direct investment 
in general, sometimes in consensus with and sometimes against societal groups. 
The “state” has not always been considered to be an important player in the 
political arena.  Until the late 1970s, many political theories revolved around various 
economic and social groups within the state, arguing that such groups use the state as 
an arena in which to cooperate and compete in order to further their economic, social 
and political interests.  Studies in political economy have more or less acknowledged 
the existence of the state, with some that give the state a greater role and responsibility 
and assigning various roles to it.  For example, in classical political economy as 
articulated by Smith and Ricardo and their followers, the state plays a minimal role.  The 
working of the market is presented as a seamless system, where individuals that act as 
both buyers and sellers of products and labor pursue the means to meet their 
subsistence levels.  Public welfare is met if the market is free to operate according to its 
own rules; though hardship is inevitable for individuals for periods of time, the laws of 
supply and demand serve the public good overall.  The state is relegated to protecting 
life, property and providing public goods that the market cannot provide. 
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Neoclassical political economy similarly downplays the role of the state.  The 
neoclassical perspective argues that public welfare is maintained if all people are 
allowed to maximize their satisfaction.  In maximizing satisfaction, people pursue 
consumption, thereby entering into exchange with others who are equally trying to 
maximize their own utilities.  Neoclassical theories argue that a perfect market with 
plenty of competition features maximum group welfare if individuals are allowed to 
pursue their satisfaction without interference.  Unfortunately, markets are not perfect 
and there are problems of externalities – the effects that transactions between two 
parties have on others who are not part of the transaction.  Thus, neoclassical theories 
also see a role for the state in the absence of perfect markets, because the state can 
intervene to create more competition by breaking up monopolies and preventing 
collusion, and use fines, subsidies and regulation to limit externalities. 
The Marxian perspective perceives the state in a very different way.  Like Smith 
and Ricardo, Marx argued that the market system creates a social division of labor, 
which separates upon class lines.  The most simple and important class division is that 
between workers and producers, or in other terms, labor and capital.  Marx argued that 
labor and capital are diametrically opposed to each other because of conflict over 
surpluses created by the market.  These surpluses are coveted by capitalists as profit, 
and by workers wishing to move beyond subsistence and to gain other social welfare 
benefits.  Because capitalists always want more profit, they attempt to make production 
more efficient at the expense of labor.  However, whereas workers may achieve class 
consciousness and unite, Marx argues that capitalists are not very cohesive as a class 
because they are in competition with each other and weaker capital is constantly 
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subsumed by stronger capital.  Thus, the Marxian perspective sees the state arising for 
two different purposes.  The state exists to keep social order because of the conflict 
between labor and capital, and to represent the interests of the capitalist class.  This 
does not mean that the state acts at the behest of the capitalist class, but simply in 
capital’s interest. 
More academic interest has focused on how the state acts not only as an arena 
for political conflict, but also as an autonomous actor in the political process affecting 
political outcomes even as it is affected by them.  Part of this “upsurge” in interest in the 
state, as Skocpol (1985) described it, was the realization that the state often took 
actions that either went beyond or went against the wishes of the dominant societal or 
economic groups.  In addition, the fact that states cooperate and compete with each 
other in an international political and economic environment, and the assumptions 
already inherent in these relationships that states act in an internally cohesive manner 
by serving as an arena for compromise among their constituent units, helps to give the 
concept of “state as actor” more credibility. 
Researchers, beginning in the 1970s, began to take the state into account in their 
studies.  As Duvall and Freeman (1981) succinctly write: 
“In capitalist societies of the twentieth century, the state is deeply and 
directly involved in the processes of economic growth, not only through benign 
facilitation, but through active promotion and direction.  Partly through Keynesian 
demand management, and partly through intervention into the sphere of 
production, the capitalist state plays an important role in shaping the course of 
the economy.  It influences patterns of distribution and consumption, affects 
savings and investment rates, devises and executes development programs 
(albeit sometimes haphazardly and unwittingly), and contributes to the national 
creation and maintenance of industrial sectors by participating in the financing 
and even ownership of the means of production.  Indeed, capital accumulation is 
so directly and thoroughly affected by the state that it becomes increasingly 
difficult conceptually to distinguish the “public” from the “private” in analyzing the 
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dynamics of accumulation.  The capitalist spheres of production and exchange 
and the capitalist state are inextricably bound together.”11
 
Evans (1979) argued that the rapid industrialization that occurred in Brazil from 1950 
through the 1970s would not be possible without an activist state whose interests were 
sometimes allied with and sometimes opposed to multinational corporations and local 
elites.  Caporaso (1982), in addressing the industrialization of Brazil, Mexico, Taiwan, 
Singapore and South Korea, found that one common characteristic among them was an 
active state that aggressively entered the economy and promoted the industrialization 
process, often by mobilizing both domestic and foreign finance.  Campbell and Lindberg 
(1990) argue that both the state as actor and the state as a collection of institutions 
influence their economies by shaping, defining, and redefining property rights.  The 
research suggests that the state can be perceived as an actor that cannot be dismissed 
in political economy, and serious consideration of the state should be taken into account 
in any discussion of FDI, especially FDI policy. 
What does it mean for a state to be an actor?  According to Skocpol (1985), 
states are considered actors if they formulate and pursue their own goals.  This 
independent action may come about because of states’ linkages into the international 
economic and political environment, and because of their need to maintain order 
domestically.  States are made up of collectivities of actors implementing established 
policies in an organizationally coherent fashion over a long period of time.  The 
organizational resources states can bring to bear are very important.  In particular, state 
autonomy and capacity become crucial if the state is to be successful in reaching its 
economic goals.  Autonomy refers to the separation the state can maintain from 
                                                 
11 Italics are mine. 
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dominant groups, and capacity refers to the resources the state can bring to bear.  In 
many cases, capacity not only refers to financial resources, but human resources as 
well, such as the skill and loyalty of state officials.  Autonomy and capacity are not 
constant, but may vary across policy areas. 
States value autonomy and capacity because of the opportunity it gives them to 
maximize various goals.  What are these goals?  Four possible goals of the state in the 
international economic arena have been defined as aggregate national income, political 
power, social stability, and economic growth (Krasner 1976).  Krasner argued that these 
goals apply to all states in the international system, regardless of size and level of 
development.  Even though Krasner was exploring the question of states’ openness in 
the international trading sphere, these goals also apply to foreign direct investment, and 
are especially important in developing countries, where distortions of the market make 
state autonomy and capacity very important in order to achieve these goals.  
Reuschemeyer and Evans (1985) argue that one goal of states is to promote economic 
development by stimulating and disciplining entrepreneurship in markets that are less 
than competitive.  In some cases, the state inserts itself into the economy in the form of 
state-owned enterprises, ostensibly to replace the lack of private capital in certain 
problematic sectors.  In other cases, it may offer incentives for local and/or foreign 
capital.  Another goal of the state is to try new methods of achieving economic growth.  
Amsden (1985) offers a case study of Taiwan in which the state managed to move the 
economy from import-substitution to export-led growth, overcoming the influence of the 
military and its interest of continued defense spending.  Regardless, the state’s ability to 
affect the economy seems relatively clear. 
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As discussed above, state autonomy is important, but some see state autonomy 
as being clearly dependent on a number of important factors.  A long-standing 
traditional political science framework for influences on the state has been pluralism, or 
the degree of strength and competition between interest groups within society.  
Traditional pluralism as applied to the United States held that interest groups competed 
in a “free market” of politics.  It was argued that the existence of many points of access 
in the federal U.S. political system allowed ample ways for groups to influence 
government.  Competition between groups checked the monopolization of one or a few 
groups (Truman 1951, Dahl 1967).  According to Keehn (1976), pluralism relegates 
government to the task of night watchman, acting as a referee and balancing the 
competing interests.  Policy is created by government after weighing competing 
proposals from groups.  Corporate pluralism held that interest groups do not compete 
freely in American politics, but that individual groups or small collectivities of interest 
groups “capture” governmental institutions and literally write governmental policy 
because government has given them sovereignty in certain areas (Lowi 1967, 1979).  
Subsequent refinements of pluralism include the more complex models of policy 
subsystems, such as subgovernments consisting of Congressional committees, 
administrative agencies and interest groups, and the more complex model proposed by 
Heclo (1978) which proposed the existence of issue networks within which 
subgovernments operate.  As issues become more complex, the federal government 
finds it more difficult to address them comprehensively through public policy.  New 
networks form from a rapidly increasing pool of new groups, as well as federal, state 
and local governmental agencies.  The representatives of these groups and agencies 
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are more politically and technologically savvy about the issues their groups and 
agencies represent, and more tightly focused policymaking occurs as a result. 
The concept of pluralism has been argued to more or less describe the federal 
U.S. system, though it has been criticized as not capturing the essence of the American 
political system. (Keehn 1976).    Pluralism is also a much less compelling argument in 
other parts of the world, but the existence of groups in developing countries and their 
relationships to the state, in some cases reducing state autonomy and capacity, have 
been noted.  For example, it has been documented that African states regularly 
intervene in agricultural markets at the behest of interest groups with a stake in 
agricultural prices (Bates 1988).  Migdal (1988) argues that in weak developing states 
such as Sierra Leone, central governments have been hampered by local strongmen 
and their followers who were empowered by previous colonial governments.  The 
implication, however, is that pluralism does not necessarily indicate a vibrant state.  For 
instance, it has been argued that “pluralism by default” has been the process by which 
developing states in the former Soviet Union have progressed politically, based not on 
strong civil society or democratic institutions but in the breakdown of autocratic control 
(Way 2005). 
Many modern European democratic systems were built partly through interest 
groups operating in close alliance with governments.  These groups did not capture 
government agencies but were officially sanctioned by governments.  This type of 
system has been labeled corporatism, and has been defined as a system in which 
“strategic actors are given a permanent role in policymaking in those sectors that are 
relevant to their interest” in exchange for “politics of moderation characterized by a 
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willingness to compromise with each other and with the state” (Magagna 1988, 422).  In 
Europe, corporatism seems to be associated with consensus democracies, while 
pluralism tends to concentrate in majoritarian democracies (Lijphart and Crepaz 1991)   
However, this is not necessarily the case in developing countries.  In Latin America, for 
example, majoritarian systems such as Mexico and Brazil have at times been 
corporatist.  In such countries we see similar situations in which governments sanction 
official interest groups and leave independent groups on the margins.  Corporatist 
systems allow government elites to define the scope of civil society through 
inducements and constraints and maintain more control over the policymaking process.  
Groups that are officially sanctioned receive organizational benefits, such as official 
recognition and subsidies that give them significant advantages over groups that claim 
to represent the same members of the public.  In addition, official recognition may allow 
the government to penetrate and dominate officially sanctioned groups, which then 
respond to the government’s wishes more readily than the needs of their constituents 
(Collier and Collier 1979). 
So far, the developing state in a corporatist scenario seems to have relative 
autonomy from interest groups.  However, this is not entirely the case.  First, the 
support of interest groups does not come for free for governments in developing states; 
they must provide some reason to win the initial cooperation of the groups.  Often this 
may involve acceding to certain demands.  The stronger the interest groups in question, 
the more inducements the state must offer to win them over.  Second, a developing 
state under the corporatist model cannot always fully silence non-sanctioned groups 
unless it reverts to a more oppressive system.  This is not to say that corporatist states 
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do not repress non-official groups; they often do, especially when the state is strong 
enough to dictate high constraints and offer low inducements (Collier and Collier 1979).  
However, there is some latitude for non-official groups to operate.  In other words, even 
an authoritarian state’s policies will still reflect a certain amount of deference to official 
groups, and even to some issues from strong non-official groups. 
In the case of FDI and FDI policy, domestic interest groups may line up for or 
against FDI, and dominant groups within the society may exert more or less influence, 
based on whether these groups are open or wary of this form of economic development.  
Yet the state must, whether it is legitimately representing its entire population or even a 
small portion thereof, set policy and use that initial stance to bargain with multinationals 
in order to attract investment.  Therefore, whether policies reflect the interests of strong 
interest groups or the interests of an autonomous state, they still indicate a set of 
preferences.  Regardless of whether these preferences reflect narrow interests or a 
majority of the population, they are what developing states bring to the bargaining table 
with firms and indicate the initial stance of these developing states toward FDI. 
Multinational Corporations 
Multinational corporations (MNCs), sometimes referred to in this dissertation as 
firms, are the second actor in the FDI story.  As I have explained, developing states 
form attitudes about FDI, which influence their preferences about how open they will be 
toward this avenue of development.  Their policies toward FDI, either more restrictive or 
more open, are an indication of their initial preferences. 
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The MNC plays a key role in the story of FDI.  Understanding their role as entities 
that enable FDI is essential, because they serve as agents of development.  In doing 
so, firms act in their own interest and therefore are independent entities in the process.  
Nevertheless, their preferences and motivations must be taken into account, because 
the results of developing states’ interactions with them can also affect those states’ FDI 
policies. 
MNCs are distinguished from strictly national firms by their large size, the 
complex character of their organization, the diversity of their business interests, and 
their geographical dispersion (Vernon 1977, 1998).  Because MNCs operate on a global 
scale in the pursuit of profit, they are not as concerned about their effects in local 
markets as their hosts are.  Since they make direct investments, they also control the 
actions of their subsidiaries in developing countries through their hierarchical structures.   
These traits, argues Vernon, tend to bring firms into conflict with host nations which 
have desires and preferences of their own based on local conditions.  Thus, firm and 
host country desires will sometimes clash with the global preferences of firms. 
Even though this study does not approach FDI from the firm perspective, I argue 
that firms play a major role in providing an impetus for foreign direct investment policy.  
With their investments, firms provide a shopping list of benefits that developing 
countries lack and desire, such as resources, expertise, know-how and efficiency.  
MNCs also offer a way for developing countries to exploit valuable resources, whether 
those resources are natural or human, which they may not have been able to exploit 
before. 
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Theories of the firm tell us about firm preferences that lead them to invest in 
developing countries.  These preferences indirectly influence FDI policies and should be 
briefly touched on.  Hymer (1976) articulated perhaps the first firm theory devoted to 
FDI where he argued that FDI could be differentiated from portfolio investment because 
of its long-term nature and the characteristic of MNC control over its nature for its 
duration.  Firms engaging in FDI want control in order to ensure the safety of the 
investment, to remove competition between themselves and other international or local 
competitors, and to fully take advantage of any returns on skills and abilities acquired in 
the investment. 
Firms have a variety of motivations to engage in FDI.  MNCs gain advantages, 
such as such as acquiring lower-cost factors of production, gaining knowledge or control 
of more efficient production functions, obtaining better distribution facilities, increasing 
the differentiation of their products and reducing risk by diversifying globally (Hymer 
1976).  They may also gain monopolistic or oligopolistic advantages by investing in 
other countries.  They gain such advantages by competing and driving out local 
business or exploiting imperfect market conditions.  Their sheer size gives them the 
ability to exploit economies of scale and diverse resources and affords them many 
advantages in lesser-developed countries.  They also provide benefits to host countries, 
including increased exports and a boost in the host country’s economic capabilities 
(Grieco 1986). 
Firm theories focus on the reasons MNCs choose to directly invest abroad.  One 
variant focuses on market imperfections that create opportunities for firms to engage in 
oligopolistic behavior.  Companies prefer to directly invest in foreign markets in order to 
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overcome the disadvantages of distance, communication, culture and imperfect 
information.  In addition, other draws include low costs of production and generous 
individual country policies.  Marketing advantages also play a role in firms’ decision to 
invest.  This theory argues that firms seek opportunities to gain an advantage over their 
competitors internationally through their investments and must possess advantages 
over local competitors when they enter foreign markets (Caves 1996). 
Another widely referenced theory of firm foreign direct investment involves the 
product cycle.  Firms that create products at home may venture to market in other 
similarly industrialized countries.  High demand may lead firms to decide to invest in 
manufacturing capabilities in those countries, thereby cutting costs by manufacturing 
the product in the same market.  Eventually, production may shift down the income 
scale to less-developed countries where the product can be produced and exported 
back to high-income countries more cheaply than the costs of production in high-income 
countries allow (Vernon 1966).  In Europe’s industrial development, for instance, textile 
production in Britain led to saturation of that market.  Britain marketed textiles in other 
European countries, which not only helped spur a wave of industrialization but also 
spilled over into other industrial sectors.  Later Latin American development was also 
spurred by investment from European countries when economic conditions such as 
inflation demanded new action, and industrial capital looked for new, stable and 
cheaper markets (Kurth 1979). 
 MNCs may also engage in FDI as a mechanism to get around state trade 
barriers such as high tariffs (Blonigen 2006).  Tariffs are meant to shield domestic firms 
at the expense of foreign firms, effectively protecting domestic businesses against 
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waves of cheap foreign imports, though this simple relationship is not so 
straightforward.  Goodman, Spar and Yoffie (1996) argue that differences between 
import-complementing and import-substituting investment create different coalitions.  
For example, import-complementing investment, or investment that competes directly 
with local firms, causes locally-producing U.S. domestic firms to line up in favor of 
protection and foreign firms that import goods into the United States to join together in 
favor of free trade. Import-substituting investment, or investment where the foreign firm 
replaces imports with products manufactured by its local affiliate, causes a different 
alignment.  This type of investment will ally both foreign and domestic firms against 
protection.  However, Blonigen labels the notion of tariff-jumping, or investing in a 
foreign country to bypass tariffs, “folk wisdom” among economists.  He argues that tariff-
jumping occurs, but only among firms that have experience in international markets 
(Blonigen 2002). 
Finally, firm decisions to invest abroad can be determined by considerations of 
the advantages of ownership, location and firm internalization (Dunning 1980).  By 
taking direct ownership in foreign countries, firms can gain additional advantages such 
as international transfer pricing, the ability to shift assets to different currencies in order 
to create profits, capabilities to diversify investment portfolios and opportunities to 
create parallel production capacity in different countries to protect against slowdowns or 
labor unrest.  Simmons and Elkins (2004) echo Dunning when they point out that firms 
weigh the competition and will see countries that offer similar policies on the free 
movement of capital as similar risks for investment.  Market structure, natural resources, 
labor, proximity to market, legal and commercial environments, and government policy 
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provide locational advantages.  MNC internalization of capital, technology, and 
management through direct control in their subsidiaries, rather than leaving control to 
local partners, giving local subsidiaries free rein, or engaging in risky and uncontrolled 
portfolio investment may also factor into firms’ decisions to invest abroad. 
Firm and State Agreement 
In the progression of the FDI story, we have met two actors, each with unique 
sets of motivations and preferences in how to reach their goals.  These preferences 
sometimes harmonize and sometimes clash with each other.  Developing countries, 
hoping for progress through greater foreign direct investment but also with some degree 
of wariness, weigh alternatives and make decisions on how much they will rely on FDI.  
These decisions are realized through the political process and become policies.  Firms, 
looking to earn greater profits, make decisions on whether to invest in developing 
countries based on the advantages they see by doing so.  Firms and developing 
countries must come to agreement over FDI and the conditions that will allow the 
investment into the host country market. 
The firm-state agreement process is an important part of the story that is told in 
this study.  Developing countries bring existing explicit or implicit policies on FDI to the 
table.  These policies are a gate, where the width of the opening serves as a screening 
function.  Some firms will rule out investment based on the policies they see.  Those 
firms that can live with host country policies may enter into agreement with a developing 
state.  Developing countries’ FDI policies, in essence, are their opening gambit in the 
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bargain.  They set the tone for the conditions of investment, and upon conclusion of the 
agreement, these policies influence both future FDI policies and future FDI flows. 
 The first and foremost goal of firms is profit, and MNCs are not driven by altruistic 
motives to help developing countries exploit their resources or develop their economies.  
MNCs want to make sure that their investments in developing countries will yield more 
benefits than costs.  If profit is firms’ primary goal, how can they go about reaching that 
goal in the most efficient manner?  How can they squeeze the most possible profit they 
can out of their foreign investment?  Internally, they can take a number of measures, 
such as making best use of their organization.  The internal workings of the MNC do not 
necessarily concern us.  However, the external conditions that MNCs must confront 
point toward Hymer’s initial identification of control as a key preference.  MNCs want to 
control as much of the FDI process as they can.  MNCs try to establish this control in a 
number of ways.  First, they find imperfect markets that allow them to corner a sector, 
either by themselves or with a small number of other firms, which gives them greater 
control over pricing.  Second, they seek to make use of peculiarities of domestic and 
international markets that allow them to move assets and finances quickly and cheaply 
in order to create greater profit.  Third, they seek stable markets in countries with low 
wage bases and few regulations and restrictions in order to keep costs down as they 
exploit resources.  In other words, MNCs invest in developing countries as long as they 
can keep costs low and profits high, and as long as economic and political realities favor 
continued business there. 
Developing state preferences are a little more complex.  Developing states look 
upon incoming FDI as a way that they can meet development goals, maintain state 
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legitimacy in the eyes of powerful segments of the population, maintain legitimacy in the 
eyes of other nations, and participate in the world economy.  These countries also want 
to achieve a maximum amount of rents and control over the timing and the amount of 
flows of investment for their own particular social and political purposes.  In order to 
achieve their goals, they must insist on taxes, restrictions and regulations and give 
away as little as possible.  In addition, the priority they put on their preferences and 
goals is tempered by the emphasis they put on the participation of FDI against wariness 
over allowing foreign capital and corporations to play a part in their national economies. 
FDI agreements occur because both firm and state feel they are better off with 
the agreement.  Should the firm not feel it benefits from the potential agreement, it will 
walk away before the deal is made.  Should developing states not be happy with the 
proposed terms of the agreement, they will call off the process if the terms cannot be 
adjusted.  Yet there is some reason to question whether firms and developing states are 
equally matched at the start of the agreement process, and whether their position in the 
bargain remains unchanged after the agreement is reached. 
For example, the basis of the relationship between MNC and state may be 
characterized as a bilateral monopoly (see Kindlberger 1969, Kobrin 1987).  The host 
has resources that it cannot exploit but control over access and conditions for operation, 
and the firm has the technology, capital and other means to extract the resources.  In 
this type of relationship, characterized by one buyer and one seller, the bargaining that 
takes place between the state and MNC is over the monopoly rents that accrue from the 
investment.  Within this framework, the outcome of the agreement depends upon the 
relative bargaining strength of the firm and the host country.  Both firm and state each 
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have specific behavior patterns that they follow in such relationships.  The firm often 
behaves according to the state of the industry in which it produces.  The state, on the 
other hand, behaves according to its economic and political bases. 
Thomas and Worrall (1994) offer a test of the bilateral monopoly framework in 
terms of expropriation, or in other words, a host country taking control over the 
operations of a foreign firm within its borders.  They argue that a one-shot bargaining 
process is not sufficient to account for why firms and host countries enter agreements.  
Their rationale is that if bargaining was a one-shot deal, firms would know that countries 
would eventually expropriate and therefore not invest.  However, if the agreement 
process is over infinite repetitions, then contracts become self-enforcing because each 
side realizes it has something to lose by breaking the agreement.  The firm withholds 
maximum investment and payments to forestall expropriation, but must increase 
investment and payments over time.  The contract thus evolves, “ratchet-like,” toward 
greater levels of efficiency.  If the contract remains below optimum efficiency, the state 
expropriates; otherwise an efficient level of investment is reached. 
Also in this infinite bargaining period, the state’s power in the agreement process 
may get stronger relative to the firm.  This “obsolescing bargain” was first proposed by 
Kindlberger (1969) and articulated by Vernon (1971).  As host countries become more 
knowledgeable and the firm’s costs become more tied to the host country, the host 
country can begin to exert pressure and get better terms.  For example, the erosion of 
the bargaining power of foreign copper firms in Chile, along with domestic political 
factors, played a role in the nationalization of the copper industry in that country (Moran 
1974). 
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Shapiro (1991) studies another case in which the Brazilian government was able 
to use its bargaining power to manipulate foreign firms.  In the 1950s and 1960s Brazil 
put in motion a set of economic policies designed to pressure foreign automakers to 
increase the domestic content of their manufactures in Brazil.  The goal of the Brazilian 
government was to create a domestic Brazilian car industry.  The foreign automakers 
responded tepidly to initial requests by members of the Brazilian administration.  They 
did not feel that the Brazilian automobile market was large enough to sustain local 
production.  The administration of Kubitschek then put into place policies constricting 
foreign exchange for firms unless they created new products using at least fifty percent 
local content, and rising over five years to 95 percent local content.  These constrictive 
policies were supplemented by generous financial incentives offered to companies that 
agreed to abide by the new regulations.  The use of these policies were partly 
responsible for the development of the Brazilian car industry, which was the first of its 
kind in Latin America and served as the basis for later government policies in Argentina 
and Mexico. 
Kubitschek’s initial impetus was political; he wanted to create a national policy 
that would be successful and would survive beyond his presidential tenure.  There was 
also intense popular support for home-grown industry, and the policies were meant to 
not only prop up Brazilian capital invested in smaller local auto and truck manufacturers, 
but also to create spillover effects to suppliers.  In addition, local labor would benefit.  
However, his policies also gained from the condition of the auto industry at the time.  
Volkswagen was at a point in its history where it was willing to try overseas 
manufacturing for the first time.  This coincided with slowed demand at home for U.S. 
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and European carmakers after an initial burst of post-war car sales, and increased 
demand in Brazil due to a rising economy.  Volkswagen’s willingness to enter the 
market under Brazil’s policies led other U.S. and European firms to follow suit to protect 
their positions in the market.12
As companies petitioned to enter the Brazilian market, the administration set up 
an agency, GEIA, to oversee the process and to rule on applications.  This agency was 
criticized by many automotive officials for, in their perception, impeding the process and 
ruling arbitrarily.  Government officials preferred that GM and Ford lead the Brazilian 
automotive industry; landing one or both of them would ensure credibility to the program 
and the architects of the Brazilian policies assumed that some of the smaller 
participants would eventually be driven out or subsumed.13  GEIA, which was also 
intensely aware of showing favoritism, worked cooperatively with all companies that 
submitted proposals.  However, GEIA hardened its position, particularly with Ford, when 
it perceived through the application process that the companies were trying to get 
around regulations.  GEIA could only accomplish its job with relative insulation from the 
administration and from pressure groups, such as local industrial concerns. 
Shapiro insists that neither theories of the firm, nor theories that put the state and 
its policies to the front, can completely explain the Brazilian case.  There is considerable 
overlap; states react not only to their economic and political bases but also to the 
conditions of industry, and MNCs react not only to their industries but conditions within 
the state.  In addition, states and MNCs may find their interests to be convergent if 
                                                 
12 Except for Ford and GM.  Ford held out against the regulations in its truck division and only entered the car market after the 
military coup.  By this time, however, Volkswagen had captured the passenger car market and Ford executives lamented that they 
had missed an opportunity.  GM never did enter the auto market, but did comply in its truck assembly plants. 
13 In fact, this did happen after the initial wave of entrants.  However, among the casualties were the car and truck makers that had 
majority Brazilian control. 
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those political and economic conditions in the state correlate favorably with conditions in 
the industry, which Shapiro argues was clearly happening in the Brazilian case.  
However, despite convergent interests, Ford held out for years despite intense pressure 
and almost walked away altogether. 
What is clear from Shapiro’s account is that the Kubitschek administration used 
its restrictive foreign exchange regulations and the financial incentives policies to 
encourage foreign automakers to invest new technology and production processes in 
Brazil.  These policies set up the initial conditions by which Brazil could then, company 
by company, reach agreement on its initial goals of increasing local content in 
automotive manufacturing, and on the long-term goal of creating a stand-alone Brazilian 
automotive industry through new investment. 
Stopford and Strange (1991) take the bargaining scenario one step further, 
arguing that firm and state bargaining is part of a more complex scenario that pits states 
against firms, states against other states, and firms against firms.  In their study of firm 
and state policy in the face of FDI, they argue that the bargaining that takes place 
between firms and states are conditioned by the competitive structure of the market, for 
example, if the firm is entering a global market, is trying to enter a local market, or if the 
firm is trying to exploit natural resources.  It is also conditioned by the national policy 
intent of the host state, such as whether the host state is looking toward import 
substitution or exporting in a dependent or independent relationship with the rest of the 
world.  They contend that the problem with existing economic models, except perhaps 
for Vernon’s product-cycle model, is that they are static and do not adequately explain 
the changing economic and political environment that firms and countries face.  
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Governments in particular face excruciatingly difficult decisions.  Should they liberalize 
or restrict investment?  Should they or should they not utilize monetary policy to control 
capital?  Should they promote trade, and if so, what kinds of restrictions are 
appropriate?  Should they privatize their state-owned firms and open up to market 
forces, and if so, do they put any restrictions at all on private ownership and foreign 
firms?  What differences across sectors should they take into account?  Stopford and 
Strange argue that as governments design policy, the dynamic political and economic 
environment ensures that governments often have multiple, conflicting and shifting 
objectives, and their decisions lead to political consequences. 
FDI Policies 
In the process of telling the FDI story, I have thus far introduced two different 
views, openness and wariness, of FDI which inform developing states’ impressions of 
FDI and thus, influence their FDI policies.  These views I derived from paradigms 
established by modernization theory and its descendents, and dependency theory.  I 
have established two main actors in the FDI story, developing states and multinational 
corporations, and explored their motivations.  Generally, firms look for conditions of 
investment that will improve their ability to make profits, and developing states look to 
investment to increase their economic abilities.  Both actors hope to be able to control 
aspects of investment that put them at odds on many of their goals, and therefore a 
bargaining situation arises.  Developing states’ policies provide a starting point for 
negotiations, and agreements reached provide one influence on developing states’ 
future FDI policies. 
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In this section, I will look at two possible ways to examine FDI policies.  The first 
way is by comparing FDI policies to tax incentives policies.  Tax incentives policies are 
used to encourage or discourage investment in certain regions, sectors or industries in 
local economies (Biger and Pepe 1986).  As such, tax incentives policies can be 
targeted at both local and international capital.  Tax incentives policies, their causes and 
effects on FDI may have similarities to FDI policies.  I will also examine another possible 
theoretical perspective on FDI policies which argues that FDI policies are influenced on 
two levels, the domestic and the international. 
Economists took the lead in examining tax incentives and their effects on FDI.  
Taxation, or more precisely effective rates of taxation, are central to the study of 
investment incentives (Birla Institute of Scientific Research 1985).  The theory of optimal 
taxation, one of the core theories of investment incentives, argues that governments 
aim for an optimal tax that increases both revenue and welfare.  To take the extremes, if 
governments do not tax firms, they get nothing.  Similarly, if governments tax firms fully, 
they will also get nothing because no goods will be produced within their borders.  
Governments therefore tax at rates that ensure that they will receive an appropriate 
amount of revenue while simultaneously allowing firms to make a profit.  In other words, 
there is a window of possible tax rates for governments.  Governments that set tax rates 
higher than this optimal area will get less tax revenue because firms will leave the 
country.  Governments that set tax rates lower than this optimal area will find it difficult 
to maintain revenues because they are not taxing enough.  Why wouldn’t firms flock to 
states that set inordinately low tax rates?  If we take into account that international 
markets are not perfectly competitive, then we must accept that many industries are 
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oligopolistic on the international stage, therefore limiting the number of firms that will 
enter foreign markets.  This theory is weighted by standard assumptions; consumers 
maximize utilities, all goods can be taxed, and income can be perfectly observed.  
However, at its core it still suggests that firms and countries are engaged in a delicate 
balancing act, trying to work out a range of possibilities that will be useful and beneficial 
to each while also keeping an eye on their competition. 
Tax incentives are one of the mechanisms used by states to indicate the level of 
their seriousness in drawing FDI (Li 2006).  Incentives affect the allocation of scarce 
financial resources, influence government revenues, favor particular groups at the 
expense of others, reduce market competition, and often cause rent-seeking behaviors 
in host countries.  Governments pick winners and losers in the market, leading them to 
discriminate against small and local firms, and design programs through backchannel 
negotiations.  Incentives can strengthen MNC competitiveness internationally, but also 
enhance their ability to monopolize the local market.  Tax incentive policies have 
distributive consequences, pitting groups within the society for or against foreign 
competition, and against each other. 
Research has shown that taxation can have a deleterious effect on investment.  
Taxes raise the costs of capital, which disadvantages companies in high taxation 
markets and therefore discourages them from investing.  High taxes can impede local 
research and development if the R&D is complementary to imported technology – 
although it can encourage local R&D if it substitutes for imported technology (Hines 
1995).  Cummins and Hubbard (1995) find that a one percent rise in the cost of capital 
leads to a one to two percent decrease in annual rates of investment.  Hines (2001) 
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finds that tax sparing agreements, which grant credits in order to get rid of 
contradictions between home and host country tax policies, can lead to much higher 
levels of FDI and lower tax rates on FDI. 
Research has also been conducted on the effects of globalization on tax-rate 
policies.  Some theories speculate that increased participation in world markets and 
increased trade integration maximizes the power of the market at the expense of 
countries’ policy options and creates a greater need for countries to be economically 
efficient in order to effectively compete (Garrett 1995, Owens and Whitehouse 1996).  
These conditions lead to policies that favor lower taxes, reduce the welfare state, and 
increase labor flexibility. 
However, another theoretical strand argues that globalization does not threaten 
national sovereignty and is not a new phenomenon.  This view argues that corporations 
face obstacles that keep them from leaving markets once they invest (Spar and Yoffie 
1999), that country characteristics offer enticement to corporations (Garrett 1995, Caves 
1996), that political institutions can provide stability that may hold long-term 
attractiveness to corporations (Hall 1997) and that countries can use these leverages to 
continue to approve taxation policies.  Gelleny and McCoy (2001) find that education 
levels significantly enhance government abilities to tax, that left-leaning governments 
are more likely to tax than centrist or right leaning governments, and that openness to 
trade actually increases the likelihood of higher taxes.  They speculate that pressures 
on societal groups resulting from greater openness lead governments to tax more highly 
in order to offset some groups’ losses.  Li (2006) echoes this view, arguing that 
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democratic governments and governments associated with rule of law tend to be less 
generous in their tax incentive policies. 
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) spells out 
some of the elements of this balancing act in its paper advising governments on 
taxation in a global economy (OECD 1991).  While arguing that countries tax because 
1) they use taxes as an instrument of social policy and 2) they want to exercise their 
right to tax, the OECD cautions that taxes are often market distorting but should not be.  
One reason for the distorting effects of taxes is that there is always the potential for 
double taxation, in which a firm is levied taxes both in home and host countries.  The 
cures for such distortions, such as exemptions, credits and deductions, may be 
distorting in themselves in that they may favor international firms over local firms.  In 
addition to market distorting effects, there are also issues caused by companies 
attempting to avoid or evade taxation, fair distribution of taxes, and administrative 
problems.  Not all nations are inclined to tax in the same way, so nations must decide 
whether to tax incomes of resident companies and affiliates or source companies, to tax 
international equity, or if domestic rates or some other rates apply. 
States use incentives because, as Stopford and Strange argued, states are also 
pitted against other states for investment.  Chudnowsky and Lopez (2002) point out that 
when business leaders are questioned in surveys, incentives don’t appear to be as 
important as other factors, such as host market size, a country’s rate of growth, physical 
and communications infrastructure, and the quality of human resources.  However, they 
argue that incentives are important on the margins, when MNCs have a number of 
different countries that they can choose from in making investment decisions.  They 
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point to Ireland as an example, which used incentives to separate itself from the crowd 
in Europe.  These incentives included grants for research and development facilities, 
and were part of Ireland’s set of policies designed to attract higher value-added 
industries, create specialized industrial clusters, and promote links with domestic firms.  
Ultimately, Ireland’s targeted investment policies were helpful in landing a number of 
high-tech companies, which fueled a boom that transformed the country from European 
economic backwater to economic engine in just a couple of decades. 
Like tax incentives policies, it can be argued that all FDI policies also provide an 
indication about the environment for FDI.  The effects of FDI policies, including favoring 
particular groups and reducing competition, are very similar.  Open policies may provide 
a basis for competition against other states, but the level of openness must always be 
balanced with potential domestic political costs.  Globalization demands may influence 
more open policies, but openness is tempered by the extent of the need to rely on FDI 
versus other avenues of development.  Like taxation policies, many factors make it 
certain that FDI policies are a balancing act.  The balance must be configured between 
the degree of openness to FDI and domestic political needs, domestic economic goals, 
world pressure, demand for FDI, and past experience with FDI including past bargaining 
scenarios and past policies. 
Once policies are enacted, they play a major role in firm decision-making, which 
directly affects inflows of FDI into developing states.  States that are wary of FDI will 
enact more restrictive FDI policies.  Firms that can still find advantages in states that 
restrict investment will invest regardless of the policies, but there will be fewer of them 
than in countries that are more open to FDI.  Thus, firms examine policies before 
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entering agreements with developing states.  In this way, developing states set the tone 
for any future agreements, and exert some control over the flow of FDI into their 
markets. 
Another way to look at FDI policies is by examining the environment in which 
they are created.  The weakness of using existing theory on tax incentives policies is 
that while they examine both domestic and international effects on tax incentives, they 
do not take into account the dual influences together, nor do these primarily economic 
perspectives allow for political influences.  Policies may not simply be a case of either 
demands of the domestic markets or demands of the international markets.  They may 
be a function of both together.  Add domestic political and international political 
influences into the mix, and a much more complex picture emerges. 
In this vein, FDI policies can be examined as a function of games occurring on 
two levels.  The use of games and game theory to shed light on bargaining scenarios 
has yielded much academic research.  In a seminal game-theoretic paper on 
bargaining, Nash (1950) sets up a theory of bargaining in which he outlines a two-
person non-zero sum game.  He assumes that each player is rational, able to 
communicate desires, has equal bargaining skill, and has full knowledge of the other’s 
tastes and preferences.  In this idealized environment, Nash creates a utility function for 
each player, based on the anticipation each has for what he or she can get in the 
bargain.  He goes on to prove that if these utility preferences are known, there is a 
bargaining solution in which each player can gain a deal which is satisfactory and 
leaves both better off. 
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Harsanyi (1956) later combines elements of Nash’s game theory on bargaining, 
Nash’s theory of optimal threats, and other bargaining approaches to round out 
bargaining theory.  The theory of optimal threats argues that each bargainer may use a 
threat as long as it will hurt the threatened party more than the party making the threat.  
However, each party may be prepared to make threats that will cause self-harm if the 
agreement fails in the hopes of getting a better agreement.  Thus, according to 
Harsanyi, bargainers will gain better terms if they are willing to take greater risks than 
their opponents.  In addition, Harsanyi argues that the bargaining outcome also 
depends upon the ease of transfer of goods or money between the two parties, and the 
likely effect of present behavior on future bargains between the parties (strategic 
thinking). 
While game theory on bargaining as envisioned by Nash provides a basis for 
explanation, it does not adequately explain all bargaining situations, especially when 
there are many possible agreeable contracts and multiple rounds of bargaining.  
Rubinstein (1982) proves that with many possible Pareto optimal outcomes (outcomes 
which make neither player worse off and make at least one player better off), players 
come to an equilibrium agreement among the optimal outcomes.  In the presence of 
fixed costs, the weaker player is always disadvantaged and does not come out of the 
bargain as well off as the stronger player.  In the presence of fixed discounting factors 
(how the players value the utility of the future), the player that makes the first move will 
always be at an advantage. 
The need for game theories to reach equilibrium agreements concerns Sebenius 
(1992).  He notes that game theory, while invaluable in constructing and offering 
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explanations for bargaining situations, makes several troubling assumptions including 
full rationality and perfect information, and attempts to relax these assumptions have 
been problematic.  He observes that game theory views cooperation and conflict as a 
binary construct with possible solutions located along the Pareto frontier.  However, he 
argues that cooperation and conflict are often both present in negotiation, and that the 
relaxation of assumptions of full rationality and perfect information allow for a more 
useful explanation of bargaining behavior.  In essence, the area between no agreement 
and Pareto-optimum solutions encompass an area of possible agreement.  Bargainers 
that assume that their opponents are rational but hampered by imperfect information 
may end up with solutions that are not Pareto-optimal but are the best that is possible 
given the circumstances.  Subsequent negotiations with greater information expand the 
zone of possible agreement.  Sebenius argues that the existence of epistemic 
communities on either side of the issue greatly helps this process, as they bring in new 
ideas that also create new possibilities for solutions.  In other words, the more 
information each side has, the more likely a solution. 
 Game theory has had tremendous practical applications in international relations 
(see Snidal 1985, Maoz and Felsenthal 1987, Powell (1991), Bueno de Mesquita and 
Lalman 1992, Niou and Ordeshook 1994, Powell 1996, Allan and Dupont 1999, 
Signorino 1999, Bennett and Stam 2000), Putnam (1988) addressed the complexity of 
negotiations given international and domestic constraints by introducing the logic of two-
level games.  Explicitly, Putnam argued that international negotiations are best 
explained by bargaining on two levels.  On the international level (Level I), negotiations 
between states are more open or constrained by policies and politics on the domestic 
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level (Level II).  However, negotiations on Level I can also create conditions for policies 
on Level II.  The two levels operate concurrently over iterations of bargaining, until an 
agreement on the international level is reached or lost.  Of importance is the size of the 
bargainers’ win-sets, or the range of agreements each party is willing to consider 
because it feels it has gained.  A larger win-set at the international level widens the 
range of possible agreements, but leaves the state in weaker bargaining position.  
However, a smaller win-set at the international level lowers the range of possible 
agreements, but can give negotiators bargaining power by claiming domestic 
opposition. 
McGinnis and Williams (1993) provide support to Putnam from the social choice 
perspective by introducing the concept of the correlated equilibrium to the two-level 
game framework.  They argue that the idea of a unitary-rational state is not logical, 
given that states are collectivities of institutions and actors.  However, each state 
exhibits regularized behavior.  In their models, the individual collectivities that make up 
the state reach coordinated equilibrium on their expectations by drawing from the same 
pool of information from their environments.  Iida (1993) extends the analysis to 
conditions of uncertain information, and determines that in these situations domestic 
constraints may still impede agreements. 
Two-level games, since Putnam’s theory was formulated, have been used to 
explain U.S. trade pressure on Japan (Schoppa 1993), United States-Soviet strategic 
negotiations (Knopf 1993), trade negotiations between the United States and Taiwan (Li 
1994), ethnic conflict (Carment and James 1996), and the peace process in Northern 
Ireland (Trumbore 1998)  Perhaps tangentially related to this analysis, Goldstein (1996) 
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looks at the logic of two level games in determining how domestic politics might 
encourage nations to join international trade institutions.  Goldstein’s thesis is that 
Canada used free-trade agreements as a mechanism to alter what it considered unfair 
U.S. trade laws.  The U.S. administration had some sympathy toward this view, and saw 
agreeing to international arbitration panels under the agreements as a way to thwart 
opponents of free-trade.  The new institutions created by the agreements effectively 
changed the way that the United States administered its own trade laws. 
The logic of these games assumes state-to-state negotiations.  However, if we 
follow the reasoning of Stopford and Strange, we can’t simply assume that states are 
the only entities on the world stage, and that states do not make deals with other 
entities.  States make agreements with multinational firms over foreign investment 
constantly, and like in international negotiations, whether a state gets foreign investment 
or not depends on the willingness of groups within the state and the credibility of the 
state to “seal the deal” on the international stage.  The next section will try to extend a 
form of two-level games framework to FDI policy. 
The Logic of Two-Level Games and FDI 
The logic of two-level games proposed by Putnam and reviewed above is a 
theory of how domestic policy and international agreement interact and intertwine.  As 
such, it assumes, on the international level, two or more countries trying to reach 
agreement.  However, as noted above, some scholars have taken a more expansive 
view of the international environment.  In this larger milieu, firms also inhabit the 
environment and enter into agreements with states on foreign direct investment. 
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If firms can be considered part of the international environment, we must fit them 
into a framework that will explain not only the nature and character of policies of foreign 
direct investment in developing countries, but also how those policies then affect the 
amount of capital flowing into each country through direct investment. 
Let us look at the stories of FDI we have laid out so far.  We have identified two 
actors in the FDI process that are important to understanding FDI policies, states and 
multinational firms.  Focusing for one moment on firms, we have looked at a range of 
explanations of firm motivations clustered under the label of firm theories.  These 
theories, which put their focus on the multinational corporation and its role in the FDI 
process, have shown that firms play an indispensible role in bringing FDI to foreign 
markets and the reasons for their interest in FDI.  Firms have their own set of motives 
and desires in engaging in FDI.  They look to open up new markets, gain advantages 
over competitors, diversify, capitalize on market imperfections, exploit advantages in 
local markets and reduce disadvantages of distance.  They often follow a cycle of 
production where a new manifestation of the cycle leads to foreign production.  They 
hope to get around trade and other barriers.  They also may want to gain other 
advantages available to them by expanding abroad.  All of these motivations are in the 
pursuit of greater profits.  Governments that consider allowing foreign firms into their 
markets must therefore pass policies in order to control the pace and timing of entry and 
to ensure that the state accrues gains.  However, firm theories, in their specific focus on 
what drives firm investment, treat as extraneous economic and political factors, and do 
not account for state behavior.  These theories thus lack the ability to account for FDI in 
the context of state policies. 
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If theories of the firm are not adequate to the explanation of FDI policies, then 
perhaps conceptions of the state and its various roles will help us.  After all, it is within 
the state that policies are formulated and refined.  Elsewhere, I argued that the state 
presents a united front to foreign corporations in its stance toward investment.  
However, this unified stance conceals the fact that even as states present their offerings 
to corporations, a lot of political negotiations, along with other political and economic 
realities, influence what they bring to the table.  State theories, in their examinations of 
state power and weakness, have provided us with an opportunity to envision a state 
with a unified vision and strategy when facing a bargaining scenario with corporations.  
Still unresolved, however, is how states make policies for the specific purpose of 
dealing with other entities, as international relations theories do.  However, accepting 
the state as a unitary-rational actor, as many studies in the international relations 
discipline, simply accepts that policies exist, and does not consider the influences of the 
internal workings of the political process on those policies.  However, pluralism also fails 
to provide a complete picture, for it relegates the state to its constituent units and 
institutions.  The state with any reasonable amount of independence does not exist.  
Finally, a theory based on tax policies, discussed above, might be an answer.  
However, theories of tax policies simply deal with the economic interaction, bargaining 
and agreement between firm and state, but do not account for various domestic factors 
that affect policymaking, nor do they account for international influences on the entire 
process. 
What is needed is a theory or framework that allows for a state-firm interaction 
that allows the state to follow a cohesive and stable policy, but also acknowledges the 
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importance both domestic and international influences in policies of FDI and in the 
practice of FDI.  If we accept the proposition that the state, while not precisely a unitary 
actor but one made up of constituent groups and institutions that can create consistent 
and stable domestic policies and represent them in negotiations with other entities on 
an international level, then we can set the stage for using the logic of two-level games in 
the creation of policy and in the eventual agreement between state and firm. 
Consider Putnam’s argument that international agreements are the result of 
political bargaining on two levels.  With an expanded environment that allows firms, the 
reasoning of two-level games can be modified to include state-firm agreements.  In such 
a scenario, states face twin dilemmas.  On the domestic front, leaders for the state need 
to hammer out policies on foreign investment that are acceptable to home 
constituencies.  Policies are subject to a political process that must take the ideals, 
opinions, and values of powerful coalitions into account.  FDI policies are influenced by 
these political processes as well as the realities of the domestic economy, and are 
designed to work to the benefit of the state.  With these policies, states can enter into 
agreements with foreign corporations. 
We can fit this scenario into Putnam’s two-level framework so that we can 
categorize the process of agreement between firm and state as Level I, and Level II as 
the domestic policymaking process leading to FDI policies.  In Putnam’s model, the 
process of agreement between firm and state at the international level begins the game, 
and domestic policymaking follows.  In our model, the process will work in reverse.  In 
other words, domestic policymaking at Level I starts the process toward agreement on 
FDI, and states’ agreements with firms follow at Level II.  I argue that this makes logical 
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sense, for states’ policies serve as the basis and starting points for agreement.  If a 
state’s policies are too restrictive for firms, they may not invest.  If policies are open, 
firms may be more likely to invest. 
What determines the restrictiveness or openness of a state’s policies on 
investment?  Domestic politics and economic characteristics at Level II account for 
some of the variation of state policies.  Through the policymaking process, groups and 
institutions within the political environment work out a cohesive set of policies reflecting 
the dominant preferences and economic realities within the state.  These policies are 
presented at Level I, the international level, during the agreement process.  Putnam’s 
model focused on the win-sets of various states as determined by domestic politics.  
The win-set is defined as the range of agreements a side is willing to accept in making 
an agreement.  Each side has a win-set, and where the two win-sets overlap agreement 
can be reached.  The concept works similarly here and demonstrates the importance of 
domestic political realities.  Restrictive policies are a reflection of the wariness toward 
FDI demonstrated by important constituent units within the state, such as interest 
groups, parties, and governmental officials and institutions.  These smaller win-sets limit 
the range of agreements that the state can accept and leave states with less room for 
bargaining with firms at the agreement level because going outside the win-set leaves 
the government vulnerable to political sanction at home.  However, as Putnam 
suggests, this may work to state advantage especially if the state is large or otherwise 
an attractive market.  In such cases firms may be willing to live with a more restrictive 
set of choices and invest.  Open policies, on the other hand, indicate the openness of 
important groups, parties, state institutions and leaders to FDI and indicate that those 
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states have larger win-sets.  Paradoxically, openness also weakens a state’s bargaining 
power since firms can push for the best possible outcomes for themselves and be 
reasonably sure that they will reach agreement. 
For simplicity’s sake, my models will assume one firm and one developing 
country, and one step of the agreement process.  State creates policy, policy is 
presented during negotiations with firm, agreement with firm is reached (or not).  In 
reality there may be more iterations, and more countries or firms involved in the process 
of agreement.  In addition, the negotiations on the international level may influence 
future domestic policymaking.  Putnam’s theory covered this as he included in his 
theory the possibility for multiple iterations in the process of negotiations between 
states.  In the models presented here, a dynamic element to the process of firm-state 
agreement is modeled by the inclusion of international level factors (along with domestic 
factors) as potential influences on domestic FDI policies, the inclusion of both domestic 
and international factors as influences on the results of firm-state agreements (inward 
FDI), and an accounting for the dynamic nature of the process over time.   
The model as presented here does not explore in detail the firm side of the 
agreement process.  While I will assume a rational firm presenting a cohesive face, in 
reality firms are more complex and there certainly is disagreement that must be worked 
out within each firm’s leadership before an action is agreed upon.  I will also assume 
that all information is known to both parties, though information uncertainty is more 
likely especially given that there may be multiple iterations of the agreement process in 
reality, and that in developing countries domestic political situations at Level II could 
change quickly. 
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The model using a two-level scenario modeling such dynamics is depicted in 
Figure 2-1.  Domestic politics at Level II starts the process and policies are created 
within the state through political negotiation between interest groups, parties, state 
institutions and leaders.  These policies are also influenced by domestic economic 
realities, and international economic and political factors.  FDI policies are brought by 
states and their leadership to negotiations with firms at Level I during the agreement 
process.  Restrictive policies at Level II reduce the win-set for states, leading to less 
chance of agreement at Level I but allowing greater bargaining leverage to the state. 
Open policies lead to a greater chance of agreement at Level I but reduce the 
state’s bargaining power.  The agreements are reflected by inward FDI, which is 
influenced over time by policies and by domestic and international economic and 
political factors.  Agreements between firm and state ultimately affect future policies, 
adding to the complexity and the dynamism of the model. 
A Model of FDI 
To this point, I have introduced foreign direct investment as a concept, and have 
outlined the main actors in the FDI story.  MNCs and states, both realizing the benefits 
of FDI, must come to terms with conflict over the benefits of FDI.  Firms seek to 
establish operations overseas for a variety of secondary reasons that support their main 
goal, increased profits.  Developing states seek to entice firms to invest in order to gain 
access to means of development, and to increase revenues.  While it seems that each 
has reasons to engage in FDI, they differ over the amount of control each will have and 
how the benefits will be shared.  Firms want control in order to gain more profits and to  
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distribute them as they wish.  States want control in order to expand industrialization, 
keep profits in the local economy, and maintain revenues.  Both must balance their 
preferences with each other in order to make a working agreement.  Firms must be 
guaranteed a minimum amount of profit that makes the agreement worthwhile and 
profitable for them, while states must be guaranteed that the benefits of FDI outweigh a 
host of potential costs in allowing FDI into their markets. 
The model created above shows the complexity of the FDI process, particularly 
for developing states.  States must think locally and must take domestic politics into 
account.  They must have in mind the interests of the main local groups that support 
them.  They must weigh other options to development against FDI, and they must take 
into account past experience with FDI.  These concerns, shaped by their internal and 
domestic experiences and realities, do not necessarily coincide with firm self-interests, 
which are measured on a global scale.  Thus states must also take into account 
international factors and of other influences on the international stage that may be 
supportive of firm preferences. 
Given the supposed benefits of FDI, and the fact that most developing states 
appear to desire foreign investment, why do some developing states pass policies 
limiting or restricting FDI while others pass policies that encourage FDI?  I argue that 
policies are shaped by a number of domestic and international factors that affect 
developing states, including domestic politics, international pressure, demand for FDI, 
and past experience with FDI.  These policies provide developing states with a way of 
satisfying diverse sources of pressure on them.  They also serve as an indication to 
potential investors of the initial bargaining position of the developing state.  I have also 
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argued that two development theories that had a great influence on the development 
policies of third-world states, dependency and modernization theories, introduced a 
blend of openness and wariness regarding the benefits and costs of FDI.  I explored the 
motivations of both firms and states in the FDI process.  I also introduced the logic of 
two-level games and discussed the context of influences on state FDI policies and the 
role of those policies in reaching agreement with firms over foreign direct investment.  
Finally, I forwarded a theory of FDI that includes the role of FDI policies. 
The presentation of a testable model of FDI is the next step in the development 
of this story.  My model synthesizes the concepts of FDI discussed above, and includes 
FDI policies as an integral part of the FDI process.  I present the model in two tests.  In 
the first test I explain the factors that influence FDI policies in developing states.  These 
factors express the mix of attitudes of openness and wariness that make up FDI 
policies, and are divided into the international and domestic influences described 
previously.  These domestic and international influences take the form of domestic 
political factors, international pressures, domestic demand for FDI, and past experience 
with FDI.   In the second test, I will demonstrate that international and domestic 
influences on FDI inflows, such as domestic politics, domestic investment market 
characteristics, and the international political environment, affect flows of FDI to those 
states.  I will highlight in the second test the role of FDI policies in the flow of inward 
FDI. 
Determinants of FDI Policies 
 What influences the policies that states make?  The logic of two-level games 
argues that international and domestic political factors are the major influences on 
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policies, and I argue that economic factors also play a role.  There are four general 
factors that affect developing states’ openness to FDI:  political and ideological costs, 
international pressure, demand for FDI, and strategic thinking.  I will discuss each of 
these influences more specifically in the following sections. 
Domestic politics and ideologies.  Stokes (1997), in a case study of Peruvian president 
Alberto Fujimori’s campaign promises versus actual economic policies as president, 
explores the concept of responsiveness.  Her article makes three points.  First, 
politicians in democracies do not necessarily keep their campaign promises, especially 
in developing countries.  They may be motivated to break their promises by new 
information upon taking office, a desire to say what voters want even though they know 
the voters are misguided, or a desire to mislead voters for personal gain.  Second, 
politicians may still be considered responsive to the electorate even if they break their 
campaign promises.  Third, it is difficult to determine whether politicians that break their 
promises are being responsive or unresponsive. 
Stokes’ arguments are in reference to democratic governments, but she brings 
up a germane point.  Governments are going to be more or less affected by popular 
pressure.   FDI is one issue that can feed popular sentiment for better or worse, and 
many governments must take the costs and benefits of FDI into account. 
Domestic politics and ideology affect FDI policy.  Strong interest groups, if 
present, may have an interest in the FDI question, and may or may not be in favor of 
FDI.  There are two levels of politics that we can explore.  The first centers on the type 
of regime, democratic or authoritarian, present in the developing country.  The second 
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centers on the ideology of the government, and specifically whether the government is 
leftist, centrist or rightist. 
There has been quite a bit of theoretical and empirical study on the regime-type 
and FDI which is relevant to this study.  Lipset (1959) wrote a seminal paper addressing 
the relationship between democracy and development concluding that democracy leads 
directly to development.    It has been generally noted that democracies tend to have 
safer environments for investments, with less chance that the government will 
confiscate or expropriate, and even less probability that the government will compete 
with private entrepreneurship (Freeman 1982).  Theory suggests that democracies 
provide more protections for private property rights, and provide institutional means of 
resolving disputes between parties which authoritarian governments lack (Olson 1993).  
However, many scholars, particularly those from the dependency school, have argued 
that autocratic governments also offer advantages to investors, such as relaxing 
unfavorable laws, using strong tactics to intimidate labor unions and other potential 
opposition to investment, and putting favorable policies in place faster than democracies 
(Evans 1979; O’Donnell 1988). 
The effects of regime type on FDI have been empirically mixed.  O’Neal (1994) 
shows that democratic governments create overall better rates of return for 
multinationals, but that multinationals investing in developing states with authoritarian 
regimes still manage to come out ahead.   Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994) also find this 
association.  Guillen (2000) in case studies of Argentina, Spain, and South Korea, finds 
that authoritarian and democratic governments stimulate different responses from labor 
unions toward FDI.  He finds that populist labor unions under authoritarian governments 
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tend to see multinational corporations as villains, whereas in democracies, populist 
labor unions support import-substitution models and adopt a “necessary evil” approach 
toward FDI.  Modernizing labor unions, on the other hand, collaborate with FDI at arms’ 
length in authoritarian countries, while adopting a partnership attitude in democracies. 
Most theoretical work generalizes the concept of “development,” while 
quantitative work tends to focus more specifically on actual flows of FDI, rather than on 
the policies of FDI.  Democracy has been the subject of many studies about its 
relationship to FDI flows, and in a broader sense, democracy has been tested for 
relationships to free trade, open markets, and most recently globalization.  Reactions by 
developing countries to free trade pressures and globalization lead to policy choices 
that have substantial effects on FDI.   
Teune (2002), for example, writes “it took most of the 1990s to grasp that without 
democracy, globalization could not continue in a peaceful, orderly fashion….,” and that 
“….Democracy at the national level became the political environment most open and 
receptive to processes of globalization.”  Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff (2000, 
2002a, 2002b) argue that democracies, with free and fair elections, create greater 
economic gains for leaders through trade agreements, which encourage them to pursue 
greater economic cooperation with other states and signal to the population that their 
leaders are open to more transparency in their decisions.  They find that democracies 
are more likely to conclude trade agreements, are more likely to conclude preferential 
trading agreements with one another, and generally set lower tariff barriers with one 
another regardless.  Milner (1998) suggests that ideas help define states’ policy actions, 
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and certainly democracy brings expectations of greater openness and transparency with 
it. 
An oft-debated concept in international relations, the democratic peace theory, 
argues that democratic regimes are less likely to go to war with each other, partly 
because of the economic links they forge (Maoz and Russett 1993).  One study has 
shown that democracy and economic interdependence exist in a relationship that brings 
greater peace and stability to the international arena, particularly when states are 
contiguous with each other (Oneal, Oneal, Maoz and Russett 1996). 
The above theoretical arguments give an indication that the preferences of 
democracies and autocracies are different when it comes to economic openness.  
Democracies generally are more open economically and likely to establish more open 
policies toward FDI, while autocracies want greater control over their economies and 
therefore set restrictive FDI policies.  Given this theorized and empirically supported 
relationship, and the fact that economic policy is an outcome of nations’ political 
regimes, it can be expected that democracies should be more open toward FDI and 
autocracies being less open. 
A second measure of political and ideological costs indicates what people in a 
country believe about the role of government in their economic and social lives.  
Running along a left to right spectrum, with those on the left advocating a greater role 
for government in the economy and society, and those on the right generally advocating 
for a smaller government role, these ideologies permeate political structures and 
provide a platform upon which the political process creates winners and losers.  In other 
words, we can predict policies based on the ideologies driving governments. 
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When it comes to foreign direct investment, the issue would seem to be pretty 
well cut and dried.  Past research has noted the presence of differing views on 
economic development within the domestic polity.  Vandevelde (1998) spells out the 
differences between economic nationalism, which is descended from the writings of 
Hobbes and Machiavelli and which prescribes wealth redistribution, state intervention in 
the economy and economic protection, versus economic liberalism, which has its roots 
in Locke, Smith and Ricardo and espouses wealth creation, free markets and limited 
government intervention.  Economic nationalists, he writes, are more likely to call for 
restrictions on trade and FDI, whereas economic liberals call for free trade and free 
movement of capital across borders. 
There are plenty of scholars who find that traditional relationships hold.  Ornstein 
and Stevenson (1984), in a study of elite attitudes in Canada, generally described right-
oriented elites as those favoring the status quo, cutting back on social welfare, and 
opposing government economic intervention (though this last point breaks down 
between the big business-small business divide).  Those on the left had high 
identification with labor unions and favored nationalization of some major enterprises, 
redistribution of income, and strengthening labor rights.  Similarly, the so-called 
“Washington Consensus,” a series of economically liberal prescriptions that were 
adopted by many developing countries, particularly in Latin America, held that 
developing countries could prosper by curtailing government intervention, lifting barriers 
on imports, exports, foreign investment, and financial transactions (Naím 2000). 
Empirical work trying to relate these ideologies to economic outcomes has been 
mixed.  OECD countries with strong leftist governments are associated with more 
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corporate taxes, larger interest rates, and increased public spending despite the fact 
that globalization would predict a weakening of their ability to implement such policies 
(Garrett 1995, 1998).  Oatley (1999) finds that partisan macroeconomic policies exist, 
despite the hypothesis that globalization has reduced the ability of parties to follow their 
own agendas.  He observes that leftist governments, under fixed exchange rates, 
impose more capital controls.  However, Gelleny and McCoy (2001) find that leftist 
governments do not necessarily tax more than other types of governments, and 
attribute this finding to one of two things: either leftist governments are nervous about 
creating an “anti-investment” climate, or they have accepted neo-liberal economic 
policies.  Nielson (2003) found the presence of leftist governments an unreliable 
predictor for the level of collected tariffs, a potential investment-discouraging policy.  
Pinto (2005) examines the hypothesis that labor is generally more favorable to FDI than 
capital because the entry of foreign capital alters the traditional returns to domestic 
labor and capital.  His empirical results on 18 developed countries uphold his 
hypothesis. 
We might generally expect that governments oriented to the right would generally 
be in favor of foreign direct investment.  For such governments, most of the opposition 
to FDI will come from leftist groups concerned about wages, social welfare and worker 
representation.  Such groups also tend to be distrustful of multinational corporations.  
However, right-oriented governments may also face some opposition from elements on 
the right, such as owners of smaller local businesses that will be hurt by foreign 
competition.  Because the right expects opposition from the left, it is prepared to deal 
with its opponents through various means (using anything from compromise to 
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repression).  Right-oriented governments are able to discount costs of their actions, 
having expected such opposition, and the other costs are relatively negligible. 
For leftist governments that consider opening to FDI, however, the costs may be 
greater.  Consider a leftist government that has been elected to power on the 
expectation that it will carry out a populist agenda.  As economic realities convince the 
leaders that they must consider opening to FDI, they must also consider the costs of 
doing so.  Leftist interest groups, particularly workers groups, might be upset at a shift 
away from the domestic economic agenda that was promised in the campaigns, and the 
costs to these groups of bringing in foreign investment may be grievous in terms of 
lower wages, the decreased power of unions and the potential loss of jobs due to 
competition. 
Some empirical findings indicate that left-oriented governments may not be as 
hostile to FDI as it may seem, especially if they are broken down along regime type.  
Guillen’s and Pinto’s work suggest left accommodation, and the fact that Pinto’s work 
takes place in developed countries suggest that the effect takes place in democracies. 
It is expected that leftist governments will be hostile to greater openness to 
foreign equity, given that they must answer to groups that stand to be hurt by foreign 
investment.  Rightist governments, which stand to benefit given their support by groups 
that stand to gain through foreign investment, should favor FDI openness.  I could find 
little information about how centrist governments should behave when it comes to FDI, 
and therefore it is difficult to predict a definite relationship. 
Most discussion of nationalism in political economy appears to equate it with 
protectionism, economic autarky, and closing the state to external economic interests 
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(Shulman 2000).    Indeed, the idea of nationalist protection of the economy in writings 
of political economy has a long history.  For example, Robert Gilpin (1975) described 
three models of the future for the international economy.  One of them, mercantilism, 
described an economic nationalism of nation-states competing for scarce resources and 
eventually, organizing into regional economic blocs to protect themselves.  Johnston 
(1985), arguing that Canadian trade unions represented a more nationalist and 
protectionist position economically, found that Canadian trade union elites did not favor 
foreign investment as much as corporate elites, and were strongly in favor of 
nationalization.  He also found that Canadian representatives of local capital favored 
more regulation on foreign firms than representatives of international capital.  Beinin 
(1999) chronicles the turn of Middle Eastern Arab regimes away from economic 
nationalist state-led industrialization and import substitution policies to policies of free 
trade and global economic integration beginning in the 1970s.  Nayar (2000) points out 
that the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party’s economic program, while not greatly 
different from the Congress Party that preceded it, took issue with the Congress Party’s 
opening of the economy to foreign capital and promoted an India-first model of 
development in which foreign direct investment would play a supplementary role to local 
capital.  Berend (2000) describes the economic nationalism of Central and Eastern 
Europe after World War One, which encouraged import substitution policies in an 
attempt to separate itself from Western Europe. 
Indeed, while nationalism cannot be equated with dependency theory, both 
appear to have sprung out of some similar concerns about globalization.  Both appear 
to focus attention on the potential harms to local economies and workers as foreign 
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capital become increasingly present, and both have encouraged affected nations to 
institute some closing-off of the economy to world forces in order to counteract these 
perceived harms.  It is therefore very likely that countries with a more nationalist 
orientation would be more wary of foreign investment and more likely to have policies 
restricting FDI. 
International political pressure.  One force that may make a great impact on the 
openness of FDI policies is the overt and implied political pressure put onto states by 
other international actors.  As trends continue to move nations toward greater economic 
openness, developing countries under greater international political pressure are more 
likely to be pushed in that direction, which includes greater openness toward FDI. 
Multinational corporations, as potential beneficiaries of FDI, are at the forefront of 
this international political pressure.  However, their efforts are supported by other 
international actors.  Some scholars have argued that under the onslaught of non-state 
actors, the sovereign state is becoming one of many international players, rather than 
the only international player (Strange 1982, Stopford, Strange and Henley 1991, 
Strange 1996).  Developed states, whose multinational corporations provide the lion’s 
share of FDI, are one additional source of international political pressure.  Another 
source of pressure is international opinion and mores.  A good example of such 
consensus of opinion is the promotion and widespread acceptance of the economics of 
the “Washington Consensus” by the international community beginning in the 1980s. 
Other sources of political pressure are international organizations which often 
make their membership and benefits contingent on greater economic openness.  While 
developing countries do not need to be members of these organizations, most join 
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because of the perceived benefits and to gain a greater voice in international matters.  
International organizations are important for a variety of reasons.  They allow member 
states to share information on the actions of other states, share and reduce the costs of 
agreement negotiation, and to bring to light and sanction other nations for agreement 
violations (Milner 1998).  Martin and Simmons (1998) indicate that there is a long history 
of research that indicates that international institutions affect state behavior and their 
domestic policies.  While Matecki (1956) argued early in the post-war period that 
institutions could be places where inspiration and ideas could be fostered, later scholars 
such as Cox (1969) showed how international institutions, through their executive 
leaderships, could influence domestic policy through building support with domestic 
interest groups.  Various interest groups and entities can even push for some policies to 
be removed from national decision-making entities and put into the hands of 
international institutions if it meets their needs.  Goldstein (1996) explores why the 
United States allowed for trade disputes within NAFTA to be removed from its national 
courts to an international body when doing so clearly weakened its abilities to rule in 
favor of its own citizens and businesses.  Goldstein argues that disputes between the 
president and Congress over free trade and protectionism led the executive branch to 
favor the international body.  However, Congress ratified this move, possibly partly due 
to political pressure from constituents concerned about the trade imbalance.  Other 
aspects of international institutions that may affect domestic policy outlined by Martin 
and Simmons include promotion of transparency in international policy, forcing 
democratic nations to live up to their ideals on the world stage, providing a vehicle for 
nations to solve collective action problems and help nations coordinate more efficient 
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policy responses (though efficient policies are not always a result!), and establishing 
rules and norms for international behavior. 
There are a number of international institutions, such as the World Bank, the 
World Trade Organization, and others that focus on world economic issues, including 
openness to investment and standardization of international regulations on investment.  
Given that membership in such institutions increases transparency, standardizes policy 
outcomes, sets rules for compliance and provides some punishment for contrary 
behaviors, it can be expected that membership in international institutions leads to 
greater openness in policies of foreign direct investment.   
Developing countries that border on or are within the sphere of influence of 
developed countries may be subject to greater pressures toward economic openness.  
The case of Mexico is all too apparent, bordering as it does on the giant United States’ 
economy.  Haggard and Maxfield (1996), for example, write that Mexico’s proximity to 
the United States limits its ability to put governmental currency controls in place.  
Hanson (1997, 114) writes “….For Mexico, the proximity and size of the United States 
make trade liberalization tantamount to integration with its northern neighbor.”  Middle 
Eastern and North African nations, particularly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
have been forced to seek greater economic integration with Europe, leading to 
increased pressures to open their economies further.  The northern African nations of 
Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania formed the Arab Maghrib Union for this 
specific purpose.  Owen (1993, 5) writes “…hence, the European Community seems to 
have had the freedom to demand integration as a prior condition to serious negotiations 
if and when it suits its own interest.” 
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Given the pressure that can be brought to bear by developed nations on 
developing nations all over the world, and considering that some developing nations’ 
proximity to the developed world gives them an interest in putting policies in place that 
will make them attractive to capital from their wealthier neighbors, it can be expected 
that this proximity leads to greater openness in FDI policies. 
Demand for FDI.  The demand for FDI is another combination of factors that affect the 
openness of FDI policies in developing countries.  The demand for FDI can be summed 
up as the relative importance of FDI in development strategies versus other options for 
development.  States are not simply limited to one avenue of development.  They can 
have access to alternative sources of capital, and may gain development funding from 
international lending institutions, overseas aid, exports (which increase cash flow), and 
domestic savings.  States can put themselves at a disadvantage by relying too heavily 
on one form of development.  States that rely primarily on loans, for instance, place a 
great amount of control in the hands of their creditors, the international lending 
institutions.  Often states cannot rely too heavily on overseas aid due to uncertainty 
about whether the funding will remain in place or at the same levels year after year.  In 
the case of FDI, states that rely too heavily on foreign investment capital face the same 
problems as outlined in the previous chapter.  By relying on FDI, they enter a bargain 
with multinational corporations.  Access to other options not only strengthens countries’ 
bargaining strength with MNCs, it also reduces their reliance on FDI. 
Domestic savings, the first component of demand for FDI, follows a simple 
maxim:  savings equals investment.  Greater amounts of domestic savings create more 
homegrown capital for local entrepreneurs.  Sengupta (1968) establishes the 
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relationship between domestic savings and investment by showing that the difference 
between exports and imports equals the difference between gross domestic savings 
and gross domestic investment.  Countries can therefore invest more than they save if 
the shortfall in savings is met by the same amount in increases in imports.  Krause 
(1989) links the high development growth of Pacific Rim Asian countries with high 
domestic savings rates, leading to a lack of dependence on foreign capital.  Graham 
(1991) writes of the low gross domestic savings rate in the United States, and how that 
has fueled a greater dependence on foreign investment to drive an economy that 
continually performs at mediocre levels.  This does not just apply to the United States.  
Mongolia has relied on foreign investment to make up for a shortfall in gross domestic 
savings as well (Goyal 1999).  In terms of policies, those countries that establish greater 
restrictions on FDI may be relying on higher savings rates to fuel development.  
Conversely, those countries that are more open to foreign capital may be trying to make 
up for a perceived shortfall in domestic savings.  We would expect savings to show an 
inverse relationship with countries’ policies on foreign direct investment, because 
greater amounts of foreign direct investment is commonly associated with a low 
domestic savings rate. 
Foreign aid, the next component of demand for FDI, is financial assistance given 
by developed countries to developing countries.  Research has established a 
relationship between foreign aid and foreign direct investment, though the relationship 
seems to run in different directions depending on the study.  Sometimes, the 
relationship seems to enhance, rather than replace, foreign direct investment prospects.  
Jodice (1980) finds that greater reliance on foreign aid reduces the number of 
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expropriations in developing countries, though the relationship is weaker than expected, 
and Bandelj (2002) found that foreign aid had a significant and positive relationship on 
logged-FDI flows between dyadic pairs. 
However, other studies find that foreign aid supports development as an 
alternative to foreign direct investment.  For example, Kamath (1990) attributes China’s 
post-Maoist “Open Door Policy” for foreign direct investment to three factors:  the 
impossibility of China raising the resources for development domestically due to its 
Mao-era economic troubles; as an alternative to foreign borrowing, which China did not 
trust and pursued with a wary eye; and China’s isolation from multilateral aid agencies 
and a desire to not become dependent on bilateral aid.  In addition, China needed the 
foreign technology that comes with FDI.  Another study attributes the growth in FDI in 
developing countries to the slowdown in U.S. foreign aid (Summary and Summary 
1998).  
While funding from developed countries is supposed to enhance the 
development options of developing countries, we might expect that, despite the 
uncertainty of its availability, countries have reasons to want to receive foreign aid as an 
alternative to other forms of development, and that a loss of foreign aid would lead 
countries to make up the shortfall elsewhere.  In developing countries, where over the 
past 30 years domestic savings have not lead to significant investment, and where 
foreign borrowing has often led to debt crises, foreign aid might be a reasonable 
alternative.  Therefore, it can be expected that larger levels of foreign aid will lead to 
more restrictive FDI policies. 
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International loans are another potential variable that may have an effect on the 
demand for FDI.  There is substantial scholarship to support this idea.  Some 
researchers indicate that external debt and foreign investment compete with each other.  
In developing countries with a large public sector, as in Brazil and Mexico, foreign 
borrowing was a direct result of import substitution policies and provided funding for 
massive new state investments in the economy.  By the mid-1970s, this foreign 
borrowing crowded out foreign investment in many sectors (Alarcon and McKinley 
1992).  Frieden (1983) relates that a net result of such borrowing was that such 
countries increased their industrial and exporting capacities.  He goes on to argue that 
foreign borrowing is simply another form of foreign investment, albeit an indirect form, 
and presents statistics demonstrating that throughout the 1960s and 1970s an increase 
in the share of foreign capital inflows into developing countries held by private 
international financiers was accompanied by a decrease in the share of inflows held by 
multinationals.   
However, there are some contrary indications that foreign loans affect the 
demand for FDI.  In particular, China has benefited from both borrowing and foreign 
direct investment, using the two simultaneously to fund its development (Lardy 1995).  
The issue may be one of causality.  If countries have racked up great amounts of 
external debt, would they be more inclined to seek capital to pay off their debt?  Might 
another way to gain capital consist of the promotion of foreign direct investment?  A 
temporal element may also be in effect, as countries developing over time may reach a 
threshold where they cannot, or will not, borrow any more.  However, since foreign 
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borrowing constitutes a possible alternative to FDI, it is expected that countries that rely 
more upon international lending will have more restrictive FDI policies. 
The trade balance may be a force that influences FDI policies.  Sengupta, as 
noted above, set the trade balance equal to the difference between gross domestic 
savings and gross domestic investment: 
InvestmentDomestic SavingsDomestic ImportsExports −=−  
This simple equation suggests that the trade balance is linked with investment, and 
particularly that a trade deficit will lead to a savings deficit which opens the door to 
foreign capital.  Lipsey (1991) argues that direct investment in the United States is part 
of a web of interrelationships involving imports, exports, market shares and component 
and materials sourcing, though he doubts the relationship leads to much effect on the 
U.S. trade balance.  The trade balance is also nested with other possible variables, 
including exchange rates, which affect whether investment will be domestic or foreign.  
In any case, Lipsey and Sengupta serve to show that trade and foreign direct 
investments are interrelated.  For example, in the United States, larger trade deficits 
have helped turn the United States into a debtor nation with a greater reliance on 
foreign direct investment, though some argue that this state of affairs is not all bad 
(Dornbusch 1990).  If trade balance is indeed related to foreign direct investment, then 
trade surpluses affect the demand for FDI, and will result in more restrictive FDI 
policies, while trade deficits will lead to more open FDI policies. 
Because the demand for FDI is inversely related to the availability of other sorts 
of development funding, we should see that these four factors – domestic savings, 
foreign aid, foreign loans and the trade balance – are negatively related to the openness 
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of FDI policies.  Alternatively, it is possible that general openness to FDI directly 
influences the demand for FDI.  For example, developing countries that have greater 
openness to FDI may gain a positive reputation that justifies greater trust from 
international lending and aid institutions and decreases the amount of domestic savings 
as the economy develops and more local resources are tapped.    In other words, 
openness to FDI may precede demand for FDI, in which case we would not see these 
relationships develop as the theory predicts.  Should the theory be correct, then 
developing countries that maintain trade surpluses and rely on greater amounts of 
foreign loans, overseas aid, domestic savings will rely less on FDI, and therefore may 
be expected to be more restrictive in their FDI policies. 
Past experience with FDI.  Finally, developing countries look to past experience in 
developing their policies.  By looking at past experience with FDI, states can anticipate 
their needs, and therefore past performance becomes part of the agreement process.  I 
argue that developing countries take advantage of their attributes, which will be 
explained more fully in the test of Model Two, to exert control over the FDI process.  
Developing countries have no exact idea what they can expect in terms of FDI inflows 
from year to year.  While they can make a prediction based on past performance, 
current negotiations with firms, and other tangible and intangible factors, they will not 
know the exact level of FDI inflows until those inflows are accounted for.  In addition, in 
order to have a modicum of control over the FDI process, developing states may want 
to keep their FDI policies as restrictive as they possibly can while maintaining inflow 
levels at an acceptable level.  For example, assume that the government of a 
developing state believes that it is attractive to investors for a variety of reasons, such 
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as natural resources, infrastructure, abundant labor, a large market, and a stable 
political system.  This government believes that investors are more disposed to invest in 
the state than not.  Should political and economic realities mean the state has restrictive 
policies, it enters the agreement phase with firms in a good bargaining position.  If firms 
agree, the various constituencies within the state might favor restrictive FDI policies in 
the future based on the anticipation that the state will still receive an acceptable level of 
FDI. 
On the other hand, assume that a state has not been attractive to investors, and 
has experienced a stagnant flow or decline of FDI in the recent past.  If the 
constituencies of this state have agreed to open FDI policies in the political process, the 
state may find itself in a weaker bargaining position so that the investment it does get 
works to a greater benefit for firms and a lesser benefit for states. 
If states review past performance, where do they get their information in order to 
make reasonable estimates?  States will look at past FDI figures as well as their assets, 
liabilities and negotiating positions and try to anticipate and predict future FDI.  On a 
basic level, if states see that past inflows have been declining and economic 
performance is down, governments may be compelled to open to FDI.  States that have 
rising FDI may act in various ways given other economic and political factors. 
Determinants of FDI Inflows 
 All of the factors described in the previous section influence current FDI policies, 
which indicates the extent of developing countries’ openness to FDI.  In this model, I 
argue that FDI policies have a strong influence on inflows of FDI into developing 
countries.  In addition to FDI policy, other influences on FDI inflows include 
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characteristics of the investment market, political characteristics of the state, and state 
economic characteristics.  All of these factors combine to determine the levels of 
developing countries’ overall total of FDI inflows.  I discuss the influences on FDI inflows 
in greater detail in the next sections. 
FDI policies.  Now that FDI policies and the factors that influence developing countries’ 
level of openness to foreign investment have been established, FDI policies become an 
important influence on FDI, and their level of openness should have a strong impact on 
FDI inflows.  FDI policies serve as one basis for agreement between developing 
countries and international firms over investment, as well as delineating each 
developing country’s win-set, or range of possible agreements that they can make with 
firms.  Multinational corporations’ responses to developing country policies are therefore 
indicated by the amount of investment that flows into developing markets from foreign 
sources.  Policies that are more open increase the number of possible agreements with 
foreign firms that developing countries can accept, and should lead to a greater amount 
of FDI inflows, while restrictive policies reduce the range of agreements and should 
therefore decrease FDI inflows. 
State political characteristics.  The political character of the state does not just affect 
FDI policy.  It also affects the flow of FDI in and out of the domestic economy.  This 
effect is partly because the political makeup signals to potential investors what types of 
policies are in place in the host market, what the initial bargaining position of the host 
state will be, whether the state will be more inclined toward regulation, control, and 
expropriation or toward market freedom, whether the state will protect property rights, 
and so on.  In developing countries, where governmental structures may not be as 
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advanced or as stable as in the industrialized world, the political characteristic of the 
state can make a difference in the importance of foreign direct investment in its 
economy.  The political characteristics that have the greatest impact on foreign direct 
investment are regime type, ideology, and political stability. 
Regime type has many theoretical and empirical associations with foreign direct 
investment.  While most of the discussion on this concept for the first stage of the model 
is still pertinent in Model Two, there have been some specific quantitative studies 
utilizing regime type as an independent variable where the effects of regime type on FDI 
inflows have been generally favored democracy for greater inflows, with a few 
exceptions.  One exception has been reported by Resnick (2001), who finds a negative 
association between FDI and democracy in his study of FDI in nineteen developing 
countries, and Li and Resnick (2003) come to a similar finding on foreign direct 
investment and democracy in a study of 53 developing countries.  Property rights 
protections seem to mitigate this effect because they are stronger in democracies and 
suggest that developing countries may gain greater foreign investment by making 
incremental improvements in the protection of the rights of property owners. 
However, Feng (2001) finds that political freedom (usually associated with 
democracy) enhances private investment.  Jensen (2003) argues that findings that 
downplay democracy’s effect on FDI are in error because they do not account for the 
fact that most developing countries are more authoritarian than developed countries, 
and all developing countries depend on FDI as a greater share of their GDP than 
developed countries.  In tests on cross-sectional and time-series cross-sectional models 
he finds that democracies are 70 percent more likely to attract FDI than non-
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democracies.  He concludes that democracies are considered low-risk, which makes 
them attractive to international investors. 
In the face of much theoretical and empirical support, it is likely that countries 
that are more democratic will be more likely to receive the benefits of FDI over countries 
that are not, although there is a possibility that, given the mixed findings, political 
stability matters more than regime type and therefore stable authoritarian and 
democratic regimes are considered attractive to investors. 
Ideology should also play a role in determining the amount of foreign direct 
investment inflows.  Ideology matters for numerous reasons, explained in Model One, 
and which serve as the basis for hypotheses.  If left-leaning governments are more 
likely to restrict FDI than right-leaning governments, then there should be less FDI in 
left-learning developing countries than in right-leaning ones. 
Unfortunately, few existing studies use ideology as a variable to predict FDI.  A 
very recent study that uses ideology was written by Jakobsen and de Soysa (2006) in 
response to an earlier study by Li and Resnick, cited earlier.  They take issue with Li 
and Resnick’s findings that democracy and FDI inflows have a negative association 
when controlling for property rights.  By increasing the sample size to 114 countries 
from 1984 to 2001, they find that property rights become insignificant.  Developing 
democracies gain higher inflows of FDI, and governments under the control of leftist 
political parties gain more FDI than governments under centrist and rightist control.  
They argue that leftist governments prefer FDI because it will help labor.  In turn, labor 
is less likely to engage in internal struggles over policy change, which offers potential 
investors credible guarantees against policy reversals.  Leftist democratic governments 
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are also more likely to fund public goods and engage in human capital formation which 
would be attractive to foreign investors. 
In the paucity of quantitative evidence about ideology and FDI it is hard to predict 
an outcome.  Certainly leftist governments should be more guarded about FDI as 
reflected in their policies, but does this translate to inflows?  Are MNCs attracted to 
supposedly capital-friendly right-oriented countries as opposed to capital-unfriendly left-
oriented countries?  It is expected that the traditional relationships will hold, but it is also 
quite possible that left-leaning developing democracies may be different, as Jakobsen 
and de Soysa suggest. 
Political stability and its relationship to FDI have been well-researched.  While it 
is possible that political instability inhibits FDI, the evidence has been decidedly mixed.  
Early research tended to equate democracy and political stability, but Bollen and 
Jackman (1985) make a good empirical case for not making such an assumption, and 
encourage researchers to test stability as a concept separate from democracy.  Bollen 
and Jones (1982) find a negative and insignificant correlation between political 
instability, defined as armed attacks, riots, deaths from political violence and 
assassinations, and domestic auto production (which, as they argue, involves significant 
foreign investment from the auto-producing corporations) in 84 countries.  Crenshaw 
(1991) also finds political instability, defined similarly to Bollen and Jones, to be an 
insignificant determinant of FDI in 69 developing countries.  Feng (2001) finds that usual 
indicators of political instability (strikes, revolutions, coups d’etat, and riots) have little 
effect on private investment.  Perhaps these findings are due to the fact that strikes and 
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riots are limited instances of instability and should not be grouped with larger, more 
disruptive instances of instability, such as wars, civil insurrection, and revolution. 
Political instability can also be measured by the rate of change of government.  
The more change that governments undergo, the fewer guarantees investors have in 
terms of protections and policy certainty.  Root and Ahmed (1979) find that frequent 
changes in government deter non-extractive foreign direct investment.  Feng, cited 
earlier, finds that government changeability and policy uncertainty have negative effects 
on FDI.  Li and Resnick (2003) find a positive correlation between regime durability and 
foreign direct investment, while Jakobsen and de Soysa (2006) discover that the 
association disappears when they increase sample size. 
Political stability in a country can often depend on whether it is in conflict 
externally or internally.  Internal conflict, such as civil unrest or civil war, is related to the 
concept of political instability as defined by strikes, revolutions, riots and coups d’etat. 
Civil war can be an extension of those occurrences, and is perhaps the next, more 
violent step of political instability.   External warfare, on the other hand, consists of 
government sponsored violence against another country.  External war can create 
political instability in all parties to the war, and most especially in the nation that fares 
badly. 
As one indicator of the domestic political environment, we can expect that greater 
political instability hinders, not enhances, FDI prospects in developing nations.  Given 
that developing nations are perceived to be less stable than the developed nations, and 
that theoretical links have been proposed linking greater FDI to greater stability, all 
aspects of political instability should correlate negatively with FDI. 
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Characteristics of the investment market.  Characteristics of states’ investment markets 
may affect foreign direct investment and its location in developing countries.  Theories 
of firms cited above have identified locational factors as contributing to firm decision-
making in foreign direct investment.  I will list a few factors here that fall under the 
locational rubric.  They include economic sectors, regional trade agreements, wages, 
and unionization.   
FDI may be attracted to certain countries based on the strength of certain 
sectors.  Much early FDI was attracted to extractive industries in raw materials, but 
newer investments are to be found in manufacturing and services.  It is crucial, when 
looking at issues related to development, to account for differences not only between 
but even within sectors (Semyonov and Lewin-Epstein 1986). 
Do these differences determine whether FDI enters developing countries?  
Research has linked investment in sectors to development in lesser-developed nations.  
While most pre-World War II foreign investment in Mexico was in public services and 
extractive industries, the latter half of the 20th century saw most investment go into the 
industrial sector (Weinert 1981).  Export-led growth in manufacturing, aided by foreign 
direct investment, helped Sri Lanka rebound from a dismally underperforming economy 
to a vibrant outward-oriented economy (Athukorala and Rajapatirana 2000).  Public 
investment in Malawi, which includes significant investments in the services sector, has 
been shown to demonstrate a two-directional causal relationship with private investment 
(Mataya and Veeman 1996).  However, Root and Ahmed (1979) do not find any 
significance in the relationship between the ratios of manufacturing to GDP and raw 
material exports to GDP to foreign direct investment in manufacturing, and  Crenshaw 
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(1991) finds that foreign capital penetration in extractive industries actually reduces total 
FDI stock, while foreign capital penetration in manufacturing increases FDI stock. 
If sectoral differences are a factor in attracting FDI, there should be a positive 
relationship between one or more sectors and FDI performance, assuming that there 
are no causality questions.  Developing countries with industrial economies or 
economies that focus on manufacturing should attract foreign direct investment.  More 
recently, services have accounted for a greater share of overall foreign direct 
investment.  Services accounted for the majority of FDI in developing countries in 
200514.  In 2004, the share of services in FDI accounted for 63 percent of FDI flows, 
and 55 percent of FDI stocks in 2001 (Kolstad and Villanger 2004).  Most of the share of 
services in FDI can be attributed to the financial and business sectors.  Kolstad and 
Villagner (2004) also report that there is also evidence of a positive interrelationship 
among FDI in various sectors, particularly between the manufacturing sector and the 
services sector.    Based on such evidence, it is expected that developing countries with 
economies focusing on services should also attract more FDI. 
International Factors.  International factors do not only affect FDI policies, but can have 
a large effect on FDI inflows.  Membership in international organizations concerned with 
trade and investment, for example, may be an attraction for firms that look for a level 
playing field when making their investments.  Besides Jodice’s (1980) finding of a weak 
relationship between FDI and international institutional pressure in terms of 
expropriations, McGinnis and Movsesian (2000) explore the impact of the WTO on 
world trade and argue that its rules and norms restrict protectionist groups within 
                                                 
14 UNCTAD, 2006 World Investment Report.  Highlights of the report can be found online at 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/webflyer.asp?docid=7431&intItemID=2527&lang=1&mode=highlights 
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domestic society and increase countries’ abilities to engage in trade, and by extension, I 
would argue, foreign investment.  Solingen (2001) defines internationalization as the 
expansion of global markets, institutions and norms, and maintains that countries in 
internationalizing regional coalitions attracted greater trade and foreign investment. 
Proximity may also have an effect on FDI inflows.  Deichmann et al. (2003) find 
that geographic factors helped determine Eastern European countries’ attractiveness to 
foreign firms.  Eastern European countries clustered in three groups geographically; 
those that were making progress in economic and political reforms, those that were 
implementing some reforms but struggling with others, and those that lagged behind.  
These factors, plus their proximity to Europe, helped determine their attractiveness to 
foreign firms.  In addition, a recent study on the impacts of the globalization of health 
care and its meaning for the Caribbean nations argues that proximity to the United 
States, which has an aging population and high costs of health care, could benefit 
foreign investment in health care in countries such as Jamaica (Bernal 2007). 
Other factors exist that may influence FDI inflows.  Regional trade agreements 
(RTA) may enhance FDI inflows to individual countries within the RTA, but only if the 
country is already a desirable site for FDI and if it has liberal trade and investment 
policies (Blomstrom and Kokko 1997).  Worth (1998) finds that RTAs enhance trade 
liberalization, which affects per capita GDP, GDP growth and market size and which, in 
turn, affect FDI flows. 
FDI inflows in developing countries may also be affected by their comparative 
advantage in labor provision owing to a surplus of labor.  Neoclassical economics 
argues that a greater supply of labor in a market should mean lower wages.  Theories of 
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FDI argue that FDI should flow from high labor cost markets to low labor cost markets to 
minimize labor costs to firms. (Calvet 1981).  Low wages are a basis for price 
competitiveness for firms (Ozawa 1992).  Cushman (1987) finds that failing productivity 
and higher wages reduce the inflows of FDI.    However, Hanson (1995) disputes this 
notion, demonstrating that low wages in developing countries have not been associated 
with higher investment rates – the reverse is true.  He speculates that other factors, 
such as low labor productivity, have a greater influence on FDI.  Also, years of FDI 
investment may have a residual effect.  Several authors find that foreign investment 
raises wages in host countries (Feenstra and Hanson 1995, Aitken, Harrison and Lipsey 
1997, Lipsey and Sjoholm 2001). 
Unionization may be another influence on FDI inflows, and firms may assess 
unionization as one local factor that affects their decision to invest.  Cooke (1997) lists 
three reasons why firms would want to avoid unions: restrictions on management ability 
to direct their workforce, added transaction costs from bargaining and work disruptions, 
and higher wages and benefits associated with unionization.  He finds a significant 
negative association between percentage of union membership in OECD countries and 
U.S. direct investment.  Alderson (2004) explores another angle, that union density 
causes firm production costs to rise and flexibility in production to drop, and so spurs 
foreign direct investment to non-unionized countries.  However, he finds no relationship 
between union density and outward FDI. 
Another characteristic that is associated with foreign direct investment inflows is 
corruption.   Bardhan (1997) lists two main views of the effects of corruption on FDI 
inflows.  The first argues that corruption depresses FDI inflows because it places 
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barriers against investment within the market and greatly decreases efficiency.  The 
second argues that corruption aids the flow of the marketplace by allowing those 
investors that are willing to pay bribes to government officials to set up for business 
more efficiently. An example often given is China, which is considered to have rampant 
corruption but also garners much foreign investment (Wei 2000).  Wei finds that 
increases in tax rates or corruption reduce inward FDI, and that American investors are 
as averse to corruption as investors of any other nation.  Habib and Zurawicki (2002) 
find that not only does corruption have a negative effect on FDI, but also firms in corrupt 
countries will not invest in countries where corruption is even worse.  Because 
corruption is widely seen as an impediment to investment and smoothly operating 
business, corruption should be negatively associated with FDI inflows. 
Market size has been a long-established predictor associated with foreign direct 
investment, because larger markets provide greater potential sales and possibly greater 
local support and supply opportunities for businesses.  As early as 1969, Scaperlanda 
and Mauer found that GDP, proxying as market size, was the only consistent predictor 
of U.S. foreign investment in the European Economic Community.  Jaumotte (2004) 
found that market size, as operationalized by real GDP, was a significant and positive 
predictor of overall FDI within regional trade agreements.  China is often cited for its 
meteoric FDI growth partly because of its large market potential.  Even within China, 
regions with a larger market size attract more FDI (Wen 2005).   However, Miller and 
Weigel (1972) did not find a significant correlation between market size and U.S. direct 
investment in Brazil.  And Crenshaw (1991), operationalizing market size as total 
energy consumption in thousand-ton coal equivalents, found market size negatively 
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associated with total FDI stocks and stocks per capita, but acknowledged that 
elimination of overly-influential outliers in his analysis led to severe problems with 
heteroskedasticity.  These factors should be controlled for in any test. 
The Next Step: Testing the Model 
The model outlined above is one possible explanation of FDI in developing 
countries.  In the first part of the model, FDI policy is determined by domestic political 
and ideological costs, international pressure, demand for FDI, and anticipated inflows.  
The policies that result from the first stage then become determinants of FDI inflows in 
the second part of the model.  The influence of policies is supplemented by 
characteristics of each developing state’s political environment, investment market, and 
economic characteristics.  Because there is an anticipatory aspect to the first model, 
inflows from previous time periods feed back into the first part.  Figure 2-2 provides a 
graphical representation of the theory. 
In Chapter Three, I will provide a quantitative test of this model.  I introduce a 
new measure of FDI policy, the FDI Equity Index, which will shed light on how policies 
establish each state’s openness toward FDI.  I lay out a statistical model which defines 
independent and control variables for the concepts I propose above, and conduct a test 
to determine whether those variables influence FDI equity openness.   
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Figure 2-2:  Determinants of FDI Policy and Inflows 
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Chapter Three 
Quantifying and Testing Foreign Direct Investment Policies 
 
In this chapter I lay out the first part of a model of FDI policy and its effects on 
FDI.  This model follows the narrative and theory of FDI described in Chapter Two.  I 
argue that FDI policies in developing countries follow the logic of two-level games, and 
therefore are influenced by both domestic and international level factors.  Domestically, 
FDI policies are more open or closed based on attitudes (influenced by prevailing 
prescriptions for development in vogue at the time) that exist in the most powerful forces 
in the domestic political consciousness at any given point in time, along with realities of 
domestic economics.  The direct domestic influences on FDI policies are political and 
ideological forces, international pressure, the demand for FDI, and state anticipation or 
prediction of actual flows of FDI.  International influences on FDI policies come from 
pressures in the international political and economic environment. 
In the second part of the FDI story, inflows of FDI to states are influenced by the 
level of openness to FDI as indicated in their FDI equity policy, as well as domestic and 
international influences on firms’ decisions to invest.  Firms decide to invest based on 
existing state policies, characteristics of states’ investment markets, political regime 
type and stability, and other state economic characteristics.  I test the proposition that 
FDI policy is the basis for agreements developing states make with firms, and therefore 
any agreements (as indicated by FDI inflows) are influenced by these basic policies.  
The levels happen concurrently, and the outcomes from both levels help explain the 
outcomes of the other. 
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States face a fundamental tension when dealing with FDI.  I assume that states 
want to receive FDI, and I therefore argue that they are motivated to seek FDI for 
development and gain.  However, there are costs to states for implementing policies 
that are open to FDI, and states that wish to bring in more investment have to take 
account of these domestic and international political costs.  These costs may include 
domestic opposition to FDI by powerful interest groups, and loss of economic and 
political power to international actors such as international institutions and multinational 
corporations.  Consideration of costs and benefits allow states to create and modify FDI 
policies, which serve as indicators of their FDI preferences.  Such costs and benefits not 
only influence states’ openness to FDI, but also predict the inflows of FDI into the state.  
States also examine their past inflows, which help them identify the usefulness of their 
current FDI policies.  Therefore, the explanation and testing of the complete model will 
follow this approach. 
Determinants of FDI Equity Policy 
 The first part of my theory explains the openness of countries to FDI.  States 
considering the extent of their openness weigh the benefits and costs of FDI against a 
number of other domestic and international factors.  In other words, we cannot assume 
that states are simply willing to accept FDI without first considering the factors that lead 
to such policies.  The factors described below are an integral part of the way states 
weigh the benefits and costs of FDI. 
 States’ openness to FDI is a difficult variable to measure, partly because there 
have been few quantitative studies of FDI policy and partly because the theoretical 
concept of FDI openness is very complex, consisting of many different components.  
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For example, Guisinger (1985) identified over 50 separate incentives and disincentives 
that pertain to FDI, and mapped these policies in ten countries.  The policies affect 
corporate revenues, inputs, value-added, the ability of individuals or corporations to own 
land, and corporations’ relations with labor.  FDI policies can consist of restrictions on 
new investment, regulations on existing investment, respect for and government 
protection of property rights, and level of taxation on foreign corporations to name a few.  
Which of these is most important?  Alternatively, are all of them important in determining 
FDI policy openness?   
Similar problems exist in measuring trade policy, leading some scholars to 
employ creative solutions which have relevance to the study of FDI policy.  A gravity 
model of optimal level of trade, employed by Hiscox and Kastner (2002) inspired Pinto 
(2005) to utilize their procedure to predict openness toward FDI.  Basically, a gravity 
model of trade utilizes the distance between two units and their respective market sizes 
to predict trade flows.  Pinto utilized the technique to develop a measure that indirectly 
represented FDI policy.  However, an indirect measure based on flows of investment 
may be problematic because it assumes that flows relate to policy.  This is not a sure 
assumption.  The only way to determine if flows relate to policy is to develop a direct 
measure of openness to FDI and test it; otherwise other methods remain approximate 
techniques of determining this elusive concept. 
One possible solution to the problem is to find a measure that more closely 
reflects FDI policy and policy changes which will allow a direct test of the influences on 
openness to FDI.  To date, few solutions have been forthcoming.  Bandelj, stating that 
“no other study has tried to quantify host country FDI policy,” wrote perhaps the first 
 109
paper where a direct measure of FDI policy was utilized.  She created her variable by 
conducting a content analysis of government provisions for incoming FDI in eleven 
Eastern and Central European countries (Bandelj 2002, 426).  Her policy variable, 
which she used as an independent variable, did not significantly affect FDI inflows. 
So far, FDI policy measures consist of indirect measures applicable to a large 
number of countries, as in Pinto’s gravity model measure, or a direct and encompassing 
measure that is limited to a small number of countries, such as Bandelj’s measure.  A 
large-scale statistical analysis utilizing a direct measure of FDI policy has remained 
elusive.  The variable created for this study, the FDI Equity Index, is a significant step 
toward resolving the gap between indirect and direct measures and offers researchers 
the benefits of each. 
The FDI Equity Index is an ordinal measure of the equity openness to foreign 
investment of 57 developing countries over 29 years (1976-2004).15  The variable was 
created primarily through a content analysis of the Exporters Encyclopedia, a yearly 
publication currently published by Dun & Bradstreet which lists practical trading 
information for exporters.  Much of the information published in the Encyclopedia has to 
do with specific trading issues, such as tariffs and other taxes, labeling and packing 
regulations, a description of ports and the machinery available in them, etc.  However, a 
section on marketing in each country often includes a subsection on foreign investment 
and various policies that are in effect.  From these descriptions, exporters can 
determine whether equity restrictions are in place against foreign investment and 
                                                 
15 The full list of countries in the sample may be found in Appendix A.  A listing of summary statistics for each untransformed 
variable in this chapter is provided in Appendix B.  Transformed variables are indicated in the listing. 
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whether tax breaks and customs duties exemptions are allowed.  Sometimes even the 
entire text of a law or regulation is printed.16
The foreign equity index is thus a one-dimensional variable of equity openness.17  
The countries for which information was obtained are listed in Appendix A.   The 
variable was coded into four categories, with the lowest category correlating to the 
highest restrictiveness on foreign equity, and the highest category allowing the most 
foreign equity participation.  The categories therefore take on the following values: 
 
Category Description 
0 Less than 100 percent participation allowed, but 
majority foreign equity possible. 
1 100 percent foreign equity allowed in some sectors, 
but many sectors (over 10) restricted or prohibited 
2 100 percent foreign equity allowed in most sectors, 
but some sectors (6-10) restricted or prohibited 
3 100 percent foreign equity allowed in nearly all 
sectors; small number of sectors (0-5) may be 
reserved for state or domestic equity. 
 
This variable allows testing of an aspect of FDI policy that has not been directly 
tested before.  It is a direct measure and is also available for a large number of 
countries, and therefore presents an improved alternative to existing measures of FDI 
policy.  Figure 3-1 portrays the histogram of the variable.   
                                                 
16 Please refer to Appendix C for more information regarding the creation of the Foreign Direct Equity Index and problems 
encountered. 
17 The index does not count free trade area policies or export processing zone policies, which a number of developing countries 
have set up.  The policies creating these zones set aside a certain area where foreign companies can establish manufacturing 
plants, and where they get privileges not available to them in the overall domestic economy.  These policies are an attempt by 
domestic governments to manage foreign investment.  Free trade areas often allow 100% ownership and offer tax breaks and 
customs duty exemptions as long as all or a majority of the finished product is exported out of the country.  However, these are 
exceptions to the general domestic economy, and not the rule.  The FDI Equity Index only considers FDI equity policies that apply to 
the entire economy. 
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Over time, the countries in the sample moved toward greater openness in 
aggregate.  Figure 3-2 illustrates more of this upward drift in categories.  The mean 
value in 1976 for all countries is 0.92 and the median is 1.  By 2004, the median value 
increased to 2, and the mean value to 2.14.  A movement of one category in a positive 
direction for all countries in the sample does not seem like much movement, but it 
conceals some volatile movement within many individual countries.  Table 3-1 illustrates 
that some countries have moved toward greater openness in their foreign equity policies 
over 29 years, while others have remained more or less static. 
One fact stands out clearly:  once countries passed new foreign equity policies, 
they were unlikely to reverse them.  Only two countries in the sample ever reversed 
direction in their FDI equity policies.  Iran began 1976 in category 0, and then moved up 
to category 1 in 1995 after passing a law that allowed more than 50% foreign equity in 
joint ventures.  However, Iran fell back to category 0 in 2002 after a new law put a cap 
of 35% on foreign equity in individual companies and 25% cap on foreign equity in 
sectors.  Nigeria, in category 2 in 1976, passed a 1977 law setting caps on new 
investment and calling for the gradual phase-out of foreign equity to domestic investors, 
moving it back a category.  Nigeria moved up again after liberalizing its codes in 1989, 
and then to category 3 in 1995 following its Investment Promotion Commission Decree, 
which removed a number of sector-based restrictions on foreign equity. 
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 Table 3-1: Movement of Selected Sample Countries Along Equity Index 
 1976-2004 
Countries Moving 
Upward Two or More 
Categories 
Countries Remaining in 
Same Category  
Countries That 
Reversed Course 
during time period 
Algeria Brazil Iran 
Bangladesh Chile Nigeria 
Bolivia Cote D’Ivoire  
Colombia Gambia  
Dominican Republic Haiti  
Egypt Kenya  
El Salvador Lesotho  
Ethiopia Malaysia  
Ghana Niger  
Guyana Papua New Guinea  
Jordan Philippines  
Madagascar Swaziland  
Morocco Syria  
Mozambique Tunisia  
Nicaragua   
Nigeria   
Peru   
Trinidad and Tobago   
Turkey   
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What has influenced these countries’ FDI policies at particular points in time?  I 
have argued throughout this dissertation that factors at both the domestic and 
international levels affect FDI policies.  This blend is conditioned by prevailing attitudes 
toward FDI at any given point in time and even toward globalization in general.  The 
main domestic factors that influence FDI policies are domestic politics and economic 
realities.  The main international factors are international political and economic 
pressures.  I will operationalize these factors in more detail in the following sections. 
Domestic Level Politics:  Political and Ideological Costs to Government 
 In the previous chapter, I established that the domestic level political environment 
has an effect on FDI policymaking.  Domestic level bargaining between interest groups, 
political parties, state governments and other players in the political system produce 
coherent policies which are then presented to foreign corporations as the basis for 
agreement on FDI.  The state, once the policies are agreed upon, may enhance its 
prospects for agreement if it goes outside the bounds of domestic policy, but will face 
political costs at home.  The next sections will discuss the domestic political factors that 
influence FDI policies 
Regime type.  The previous chapter established sound theoretical reasons for believing 
that regime type influences FDI policy.  It has been argued here that democratic 
regimes tend to have safer environments for investments because they protect property 
rights and provide fair ways to resolve disputes.  Despite the fact that autocracies also 
can provide protections for investment, democracies have been at the forefront of the 
globalization movement and therefore have been open to free trade and investment. 
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To test the relationship between regime and FDI policies, I use the Polity IV 
dataset, which is one of the most widely used dataset on regime characteristics.  Polity 
IV consists of an index built on a number of regime indicators identified by Ted Robert 
Gurr.18   The dataset codes many countries from the early 1800s, utilizing a continuous 
scale from complete autocracy (-10) to complete democracy (+10).   
Figure 3-3 illustrates the distribution of the Polity IV variable over the sample 
data.  The Center for International Development and Conflict Management, which 
administers the Polity IV index, recently released its country codings through 2004, 
making them available for use in this study. 
In 1976, the median Polity IV aggregate score was -7, indicating that most 
developing countries in the sample were highly autocratic.  By 2004, the median 
aggregate score was 6, which put most countries in the sample in the democratic 
designation.  In 1976, 39 of the 57 countries in the sample had a score that was -5 
(autocratic) or below, and only 10 countries had scores of 5 or above (democratic).  The 
remaining eight countries (which could be labeled “transition” countries) occupied the 
area between -5 and 5.   By 2004, the situation had reversed.  The number of autocratic 
countries had dropped to 10, and the number of democratic countries in the sample had 
risen to 36, with the remainder in transition. 
There are theoretical and empirical reasons to believe that regime type is 
positively related to FDI policy.  Democracies are more likely to have open economies, 
while autocracies prefer to maintain more control over their economies and are 
                                                 
18 The Polity IV dataset can be found at the website of the Center for International Development and Conflict Management, 
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/projects/project.asp?id=18.  Use of two other variables, the Vanhanen Polyarchy index and the Freedom 
House Freedom in the World index, were also considered.  All three indexes are highly correlated with each other.  The Vanhanen 
index only coded countries to the year 2000, and therefore did not cover the time-frame of this study.  The Freedom House index 
had data for all the years of this study, and its substitution into the regression equation in place of the Polity variable does not alter 
the results of the regressions. 
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Figure 3-3: Regime type
therefore likely to be more restrictive.  It can be expected that this relationship will hold 
with FDI equity policies. 
H1: Regimes that are more (less) democratic will have more (less) open FDI 
equity policies 
Left-right spectrum.  Theoretical links have been established between ideological 
orientation and economic preferences, which encourages a test of this concept.  In 
general, literature reviewed in Chapter Two showed that the right is associated with 
free-market principles, free trade, and economic globalization while the left tends to be 
focused more on the national economy and various groups within it that depend on 
social welfare. 
The measure utilized for ideological orientation is taken from the Database of 
Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001).  The DPI categorizes the ideological orientation 
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of each country’s chief executive’s party by labeling it as “left”, “center”, “right” or “other.”  
The category “other” consists of those governments that cannot be categorized on a 
left-right continuum, such as monarchies, theocracies, some military dictatorships and 
periods of non-governance. 
The database also lists the ideological orientation of the ruling party in 
government, and of the largest opposition party.  In few cases were there any 
misalignments.  The entries for Bangladesh in 2002, 2003 and 2004 were corrected for 
this study because the entries for the chief executive’s party and the largest government 
party were not aligned even though they were both labeled as the same party in the 
database.  In nearly all cases, the chief executive aligned with the ruling party in 
ideological orientation, and so the orientation of the chief executive’s party was chosen 
as the measure to be used. 
Out of the 57 countries in the sample, leftist governments averaged just over one 
fourth of all governments each year during the time period examined, with the highest 
proportion of leftist governments in existence from 1976 – 1990.  Rightist governments 
averaged just over one-fifth of all governments during this same period, but gained a 
higher proportion during the 1990 – 2004 time range.  Centrist governments only 
existed in about three countries per year in the sample.  The governments characterized 
as “other” account for almost half the governments in the sample from 1976 – 2004. 
The categorical variable from the DPI was reconfigured into separate dummy 
variables, labeled “left”, “center”, “right” and “other”.  The “right” category was left out of 
model estimations and serves as a basis of comparison.  The variables were coded 1 if 
they possessed the required ideological attribute.  For example, “left” is coded 1 if the 
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chief executive’s party is oriented to the left and 0 if it is coded any other way.  The 
same coding rules were utilized for “center” and “right.” 
Research suggests that the left tends to be less supportive of and open to FDI 
because it is more concerned with boosting and protecting the national economy, 
redistributing income and supporting a strong labor movement.  Alternatively, the right 
tends to be less hostile toward FDI because in the past 30 years it has supported global 
interdependence and free trade.  This relationship should therefore hold with FDI equity 
policy.  There is little research on the center’s attitudes toward FDI, and therefore the 
relationship could run in either direction or be non-significant. 
H2: Left-oriented governments prefer less open FDI equity policies than right-
oriented governments. 
Nationalism.  Neoclassical theory and researchers studying nationalism suggest that 
nationalist governments may be more inclined view the international economy as a 
competition for scarce resources.  Nationalist governments also may attempt to shield 
certain constituencies in their country by protecting their markets from outside forces in 
the belief that greater openness to international economic forces may cause harm to 
local economies. 
To test nationalism’s effect on FDI policies, I employ a variable from the 
Database of Political Institutions, which is coded as 1 when the largest party in the 
government is a nationalist party and 0 when it is not.  In the sample, nationalist 
governments made up 19.5 percent of all governments in all countries over the 29 years 
of data.  The variable is missing 227 observations.  I predict that nationalist 
 119
governments will be more inclined to pass FDI policies that have more restrictions than 
non-nationalist governments. 
H3:  Nationalist governments will prefer less open FDI equity policies. 
Domestic Level Economics 
Domestic level politics work in conjunction with domestic economic realities.  These 
realities include the ways that the state funds development.  If a state can rely on 
alternative sources of development, or it has had past success with FDI, these factors 
will influence state policies.  The next few sections discuss the domestic economic 
environment. 
 Domestic savings.  The previous chapter discussed the links between domestic 
savings and foreign direct investment, particularly that low domestic savings is 
associated with high rates of foreign direct investment.  Countries that have low 
domestic savings are less able to develop using domestic capital, and must make up for 
the lack of capital by importing it from foreign sources. 
Gross domestic savings is used as the measure of domestic savings in this 
model estimation.  Figures 3-4 and 3-5 graphically depict the descriptive statistics for 
gross domestic savings in the country sample.  From 1976 through 2004, average gross 
domestic savings increased over three times.  In 1976, the average gross domestic 
savings in the country sample was $13.81 billion (constant 2000 dollars).    By 2004, the 
average gross domestic savings was $31.46 billion.  Overall, between 1976 and 2004, 
gross domestic savings as a percentage of GDP increased only slightly, from 18.24 
percent to 19.43 percent.  Between those years, the percentage dipped as low as 13.88 
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Figure 3-5: Gross Domestic Savings
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Figure 3-4: Gross Domestic Savings
percent in 1983 but mostly fluctuated back and forth.  Gross domestic savings as a 
proportion of GDP is the measurement used in order to control for market size and to 
solve autocorrelation problems resulting from a rising trend in the non-proportioned 
statistic.  I expect that gross domestic savings will show a negative relationship with 
countries’ policies on foreign equity. 
H4: As developing states’ proportion of gross domestic savings to GDP rises 
(falls), they are more likely to have less (more) openness to foreign equity 
Foreign aid.  Foreign aid, the next component of demand for FDI, is financial assistance 
given by developed countries to developing countries.  The previous chapter discussed 
the research on the links between foreign direct investment and foreign aid, and its 
often contradictory findings.  While foreign aid in some cases enhances foreign direct 
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investment, developing countries with capital shortages can turn to foreign aid to 
supplement or replace FDI.   
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) defines 
official development assistance (ODA) as “flows to countries…and multilateral 
institutions…to aid recipients which are 1) provided by official agencies, including state 
and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and 2) each transaction of 
which: a) is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare 
of developing countries as its main objective; and b) is concessional in character and 
conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 
per cent).”19  This study uses ODA to each developing country as a percentage of 
overall assistance to all developing countries from OECD members.  Because of a right-
skew and kurtosis, the variable has been right-shifted and logged to mitigate these 
difficulties and in order to cut down on any loss of observations.   
Figure 3-6 graphs the yearly mean of ODA to countries in the sample as a 
percentage of total ODA given to all developing countries by members of the  
OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC).  The amounts, as shown, are a 
very small percentage of overall ODA, either one percent or less.  Overall, the amount 
of ODA given to countries in the sample has undergone reductions over time, and 
generally mirrors the situation among most developing countries.  Net disbursements of 
ODA from the DAC countries to developing countries increased from about $40 billion in 
1976 to just over $74.1 billion in 1992, then fell to $57.6 billion in 1997.  By 2004, net 
                                                 
19 From the paper Is it ODA? by the Working Party on Statistics of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.  
Unclassified paper available online at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/21/34086975.pdf 
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Figure 3-6: Official Development Assistance
ODA disbursements had again risen to $79.4 billion.20  Figures for ODA per capita 
mirror the overall decline in ODA as a percentage of net DAC disbursements, peaking 
at a high of $86.14 per person in 1979 but declining to $30.89 by 2004.21  However, the 
World Bank reports that ODA has been rising recently, though most of the increase in 
development assistance has gone mainly to a small number of countries, particularly 
Iraq, Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of Congo.22
Developing countries experiencing a dearth of foreign assistance may use policy 
to draw in greater amounts of foreign direct investment.  Alternatively, greater amounts 
of foreign assistance may reduce a country’s need for foreign investment.  It is 
                                                 
20 Source:  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).  Data in constant (2004) U.S. dollars.  Statistical 
data for OECD development assistance can be found online at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/33/0,2340,en_2649_34447_36661793_1_1_1_1,00.html.  
21 Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2006. 
22 Source:  World Bank, World Development Indicators 2006 World View: Goals.  Report with analysis of Official Development 
Assistance can be found online at http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2006/contents/Section1_1_8.htm. 
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hypothesized here that a negative relationship will exist between official development 
assistance and FDI policy. 
H5: As the percentage of ODA to overall ODA falls (rises), there will be more 
(less) openness to foreign equity. 
Foreign borrowing.  The theory presented in the last chapter includes foreign borrowing 
by developing countries as another alternative to FDI.  Foreign borrowing has served to 
fund development in many developing countries, and is often seen as another form of 
investment.  Rather than being mutually exclusive in all cases, FDI and borrowing may 
work together, as in the case of China. 
I use gross external debt as the variable to represent foreign borrowing in this 
model.  Gross external debt consists of the amount that is still owed on loans to 
creditors outside the country.  According to the IMF, “Gross external debt is the amount, 
at any given time, of disbursed and outstanding contractual liabilities of residents of a 
country to nonresidents to repay principal, with or without interest, or to pay interest, 
with or without principal.”23  Therefore it gives a direct indication of the amount of loans 
that developing countries are responsible for in any given year. 
A potential problem with this variable is related to the range of time in the 
sample.  The measure not only takes into account recent borrowing, but also older 
loans that have not been repaid.  Therefore, the measure is fluid, and the statistics from 
1976 – 2004 most certainly include external debt incurred before 1976.  As with 
savings, debt as a percentage of GDP is used here.  The variable has been logged to 
protect against biased outcomes due to right-skewness and kurtosis.  Figure 3-7 
                                                 
23 From the International Monetary Fund’s External Debt Statistics: Guide for Compilers and Users, ©2003.  On the World Wide 
Web at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/eds/Eng/Guide/ 
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Figure 3-7: Gross External Debt
illustrates that the percentage of GDP of gross external debt among sample countries 
has been rising.  A negative relationship is expected because external debt represents 
an alternative path to development. 
H6: As percentage of external debt relative to GDP rises (falls), developing 
countries will have less (more) openness to foreign equity. 
Trade Balance.  As argued in the last chapter, with investment linked to trade balance, 
trade becomes another alternative to foreign investment.  Countries that focus on 
export-led development can hope to reduce their eventual reliance on foreign direct 
investment by building up a surplus in savings.   
The variable used in this study will be the trade balance as a percent of GDP.  
While the variable exhibits much kurtosis, logging the variable does little to mitigate this 
problem so the variable is used in its natural form.  Figure 3-8 demonstrates that the 
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Figure 3-8: Trade Balance
average trade balance for the countries across the sample for the years 1976-2004 was 
mostly negative, only turning positive around 1998.  With trade and investment so 
linked, I expect that trade balance varies negatively with foreign equity openness. 
H7: As the percentage of GDP of the trade balance in developing countries 
rises (falls), countries have less (more) openness to foreign equity. 
Because the demand for FDI is inversely related to the availability of other sorts 
of development funding, we should see that the alternatives to FDI, such as gross 
domestic savings, foreign aid, external debt and the trade balance, are inversely related 
to the level of openness recorded in the FDI equity index.  Alternatively, it is possible 
that general openness to FDI directly influences the demand for FDI.  For example, 
developing countries that have greater openness to FDI may gain a positive reputation 
that justifies greater trust from international lending and aid institutions and decreases 
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the amount of domestic savings as the economy develops and more local resources are 
tapped.   
In other words, openness to FDI may precede demand for FDI, in which case we 
would not see these relationships develop as the theory predicts.  Should the theory be 
supported in the model, then developing countries that rely on greater amounts of 
international loans, overseas aid, domestic savings and a positive trade balance will rely 
less on FDI, and therefore may be expected to be more restrictive in their FDI policies.   
Past FDI Performance 
Developing states that set policies on FDI and review these policies periodically 
will look at past FDI performance to determine present policies, specifically how much 
FDI they have received in previous years. How far in the past will they look?  I argue 
that states look farther than just one year in the past in order to judge their FDI 
performance.  Choosing a past time-frame may be somewhat arbitrary, yet many 
developing countries, especially those that were formerly socialist or under the Soviet 
sphere of influence, map out their economies in five year plans.   
This variable of anticipated FDI inflows will be measured using the average of the 
previous five years of FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP.  The variable is right-shifted 
and logged to reduce the effects of skewness and kurtosis.  As operationalized, FDI as 
a percent of GDP measures the proportion of FDI to its overall economy, or in other 
words, the importance of FDI to each developing country.  Figure 3-9 describes 
graphically the previous five year average for FDI inflows as a percent of GDP across 
the sample.  Figure 3-10 shows the previous five year average for constant dollars.  The 
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Figure 3-9: FDI Inflows
2218.33
2356.15
2468.07
2430.49
2302.76
2098.89
1817.79
1476.97
1187.65
947.61
729.42
582.00
466.00
396.05
364.44
312.62
281.95
298.07
332.89
333.74
356.10
366.34
352.81
309.23
312.36
283.89
268.81
241.41
229.52
0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500
 
Constant (2000) US dollars
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
1979
1978
1977
1976
Source: World Development Indicators
Mean values, previous 5 year average
Figure 3-10: FDI inflows
percent of GDP rose from an average of about 0.87 percent in 1976 to about 3.43 
percent in 2004, and a similar pattern can be seen in the constant dollar amounts. 
States may look at their past performances with FDI inflows and pass policies 
allowing for some opening if they are not meeting development goals and if FDI is too 
low.  States that are meeting their development goals, or have grown wary of the 
amount of FDI flowing into their markets, may feel a need to restrict FDI through policy.  
Regardless, states policies are a result of their proactive attempts to control their FDI 
destinies.  Therefore, a negative relationship between FDI policies and previous FDI 
inflow averages will result. 
H8: A rise (fall) in the previous five-year average of FDI inflows will lead to less 
(more) openness in FDI equity policies. 
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International Environment:  International Political Pressures 
Theoretically, international pressures influence FDI policies.  A developing state 
occupies part of a large international political and economic playing field where it 
competes and interacts with other states, multinational firms, and international 
institutions.  All of these interactions have influence on policy creation in developing 
states.  Pressure may thus come from international institutions that develop and 
represent norms and ideas about FDI, and pressure may also come from closer 
proximity to more developed states which push for greater access for their home-grown 
multinationals in other developing markets through free trade and movement of capital.  
The next two subsections will introduce the variables that represent international 
political pressure. 
International institutions.  International institutions allow member countries to uphold 
norms by allowing for effective communication.  They also provide an arena for 
generating ideas and solving problems and allow for punishments and rewards.  As 
discussed in the previous chapter, there are theoretical reasons to hypothesize a 
relationship between international institutional membership and government policies.  
International institutions are generators of norms and values which in themselves exert 
pressure on the domestic policies of their members both directly and indirectly through 
alliances with domestic groups.  Membership in international institutions, especially 
those that are organized around the international economy, should be a direct and 
indirect source of pressure on developing states because of their promotion of free 
trade, open movement of capital and other tenets of globalization. 
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The measure employed for international institutions combines developing 
countries’ memberships in international institutions and conventions into an international 
institutions index.  I selected five international organizations were selected:  the World 
Bank Group’s International Finance Corporation (IFC) which provides loans and other 
types of financing in order to spur private investment in projects in developing countries; 
The World Bank Group’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), which 
provides investment insurance for investors and lenders in the cases of currency 
transfer restrictions, expropriation, war, civil disturbance and breach of contract; the 
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), which offers 
arbitration services for dispute resolution and reconciliation between governments and 
foreign investors; the United Nations’ World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), 
which standardizes international intellectual protection laws, policies and standards; and 
the World Trade Organization (WTO), whose members agree to curtail trade-related 
investment measures (TRIMs) that are inconsistent with WTO trade agreements and 
also agree to standardization of trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights 
(TRIPs).  These five organizations represent important international norms on foreign 
direct investment. They also came into effect at different times, some before the time 
frame of the study and others between 1976 and 2004.  The index thus represents a 
percentage of the available international institutions to which developing countries could 
belong as members at every time point in the dataset. 
Figure 3-11 graphs the mean values of the index over the time range of the 
sample.  Overall, from 1976 to 2004, the mean index values of the sample countries 
rose from 0.56 in 1976 to 0.94 in 2004, indicating that the sample countries became 
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Figure 3-11: International Pressure
more aligned with world standards on investment over time. The model should show 
that the relationship between developing country membership in international 
institutions and foreign policy is positive, with membership in more institutions focused 
on investment issues leading to greater equity openness. 
H9: As developing countries belong to more (fewer) international organizations 
promoting investment norms, foreign equity openness will rise (fall). 
Proximity to Developed Countries.  Recent scholarship, as explored in the previous 
chapter, has addressed the effects of proximity to developed countries on the policies of 
neighboring developing countries.  In this analysis, proximity means contiguity, either 
along borders or along economic zones.  While there may be much variation in how 
developing states respond to overt or implicit pressure from contiguous industrialized 
states, there may be effects of this pressure regardless.  States that are closed and 
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unfriendly to the developed world still face pressure.  Cuba has faced isolation from the 
United States, but also friendlier relations and some encouragement from other 
industrialized states.  Mexico has moved over the years from some restrictions on 
foreign investment to opening to U.S. and Canadian business through NAFTA.  Even 
the presence of open, industrialized states near closed economies can generate its own 
pressure for reform.  The collapse of the Soviet Union did not leave Eastern European 
states economically closed – they almost immediately opened their economies. 
The variable used to measure proximity is taken from the Correlates of War 
(COW) contiguity dataset.  The COW data codes contiguity for dyad pairs on a scale 
from 1 - 5, with 1 meaning that countries are only separated by a land or river border, 
and 5 meaning that countries are separated by 400 miles of water or less.  The 
remaining categories reflect distances of 12, 24 and 150 miles between countries.  
COW considers 400 miles to be the maximum distance in which two 200 mile economic 
zones can intersect.  The proximity variable used here codes each country as 1 if it falls 
between 1 and 5 in a dyad pair with the United States, a European Union country, 
Japan, or Australia and 0 if it does not. 
Given the pressure that can be brought to bear by developed nations on 
developing nations all over the world, and considering that some developing nations’ 
proximity to the developed world gives them some interest in putting policies in place 
that will make them attractive to capital from the wealthier countries, we would expect 
that proximity leads to greater equity openness. 
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H10: Developing countries that are in proximity to developed countries, 
separated either by a land border or by 400 miles of water, will have 
policies that demonstrate greater FDI equity openness. 
Control Variables 
 Literature suggests controls are needed to account for other possible 
explanations of FDI policy.  A common variable used in FDI studies is market size 
(Miller and Weigel 1972; Root and Ahmed 1979; Davidson 1980), though there are 
mixed findings on whether market size affects foreign direct investment.  However, 
since the countries in the study sample are spread across a large range of countries 
and years, there may be differences between larger and smaller markets.  There are 
two ways that market size is controlled for in this study.  First, most variables measuring 
demand for FDI are proportioned as percents of GDP.  This helps keep market size in 
perspective in the study as well as providing a smoothing technique on data that 
otherwise clearly trend.  A second control for market size is added with the logged 
population variable, which lists the population of each country in each year.  The 
previous mixed findings of the effect of this variable on FDI make it difficult to predict 
whether FDI policy is affected by market size. 
A second control is labeled “region.”  The theory presented in this study is one 
that argues that countries and multinational corporations come to agreement over FDI.  
This relationship is therefore assumed to involve one country and one MNC.  However, 
there is a universe of developing countries that have made FDI a development strategy, 
and each country sets its policies given its domestic needs and the actions of other 
countries.  Each country is therefore part of a larger set of countries, each individually 
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coming to agreement with firms and hoping to bring FDI into its economy, sometimes at 
the expense of other countries.  This competition has been commented upon and 
studied in academic literature.  For example, Haaland and Wooton (1999) extend a two-
stage game model demonstrating how it is optimal for a country to subsidize FDI in 
order to attract it, illustrating that many countries that extend subsidies are drawn into 
competition which ultimately transfers income to MNCs at the expense of those 
countries if subsidies become too high.  Governments compete by extending tariff 
protections, tax holidays, loan guarantees and tax grants.  These incentives are used to 
offset other regulations and limits (Encarnation and Wells 1985).  While countries’  
policies cannot be easily changed, individual negotiations provide countries with a 
chance to bargain on particulars in order to present a favorable environment relative to 
other countries competing for the same FDI. 
 Given that each country resides in a region with other actual and potential 
competitors, a set of six dummy variables representing geographical regions was 
created.  These dummy variables represent Central Asia, North Africa, Sub-Saharan 
Africa, East Asia, South Asia, and Latin America.  Five of the dummy variables were 
introduced to the model, with the sixth, Central Asia, serving as the comparison group. 
 Proposed Relationships 
 The hypothesized relationships proposed are listed in Table 3-2.  In the first 
column are the domestic, international and control variables.  The second column 
indicates by a + or – sign the hypothesized direction of the relationships.  In the next 
section, I will estimate these relationships statistically to see if the hypotheses hold up, 
and explain the outcomes. 
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Table 3-2: Predicted Directions of Independent Variables 
Independent Variables Hypothesized Direction 
 Domestic Political and Ideological Costs 
 Degree of Democracy + 
 Govt. Ideological Orientation  
  Left - 
  Right + 
  Nationalism - 
 International Pressure 
 International Pressure Index + 
 Proximity to Developed Country + 
 Demand for FDI 
 Domestic Savings - 
 Official Development Assistance - 
 External Debt - 
 Trade Balance - 
 Past Experience with FDI 
FDI Inflows-Previous 5 yr average + 
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Model Specification 
 Because the dependent variable, the FDI Equity Index, is categorical and 
therefore has discrete values, maximum likelihood estimation is the most appropriate 
method to employ in estimating the model.  Maximum likelihood estimation assumes a 
curvilinear relationship and obtains a probability function, rather than expected or 
predicted values as in ordinary least squares, for categories of the dependent variable. 
The multiple categories of the dependent variable offer a range of options for 
maximum likelihood estimation.  Because of the ordinal nature of the categories, an  
ordered probit model is appropriate for estimation of the data.  In addition, because the 
data is in the form of a pooled time-series, additional elements must be added to the 
model to account for time effects and the possibility for additional error inherent in time-
series data, such as autocorrelation.   
I estimate three variations on the policy model.  Estimation 1a estimates the 
model using regime type and nationalism as domestic political variables, and 1b adds 
ideological variables.  Estimation 1c consists of all variables together.  The models were 
estimated using the statistical program Stata running the routine “gllamm.”  Gllamm 
stands for “generalized linear latent and mixed models,” and this type of estimation is 
becoming more commonly used in the social sciences.  “Mixed model” estimation does 
not just assume fixed effects, or in other words, that the observations are all completely 
independent of each other, but that random effects are also present.  The clustering of 
observations under country units makes the presence of random effects likely.  Gllamm 
designates these clusters as level-2 effects.  We will consider the effects of the second 
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level country clustering which are nested in the level-1 cluster of individual observations.  
The random effects are the effects of latent or unobserved variables on the dependent 
variable in question.  Using random effects will also allow for generalization from a 
sample to a larger population (Balestra 1992).  In this study, it is assumed that the 
developing countries used in the estimations reflect the characteristics of all developing 
countries within a confidence interval defined by a standard error.24
In this model, the dependent variable’s responses are coded from greater equity 
restrictions to greater equity freedom.  Therefore, it stands that interpretation of 
estimations of the primary parameters will be as follows:  Positive signs will indicate the 
probability of greater equity openness as the value of the associated independent 
variables increases, and negative signs will indicate the probability of greater equity 
openness (restrictiveness) as the value of the independent variables decreases 
(increases). 
 The addition of a time component adds a host of factors to additionally consider 
when estimating this model.  To control for autocorrelation, I created dummy variables 
representing a time lag for each category, and all but one of these dummies were added 
to the estimation equation (Long and Freese 2003).  The addition of the dummies to 
control for autocorrelation was supported by a likelihood ratio test between the full 
model and the model without the dummies.  Dummies for two-year time lags of the 
categories were also estimated, but they were insignificant and unnecessary to the final 
estimations.  To correct for the effects of time, I introduced a count variable ranging 
from one to 29 for each year in each cluster, but it tested statistically insignificant and a 
likelihood ratio test indicated that the variable was unnecessary. 
                                                 
24 For a mathematical specification of the ordered probit technique within gllamm, please refer to Appendix E. 
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 Tables 3-3, 3-4 and 3-5 list the results of estimations of the FDI policy model.  
The estimations were run specifying the family as binomial, the link as oprobit and using 
robust standard errors.  The estimations include 54 countries and 1329 observations in 
Estimations 1a and 1c, and 1511 observations in Estimation 1b. 25
In all estimations, time-lagged categorical dummies are all highly significant.  The 
negative signs of the coefficients could mean that there is considerable inertia in the 
movement of policy, perhaps contradicting the significant movement of many countries 
from more restrictive policies to more liberal policies, as shown in Table 3-1.  This is not 
surprising.  First, 38 out of 57 countries in the dataset moved one category or remained 
the same over the time period. 
Second, policies do not change very quickly.  Jordan is an example.  From 1976 
until 1994 it remained in the lowest category.  All of a sudden, in 1995 it implemented 
FDI policies that opened to foreign investment, and jumped immediately to the highest 
category.  When policies do change, they tend to change quickly, and then remain 
where they are for a long period after the change.  In other words, this could be an 
indication of state dependence – that governments are more inclined to maintain the 
same policies over longer periods of time than to change them incrementally. 
In order to interpret ordered probit estimations, I used the cumulative distribution 
function and the probability density function to determine predicted probabilities.  Table 
3-6 demonstrates how the predictions of all estimations compare to actual values of the 
dependent variable.  The proportional reduction of error, which compares the predicted 
results with the dependent variable, is very high for all model variations.  Model 1a 
                                                 
25 Two countries, Niger and Papua New Guinea, dropped out of the models due to missing observations in all 29 years in the trade 
balance variable.  Swaziland also dropped out of the model due to missing observations in the nationalism variable 
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scored the highest gamma, 0.952, but all models were well over 0.90.  Table 3-7 shows 
the effect each significant independent variable in Estimation 1c, the full estimation, has 
on the probability that FDI policies will fall under any of the categories when the 
independent variable falls along its range of values.  The minimum and maximum 
values of the variable were used if it was dichotomous, and the minimum, mean and 
maximum values for continuous variables, plus a one standard deviation shift away from 
the mean in each direction.   
For example, foreign equity policy has a 71.1 percent probability that it will be at 
its most restrictive category (less than 100 percent foreign equity allowed) when the 
variable regime is at its minimum, autocracy, and a 28.9 percent probability to be in the 
next category (100 percent foreign equity allowed with many restrictions).  As the value 
for regime type is moved across its range through its mean and toward its maximum 
(full democracy), the probability that FDI equity policies will be more open increases.  
One can see the effects on predicted probabilities of all the significant variables in this 
way.
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Table 3-3: Determinants of Foreign Equity Policy in Developing Countries 
 Estimation 1a   
Variables Coefficient Robust S.E. P-value 
Category 0 time lag dummy -5.3566 0.3905 0.000 
Category 1 time lag dummy -2.4259 0.3245 0.000 
Category 2 time lag dummy -0.8095 0.2699 0.003 
Regime type 0.0574 0.0123 0.000 
Nationalism -0.6687 0.1793 0.000 
Institutional membership 2.0303 0.4072 0.000 
Proximity 0.5610 0.4430 0.205 
Savings/GDP -0.0186 0.0044 0.000 
Logged ODA/Total DAC aid -0.9904 0.3927 0.012 
Trade Balance/GDP -0.1353 0.1706 0.428 
Logged Debt/GDP 0.1740 0.0678 0.010 
Logged Average FDI inflows/GDP – 
previous 0.6041 0.4130 0.144 
Logged Population 0.0658 0.0621 0.289 
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.5131 0.5750 0.009 
East Asia -0.1924 0.3134 0.539 
Latin America 1.0607 0.4757 0.026 
North Africa 1.1491 0.2885 0.000 
South Asia 0.3916 0.4854 0.420 
Cut 1 -1.7858 1.6110 0.268 
Cut 2 1.3322 1.6690 0.425 
Cut 3 3.7180 1.6850 0.027 
 N=1329 Log Likelihood=-678.5378 
 Variance and Covariance of Random Effects=1.3740 
(0.3590) 
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 Table 3-4: Determinants of Foreign Equity Policy in Developing Countries 
 Estimation 1b   
Variables Coefficient Robust S.E. P-value 
Category 0 time lag dummy -4.7786 0.3068 0.000 
Category 1 time lag dummy -2.0936 0.2383 0.000 
Category 2 time lag dummy -0.8846 0.2476 0.000 
Regime type 0.0765 0.0123 0.000 
Leftist government -0.2008 0.1711 0.240 
Centrist government -0.5486 0.1779 0.002 
Other government 0.5095 0.1918 0.008 
Institutional membership 2.2461 0.6099 0.000 
Proximity 2.1543 0.6561 0.001 
Savings/GDP -0.0215 0.0037 0.000 
Logged ODA/Total DAC aid -0.7360 0.4672 0.115 
Trade Balance/GDP -0.1509 0.1987 0.446 
Logged Debt/GDP 0.2798 0.0887 0.002 
Logged Average FDI inflows/GDP – 
previous 0.6604 0.4383 0.132 
Logged Population -0.0786 0.0494 0.111 
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.6513 0.6804 0.000 
East Asia 1.2557 0.4368 0.004 
Latin America 2.2248 0.7562 0.003 
North Africa 1.8135 0.3668 0.000 
South Asia 1.8778 0.7498 0.012 
Cut 1 -1.8032 1.1043 0.102 
Cut 2 1.1683 1.1237 0.299 
Cut 3 3.4246 1.1058 0.002 
 N=1511 Log Likelihood=-819.1927 
 
 
Variance and Covariance of Random Effects=1.6756 
(0.4330) 
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 Table 3-5: Determinants of Foreign Equity Policy in Developing Countries 
 Estimation 1c   
Variables Coefficient Robust S.E. P-value 
Category 0 time lag dummy -5.3902 0.4242 0.000 
Category 1 time lag dummy -2.5093 0.3039 0.000 
Category 2 time lag dummy -0.8743 0.2545 0.000 
Regime type 0.0775 0.0156 0.000 
Leftist government -0.3843 0.1779 0.036 
Centrist government -0.7441 0.2132 0.001 
Other government 0.5297 0.1846 0.001 
Nationalism -0.5438 0.1246 0.000 
Institutional membership 1.8494 0.4874 0.000 
Proximity 1.5255 0.3116 0.000 
Savings/GDP -0.0176 0.0033 0.001 
Logged ODA/Total DAC aid -0.9055 0.3866 0.032 
Trade Balance/GDP -0.1369 0.1685 0.434 
Logged Debt/GDP 0.1965 0.0674 0.004 
Logged Average FDI inflows/GDP – 
previous 0.6814 0.4499 0.104 
Logged Population -0.1293 0.0552 0.056 
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.7153 0.3495 0.000 
East Asia 0.8783 0.3824 0.084 
Latin America 1.3543 0.3601 0.000 
North Africa 0.6566 0.2596 0.022 
South Asia 1.5926 0.4607 0.002 
Cut 1 -4.1012 1.1569 0.003 
Cut 2 -0.9402 1.1138 0.817 
Cut 3 1.5103 1.0627 0.039 
 N=1329 Log Likelihood=-670.0941 
 Variance and Covariance of Random Effects=1.0358 
(0.2432) 
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Table 3-6:  Predicted versus Actual Categories of Dependent Variable 
Estimation 1a 
Predicted Equity Categories 
 
 
 Actual 
Equity 
Categories <100% 100%-m.r. 100%-s.r. 100%-f.r. Total 
<100% 183 36 10 0 229 
100%-m.r. 20 381 70 0 471 
100%-s.r. 1 30 304 27 362 
100%-f.r. 1 4 72 190 267 
Total 205 451 456 217 1329 
 Gamma = 0.957 
Estimation 1b 
Predicted Equity Categories  Actual 
Equity 
Categories <100% 100%-m.r. 100%-s.r. 100%-f.r. Total 
<100% 154 94 18 1 267 
100%-m.r. 19 341 169 0 529 
100%-s.r. 0 45 291 61 397 
100%-f.r. 1 3 102 212 318 
Total 174 483 580 274 1511 
 Gamma = 0.92 
Estimation 1c 
Predicted Equity Categories  Actual 
Equity 
Categories <100% 100%-m.r. 100%-s.r. 100%-f.r. Total 
<100% 207 11 11 0 229
100%-m.r. 21 403 47 0 471
100%-s.r. 1 59 282 20 362
100%-f.r. 1 6 141 119 267
Total 230 479 481 139 1329
Gamma = 0.946  
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 Table 3-7: Predicted Probabilities of Foreign Equity Openness Varying 
Significant Variables 
Variable Probability Min -1 s.d. Mean/ Median +1 s.d. Max 
       
Regime type Y=0 0.711 0.627 0.414 0.224 0.161 
 Y=1 0.289 0.372 0.582 0.759 0.810 
 Y=2 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.017 0.030 
 Y=3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
       
Nationalism Y=0 0.414    0.628 
 Y=1 0.582    0.372 
 Y=2 0.004    0.001 
 Y=3 0.000    0.000 
       
Savings Y=0 0.016 0.315 0.414 0.518 0.782 
 Y=1 0.754 0.677 0.582 0.480 0.218 
 Y=2 0.228 0.008 0.004 0.002 0.000 
 Y=3 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
       
Debt Y=0 0.634 0.481 0.414 0.349 0.223 
 Y=1 0.365 0.516 0.582 0.645 0.760 
 Y=2 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.007 0.017 
 Y=3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
       
Intl. Pressure Y=0 0.883 0.605 0.414  0.255 
 Y=1 0.117 0.394 0.582  0.731 
 Y=2 0.000 0.001 0.004  0.013 
 Y=3 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 
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Results of Estimations 
In this chapter, the goal has been to test both international and domestic 
economic and political factors to determine if both have an effect on FDI equity 
openness, an element of policy that developing countries use to control foreign direct 
investment access to their markets.  In this next section, I will examine the results of 
domestic factors, Hypotheses H1 through H8, on FDI equity policy. 
Effects of Domestic Political and Economic Factors 
Hypothesis 1, the democracy hypothesis, is supported in all model variations.  
The variable measuring regime type is highly significant.  The positive coefficient is an 
indication that democracies are more likely to pass policies that have fewer restrictions 
on FDI equity, which supports theories that argue that democracies generally have 
more open economic policies and are by and large open to international economic 
integration.  Coefficients estimated with maximum likelihood techniques are difficult to 
interpret directly, so with ordered probit I use the cumulative distribution function and the 
probability density function are used to determine predicted probabilities.  Predicted 
probabilities of FDI equity policy equaling the various categories are depicted in Table 
3-7, which shows small probabilities that countries in the sample will have extremely 
open policies, and that a shift toward democracy across the range of values from 
minimum to maximum increases the probability of more open policies. 
Hypothesis 2, the hypothesis that leftist governments restrict FDI, is only weakly 
supported at best by Estimations 1a and 1c.  Its coefficient sign is negative when 
compared to rightist governments in both cases, as predicted, but significance does not 
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reach the 0.05 level.  In essence, the conclusion of this test is that there is very little 
difference between governments on the left and right regarding foreign direct 
investment.  This stands in contrast with governments in the center and the 
governments that could not be classified, both of which show distinct differences with 
rightist governments. 
The failure of the variable to reach significance may have something to do with 
the problematic nature of the measure.  Part of the problem is the unknown quality of 
“other” governments, which consist of over half the observations.  Given the structure of 
the variable, “other” governments had to be integrated into this study to use ideology as 
a variable.  The inclusion of ideology adds something to the model, as indicated by the 
degree of agreement between predicted and actual outcomes, but it is difficult to 
determine just what is being added without a more reliable ideological measure. 
The nationalism variable performed as predicted in Hypothesis 3 in all models.  
As in the result for regime type, we see that most governments start out with a high 
probability of allowing 100 percent foreign equity with many restrictions, but with the 
presence of nationalist governments the probability rises that governments will allow 
less than 100 percent foreign equity, severely restricting foreign investment. 
The hypotheses on demand for FDI, Hypotheses 4-7, met with mixed success in 
all models.  Savings was significant and negative as predicted across all estimations, 
making it a robust predictor.  In the presence of greater savings rates, the probability of 
more restricted policies in developing countries rises.  Debt was also significant across 
all models, but its sign was positive, contrary to the prediction.  Developing countries 
that have greater external debt appear to have more open policies toward foreign 
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investment.  While the results for savings are not surprising, the performance of debt 
may indicate that it does not serve as an alternative to FDI.  Instead, debt may enhance 
or supplement foreign investment.  Alternatively, debt may create conditions where high 
country debt loads lead to international doubt about the economic environment in 
developing countries, or the perception of this doubt domestically, causing them to pass 
more open FDI policies in order to attract more investment.  As we will see in the case 
studies of El Salvador and Nicaragua, this last scenario is very likely.   
Official development assistance reaches significance in Estimations 1a and 1c 
but not in 1b, though the direction of its sign is negative as predicted in all models.  The 
trade balance variable has a sign in the predicted direction, but does not approach 
significance in any model. 
Hypothesis 8, which proposed that past performance of FDI factors into the 
creation of state policies toward foreign investment, had a positive sign as predicted but 
it was insignificant in all estimations.  The performance of this variable across the 
models indicates that the variable is weak at best in predicting FDI policies. 
Effects of International Factors 
The international pressure hypotheses (Hypotheses 9-10) are mostly supported.  
International institutional membership was supported across all estimations, whereas 
Estimation 1b did not support the proximity variable.  All signs of the coefficients are 
positive and significant as predicted, indicating that international pressure accounts 
partly for foreign equity openness.  Rising institutional pressure increases the probability 
that developing countries will be less restrictive in their equity policies, whereas 
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proximity to developed countries appears to have some relationship with foreign equity 
openness in developing countries 
Effects of Control Variables 
The control variables had mixed performance in all the estimations.  The 
population variable, which controls for market size, was significant in one out of the 
three estimations, and therefore not a very reliable predictor of foreign investment 
policies.  All the regional variables except for the East Asia and South Asia regions were 
significant across all models, and the insignificance came in Estimation 1a when the 
ideology variables were absent.  The results indicate that region may have a role in 
determining the openness or restrictiveness of FDI policies when compared to the base 
group, Central Asia.  However, given that all are relatively consistently significant, only 
Central Asia (in this sample this region only consists of Turkey) may stand out as being 
different. 
Discussion of Results 
In the opening paragraphs of this dissertation, I argued that developing countries 
may have some means of controlling their economic destinies, even as some scholars 
argue that the nation-state is becoming obsolete in the face of globalization.  Despite 
the fact that pressure to open their markets to financial flows and free trade besets 
developing countries from all sides, the tests conducted in this chapter show that 
developing countries do have some means at their disposal, and can set their policies to 
allow themselves to remain more or less restrictive to globalization, depending on their 
preferences.  These checks against globalization exist because developing countries 
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are beset by pressures that offset international pressures toward globalization.  
Domestic political pressures and domestic economic realities still mandate that many 
developing countries can be cautious about foreign investment because their 
governments may face political sanction if they are too generous with foreign firms.  
This cautiousness can be enhanced if there are alternatives to FDI for development, 
most critically domestic investment through higher savings rates. 
What do these models say about the determinants of FDI equity policies in 
developing countries?  First, it seems that governments take into account domestic 
political and ideological costs when forming their policies on foreign equity restrictions.  
Democratic governments demonstrate greater FDI equity openness than autocracies.  
Democracies tend to be more open to economic interdependence in general, perhaps 
because of a longstanding belief in economic liberalism and institutions that encourage 
transparency and openness.  Autocracies tend to be centered more on control of the 
political, social and economic environment, and openness erodes their ability to 
maintain a tight rein.   
Though political ideology of the left and right appears to be indeterminate from 
this data, it appears that nationalism is a force that leads to more restrictive policies on 
FDI.  Nationalist governments tend to worry more about the implications of foreign 
investment on the national market and the possible harms it may inflict on the country 
as a whole and particularly on certain groups within the population.  Nationalist 
governments on the right fear the impact foreign investment will have on local business, 
while nationalist governments on the left may be concerned about the social welfare of 
the population. 
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However, nowhere does globalization exert more pressure than on the 
international front, and in those forces firms have powerful allies that push for open 
trade and investment policies.  Perhaps the variables that most clearly represent 
globalization are the international pressure variables, and this study has found that 
some elements of international pressure matter.  In particular, membership in 
international institutions, especially those that have a focus on FDI, leads to more open 
FDI equity policies.  Governments find it more difficult to remain closed as members of 
these institutions because they are subjected to an additional level of transparency, 
openness, and accountability.  In international institutions, there are penalties for not 
conforming to rules and norms that are agreed upon, and for now developing countries 
tend to abide by the rules and not risk the costs associated with flaunting them. 
There is a possibility that causation on the international institution variable runs in 
the opposite direction to that hypothesized.  It is easy to see why.  I hypothesized that 
membership in international institutions creates pressure for developing countries to 
maintain greater openness in their FDI equity policies.  Perhaps the correlation may 
simply be a confirmation that developing countries that are more inclined toward 
economic openness are those that join international institutions.  While this outcome is 
not tested here, it has to be considered.  However, even if the causation runs the 
opposite way on international institutions, the pressure of globalization and of major 
international economic and political players is still present.  Maybe countries that are 
inclined toward openness are more likely to join institutions, but those institutions also 
encourage even greater openness in their turn.  Countries not inclined toward as much 
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openness, but who join institutions to have a voice, will still feel some pressures from 
the institutional environment. 
From examining the predicted probabilities, it appears that the models predict 
mostly a greater degree of openness.  As has been demonstrated, there are some 
powerful pressures to create and maintain open policies.  It is true that most countries 
maintain policies that allow 100 percent foreign equity.  Yet, the results also indicate 
that most countries have means to restrict foreign investment should they so choose.  
They can move in an autocratic direction, elect a nationalist government, and build their 
domestic savings at the very least to move in a more restrictive direction. 
Of course, this study concentrates on policies that are on paper, and not on 
individual agreements between firms and states which may allow countries to waive this 
or that restriction.  However, FDI policies are the initial starting point for most countries 
in their negotiations, and any restrictions that are attached must be negotiated away; 
which may entail a possibility of the loss of FDI.  If countries did not put restrictions into 
place, there would be no need to bargain and no risk of either party pulling out of 
negotiations. 
What allows developing countries to maintain some control?  First, developing 
countries’ suspicion of globalization and its costs fuel wariness about FDI.  Nationalist 
governments tend to want to put the brakes on FDI.  Autocratic governments only 
enhance this effect.  It appears that for developing countries, the fear that the developed 
world will interfere in domestic political and economic affairs, and that unfettered free 
trade and investment will cause more harm than good in local economies, unites some 
in a desire to open their developing economies only as much as they deem necessary. 
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Second, the existence of alternatives to FDI allows developing countries more 
leeway in controlling the pace and quantity of FDI.  Greater domestic savings, for one, 
allow developing countries to tap local resources and entrepreneurship and thus rely 
less on foreign capital.  The difficulty for developing countries is, of course, locating 
adequate domestic savings to fund development.  Official development aid, another 
pathway to development, may have a small effect in alleviating developing country’s 
dependence on FDI.  Foreign borrowing appears to either supplement FDI, or make 
developing countries more eager to attract FDI if their debt loads create adverse 
international opinion.  Other potential alternatives, such as positive trade balances, may 
also serve to alleviate dependence on FDI, although their effect appears to be minimal. 
A look at the dependent variable from 1976 through 2004 might give one an 
impression that regardless of their preferences, developing countries have moved 
inevitably toward greater openness.  Only one country in the sample, Iran, became 
more restrictive in its foreign equity policy and remained so.  Does this data in itself not 
indicate that globalization is winning and that developing countries should all simply 
become more open?  I believe that despite the trend toward increasing openness, these 
models show that developing countries are not completely powerless in the face of 
globalization and open markets and have some control over their economic destinies.  
Specifically, governments of nationalist and autocratic developing countries appear to 
be at least somewhat hesitant toward foreign equity, despite the pressures, scrutiny and 
risk of sanction by other governments and multinational firms.  The gradual drift toward 
less restrictive policies is an indication of that pressure.  However, there are still 
developing countries that resist the pressure to open and others that open only 
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gradually.  These results may stand in contradiction to theories like modernization 
theory, which proposes that all countries are marching toward greater industrialization, 
and therefore more openness on a Western model.  It may uphold some tenets of 
dependency theory, which argues that the developing world is at best in an ever-
increasing dependent relationship with the developed world, and at worst is being 
economically colonized.  Certainly developing countries have not fared as well as their 
industrialized neighbors.  Or, these results may simply reflect what developing countries 
say on paper, but not what they actually do when dealing with multinational firms.  
However, I suspect that for some developing countries, reducing the opening in the gate 
in the face of a horde of MNC suitors reduces the crowd down to the insistent few so 
that those countries may bargain more effectively with the remaining firms. 
I have argued that the FDI process as a whole follows the logic of two-level 
games.  Domestic political and economic forces play a powerful role in determining FDI 
policy, but one cannot dispute that international forces, brought to the table by firms and 
their allies on the global level, play a part in convincing some developing countries to 
open their markets to foreign investment.  The next question to be studied, then, is 
whether the gateway to investment, represented by policies, affects the flow of 
investment into developing countries.  If policies are the basis for eventual agreements 
between developing countries and firms, then those countries that set more restrictive 
policies limit the win-sets, or the range of possible agreements, between developing 
countries and firms and should have a diminishing effect on foreign direct investment 
inflows.  Even if such restrictive countries enhance their bargaining position by claiming 
that they cannot get agreements past recalcitrant domestic political powers, they will 
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end up reaching no agreement with a greater number of firms than those they can come 
to agreement with.  On the other hand, those countries that set open policies come into 
negotiations with firms with a wider range of agreement possibilities, and therefore 
should see more investment, even though their bargaining power is reduced.  The next 
chapter will therefore test FDI policies’ effects on FDI inflows in order to shed light on 
how this confluence of international and domestic forces enhances or lessens the 
chances of agreement, and therefore the flow of foreign investment. 
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Chapter Four 
FDI Policy and its Effect on FDI Inflows 
In previous chapters, I have laid out a narrative of foreign direct investment.  To 
briefly recap, I discussed the role of foreign direct investment policies in the FDI 
process.  In Chapter Two, I described how developing countries absorb prevailing 
attitudes toward FDI, which shapes their attitudes.  Their attitudes consist of a blend of 
wariness and openness toward FDI, and therefore they fall somewhere along the 
spectrum of being more open or more restrictive toward FDI.  The policies that 
developing countries pass on FDI are reflections of this blend of attitudes that plays out 
through domestic and international politics and the realities of domestic and 
international economics.  Their policies serve as the basis for eventual agreements on 
FDI with multinational firms.  I also argued that FDI follows the logic of two-level games, 
One level consist of the political agreement that leads to policy on the domestic level, 
and a second level is the agreement between firm and state that leads to FDI inflows.  
The activities on each level are influenced by international and domestic factors that 
affect both FDI policies and eventual FDI inflows.  In Chapter Three, I tested 
hypotheses based on these conceptual factors, and discovered that policies are 
influenced by domestic political and economic factors such as regime type, nationalism, 
domestic savings, and external debt.  They are also affected by international factors 
such as membership in international institutions related to trade and investment and 
proximity to developed countries.  Policies were also influenced by geographic regions. 
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This chapter takes up the issue of FDI inflows.  Tests performed in this chapter 
will determine whether policies work, or more specifically, whether inflows are affected 
by policies.  If developing countries tighten control and flows slow, or if they open and 
the flow increases, then policies function and developing countries have some control 
over their economic destinies.  If developing countries that desire greater FDI flows 
pass policies of openness and instead get a little trickle or nothing at all or conversely, if 
developing countries tighten restrictions and the flows continue unabated, then policies 
are meaningless and developing countries are at the mercy of globalization, that 
international concerns predominate, and development is largely out of their hands. 
This dissertation has posed two questions.  What accounts for variation in FDI 
policies?  Do FDI policies affect FDI inflows?  My model reveals some answers.  The 
Chapter Three provided strong support for a model of FDI policymaking in developing 
nations.  This chapter tests whether the policies that developing countries have 
promulgated have any effect on the FDI that flows into their markets.  This may seem 
self-evident but it is very important.  First, FDI flows are an indicator of how firms 
respond to the policies of developing states.  If FDI follows the logic of two-level games, 
policies serve as the basis for agreement between firms and states over FDI.  Policies 
establish the baseline range of agreements states are willing to consider.  If that 
baseline is restricted, then the range of possibility for agreement is small.  If the 
baseline policy is more open, then agreement can be made over a wider range of 
potential outcomes. 
Do policies allow states some control over the investment process?  Do states 
still have power to regulate their own development?  On one hand, those that celebrate 
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international open markets and free trade argue that loss of national sovereignty over 
the economy is not something to bemoan, but simply to accept.  The world is better off if 
nation-states have less control over trade and commerce and the markets are simply 
left alone as much as possible.  Needless to say, many of these supporters of 
globalization represent developed countries that need not worry about their own power. 
For others, such as dependency theorists, nationalist leaders and populist 
organizations in developing countries, loss of national sovereignty is a much more 
serious matter.  It means that developing states are always at a disadvantage to the 
developed world, without any ability to control aspects of their own political and 
economic agendas.  These countries will see further disruptions in social cohesion and 
participate in the proverbial race to the bottom.  Any attempt to assert their 
independence through policy will lead to punishment in the international economic 
arena. 
In sum, this model will demonstrate whether FDI inflows, and by extension firms, 
respond to policies, and whether developing states have some control over the 
development process.  If developing countries’ policies do not have any effect on FDI, 
or an opposite effect from that intended, then the forces of globalization are more 
powerful than individual developing states and international preferences trump domestic 
wishes and realities.  On the other hand, if policies perform as intended, limiting FDI 
when developing countries want it limited or encouraging FDI when they want an 
increase, then the factors identified in the policy stage will be shown to have an impact 
on development outcomes.  The next sections further define the inflows model, 
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explaining the dependent and independent variables, their hypothesized relationships, 
and the estimation results. 
Determinants of FDI Inflows 
 The inflows estimations are an important part of the presented theoretical model.  
While the policy estimations in Chapter Two test FDI policies, in particular how open 
developing states are to FDI, the inflows estimations measure the effect of developing 
states’ contribution to FDI agreements.  They also capture firms’ reactions to FDI 
policies.  Developing countries commit to FDI policies and, along with other factors, see 
these policies affect their FDI inflows.  In identifying this process in two separate 
estimations, we can represent the role of firm and state agreement through this second 
test. 
 I argue that inflows constitute a second form of the two-level games theory of FDI 
identified in Chapter Two.  Whereas the policies are outcomes on the domestic level, 
influenced by factors on both the domestic and international level, the firm-state 
agreement process takes place on a different level, a transnational level.  The outcomes 
of this level are indicated by agreement and, following agreement, inflows of FDI.  FDI 
inflows are in turn influenced by domestic and international level factors also, such as 
FDI policies, domestic political and economic factors, and international political and 
economic factors.  I will explain these concepts further in subsequent sections. 
 The dependent variable in these estimations, foreign direct investment inflows, is 
commonly used to measure foreign direct investment in national economies.  Inflows 
are defined as “net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 
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percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than 
that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-
term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments.” 26
I use foreign direct investment inflows as a percentage of GDP as the dependent 
variable.  FDI as a percent of GDP accounts for the importance of FDI in each individual 
economy.  The greater the percentage of GDP, the more that economy relies upon FDI.  
This allows a basis of comparison among developing countries and blunts the undue 
influence of large economies.  The dependent variable was logged to normalize its 
distribution. 
Figure 4-1 graphically describes the mean values of FDI as a percent of GDP for 
each year in the sample.  Though characterized by peaks and troughs, the trend has 
been decidedly upward.  In 1976, the mean percent of FDI to GDP was 0.648 percent.  
This percentage fell to its lowest point in 1984 at 0.546 percent, and then began an 
upward climb, peaking at 3.84 percent of GDP by 1998.  Since then, the average 
percentage of FDI to GDP has fallen again to around 2.85 percent in 2004.  Figure 4-2 
shows mean values of FDI inflows in dollars, which averaged $223.08 million dollars 
(constant 2000 U.S. dollars) in 1976, peaked at $2.6 billion in 1999, and fell back to 
about $2.3 billion in 2004. 
These figures show that over time, FDI has become more important in aggregate 
economies in the developing world.  These mean values conceal much variation among 
countries.  Values for some countries over the range of years in the sample are 
negative.  Negative inflows indicate a loss of capital at a rate greater than incoming 
capital.  Other countries are very reliant on FDI.  For example, since 2000, FDI inflows 
                                                 
26 Definition provided by World Development Indicators: http://www.lib.umich.edu/govdocs/wdi/wdivar/wdivar6.html. 
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Figure 4-2: FDI Inflows
into The Gambia, Chad and Lesotho have accounted for 10 percent or more of those 
countries’ GDPs.  Some countries in the sample receive a great amount of FDI in dollar 
amounts.  For example, China’s mean inflows from 1976 – 2004 is over $19 billion per 
year.  Others receive little – Gabon, Gambia, Guyana, Haiti, Madagascar, and Niger 
average under $30 million in FDI per year.  
FDI Equity Openness 
 In the policy model in Chapter Three, I argued that developing countries’ policies 
reflect their preferences toward FDI openness.  Their degree of openness is based on 
restrictions and incentives on FDI that have been passed and implemented by the state.  
Once these policies are passed, the theory predicts that states’ policies will be an 
indication to investors of their initial openness to foreign investment.  In other words, the 
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policies are like a sign on a door.  If states are less open to FDI, they will have less 
room for agreement with firms and they will know that attempts to invest there may be 
filled with roadblocks such as restrictions and regulations and take their capital 
elsewhere.  Likewise, if states are more open to FDI, the range of possible agreements 
opens wider and states may offer incentives such as tax breaks and exemptions to 
attract investment by multinational firms.  There should be a positive relationship 
between the openness of FDI policies and the inflows of FDI to developing state. 
The variables used to measure FDI policy are categories of the FDI Equity Index.  
The variable’s characteristics have been described already in Chapter Three.  Dummy 
variables of categories one, two and three are used, following Long and Freese’s (2003) 
advice to separate the categories of a discrete variable into separate binomial variables 
on the right hand side.  The lowest category, labeled as Category 0 and representing 
policies allowing less than 100 percent foreign equity, will be left out of the estimation 
and used as the comparison group.  I expect a positive coefficient on this variable. 
H4-1: Countries that are more (less) open to foreign equity will have greater 
(smaller) amounts of FDI inflows. 
Domestic Political Characteristics 
 Certain characteristics of each developing country can exert much influence on 
their amount of FDI inflows.  There are two aspects of this concept that will be tested.  
First, the political environment must be considered because so much of the character of 
the investment market depends on the type of government in power, and the prevailing 
ideology of that government.  Second, consideration should be given to economic 
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aspects of the market attractive to firms.  The next sections will explain the 
measurements used for the political and investment market variables in the study. 
Regime Type.  As discussed in Chapter Two, degree of democracy should be 
associated with FDI inflows.  Democracy has generally been associated theoretically 
and empirically with FDI inflows.  Democracy is generally considered to foster greater 
economic openness, greater respect for market forces and greater adherence to 
property rights.  A small number of recent studies have argued and demonstrated 
associations between non-democracy and greater FDI, however, these studies have 
been questioned on the grounds of methodology.  It is expected that in this stage, 
democracy will retain its positive association with FDI inflows.  The same Polity variable 
used in the policy stage will be used in the inflows stage estimations. 
H4-2: FDI inflows will be greater (less) as developing countries become more 
(less) democratic. 
Ideology.  Theory has linked ideology to FDI.  In particular, countries with rightist 
governments are thought to be more open to globalization in general, free trade and 
open markets in particular.  Rightist governments are also thought to be friendly to 
business, with less regulation and taxation.  Leftist governments, so the arguments go, 
are more concerned with the social welfare of affected groups within the population.  
Many believe they regulate and tax more often. Thus, countries with leftist governments 
should receive less FDI and those with rightist governments more FDI. 
Will the predicted relationships appear when predicting FDI inflows?  Using the 
same ideological variables from the Database of Political Institutions that were used in 
the estimations of the policy stage estimations, I expect that the traditional relationships 
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between ideology and FDI inflows will hold because inflows widen the scope of players 
in the model.  In other words, firms, not states, decide which states will receive their 
investment.  Firms may still perceive the left-right divide in the usual manner; the left is 
unreceptive to FDI while the right is welcoming to FDI.  Given these perceptions, the 
relationships should conform to the customary expectations. 
H4-3: Leftist governments receive less FDI inflows than rightist 
governments. 
Nationalism.  Nationalist governments are thought to be less friendly to FDI because 
they tend to view the international economic sphere as one of competition for scarce 
resources.  They are perceived to subscribe to protectionism, and therefore are also 
thought to favor local businesses over foreign competition and to generally distrust 
“globalization.”  In the last chapter, nationalism was a significant influence on foreign 
direct investment policies, pushing their countries toward greater restrictions.  It is 
expected that nationalist governments will also receive less FDI. 
H4-4: Nationalist governments will receive less FDI inflows than non-
nationalist governments. 
Political Stability.  Chapter Two explored the potential relationship between political 
stability and FDI.  Political stability is theorized to enhance FDI because it creates a 
secure environment for investment without the potential for costly disruptions or 
changes in the political and economic environment.  Disruptions can occur because of 
changes in the rules due to government variability or economic disruptions due to 
violent upheavals.  In this study domestic political stability is represented by two 
variables.  The first measure of political stability is regime durability, and is taken from 
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the measure of durability defined by the Polity IV project as the number of years since 
the most recent change in regime.  A regime change is defined as a three point change 
in the Polity score over a three year period or less, or the period immediately following a 
disruption or suspension of stable institutional structures. 
Figure 4-3 graphically depicts the distribution of the durability variable over time.  
In 1976, the mean regime durability was about 12.5 years in the sample countries.  By 
2004, the mean durability had risen to almost 19 years, indicating longer-lasting regimes 
in developing countries. 
Another measure of domestic political stability to be considered in this study is 
internal war.  This variable is taken from the Peace Research Institute of Oslo’s (PRIO) 
Armed Conflicts dataset (version 4 – 2006b).27  This dataset lists intrastate, interstate 
and extra-state conflicts and includes starting and ending information, intensity, and 
type and issue of conflict.  The dataset defines four kinds of conflict, and for the internal 
war variable we will consider two of these categories:   internal armed conflicts are 
those between a state and an opposition group inside its borders without interference 
from another state; and internationalized internal armed conflicts are those between a 
state and an opposition group inside its borders and involving intervention from another 
state or states.  In addition, the dataset identifies two types of conflict intensity levels.  
Conflicts can either be minor, reaching 25 – 99 battle related deaths, or major, reaching 
1000 or higher battle related deaths.  The dataset also contains a cumulative intensity 
variable, coded 1 when battle-related deaths reach 1000, and 0 otherwise.  The major 
                                                 
27 The Armed Conflicts dataset can be found at PRIO’s Center for the Study of Civil War website, http://new.prio.no/CSCW-
Datasets/. 
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Figure 4-3: Regime durability
conflict intensity level, meaning conflicts with 1000 battle-related deaths, will be used for 
the internal war variable in these estimations 
Figure 4-4 indicates the number of internal and external conflicts each year for 
the aggregate countries in the sample.  External wars will be discussed more fully under 
the international factors section.  Internal wars were more common than external wars 
during this time.  The highest number of internal wars, sixteen, occurred in 1987 and 
1988; the lowest number, seven, occurred in 2004.  The most external wasrs in the 
sample, six, also occurred in 1987.  Seven out of the 29 years recorded no external 
wars at all. 
For this study, the internal war dummy variable is coded as 1 if the conflict type is 
internal or an internationalized internal armed conflict, and if the conflict has reached 
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1000 cumulative battle deaths.  Otherwise the variable is coded 0.  I expect that 
domestic political stability has a positive relationship with FDI inflows. 
H4-5a: As governments in developing countries show greater (lesser) 
durability, FDI inflows rise (fall). 
H4-5b: The amount of FDI inflows fall (rise) when developing countries are 
in a state of internal conflict (peace). 
Characteristics of the Domestic Investment Market 
The investment market, and its distinctiveness in different developing countries, 
is another important link to understanding FDI.  In particular, the last chapter identified 
sectoral investment as a possible influence on FDI inflows.  Firms, depending on their 
type of business and products in which they are involved, typically want to invest in 
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economic sectors that will meet their needs and be profitable, and some developing 
countries have attractive sectors that are better developed than others.    Economic 
sectors refer to certain distinct areas of the economy.    Those developing countries 
whose economies are primarily agricultural-based may not be attractive to multinational 
firms, because many developing countries tend to protect their agricultural sector 
through high tariffs, depressing the market and dampening prices for developing 
countries’ products.28
Some developing countries may be rich in natural resources, and would then 
attract investment in extractive industries.  Still other developing countries may be poor 
in natural resources, but rich in actual or potential labor, and therefore FDI inflows into 
such economies would be associated with manufacturing investment.  Finally, some 
developing countries may possess a superior financial infrastructure or a developed 
tourism industry.  Others may have started a process of privatizing state-owned 
operations, including public service utilities.  Countries such as these may already 
possess a reasonably trained workforce, and thus create an attractive service sector for 
foreign investment. 
This study includes variables that capture four of the main economic sectors in 
developing countries; agriculture, manufacturing, extractives and services.  The data 
was obtained from the World Development Indicators, and consists of each sector’s 
value-added (or importance) as a percent of GDP in each developing country.  Using 
the ratio to GDP allows observation of the importance of each sector in each developing 
country’s economy at any particular time. 
                                                 
28 From the online paper “Global Trade Liberalization and the Developing Countries,” by the staff of the International Monetary Fund, 
November 2001.  Found online at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2001/110801.htm.  
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 The agricultural sector is comprised of the UN’s International Standard Industrial 
Classification (ISIC -revision 3.1) codes 1 – 5, and consists of crop cultivation, livestock 
production, hunting, fishing and forestry.29  The manufacturing sector includes ISIC 
codes 15 – 37, and consists of all manufactures, publishing and printing, tanning and 
dressing of leather, and recycling.  The service sector comprises ISIC codes 50 – 99 
and covers a wide range of economic activities, including wholesale trade, hotels and 
restaurants, transportation and storage, finances and insurance, real estate and 
business, public administration and defense, education, health and social work, 
community and social services, private households and extraterritorial organizations.  
The extractives figures were not provided by the World Development Indicators, but the 
WDI did provide an industrial figure that consisted of manufactures plus extractives.  A 
reasonable representation of extractives was therefore created by subtracting 
manufactures value-added from industrial value-added.  The extractives variable was 
logged to minimize problems associated with its distribution. 
Figure 4-5 graphs the mean value-added as a percent of GDP of the agricultural, 
manufacturing and services sectors over the time-range of the sample.  Agriculture 
declined from around 23.5 percent to just over 16.5 percent between 1976 and 2004.  
The decline was accompanied by an increase services, from about 45 percent to about 
52 percent, over the same time period.  Manufacturing stays relatively steady, 
measuring only a slight decline from 16.15 percent to 15.8 percent.  I expect countries 
that depend upon agriculture to receive less FDI inflows as a percent of GDP, while 
those that depend more upon services and manufacturing to receive more FDI inflows. 
                                                 
29 For a complete listing of ISIC classification codes, refer to the United Nations Statistics Division website on ISIC codes at 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regcst.asp?Cl=17. 
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H4-6a: As the percentage of agricultural value-added rises (falls) in relation 
to GDP in each developing country’s economy, the amount of FDI 
inflows falls (rises). 
H4-6b: As the percentage of manufacturing’s value-added rises (falls) in 
relation to GDP in each developing country’s economy, the amount 
of FDI inflows rises (falls). 
H4-6c: As the percentage of extractives value-added rises (falls) in relation 
to GDP in each developing country’s economy, the amount of FDI 
inflows rises (falls). 
H4-6d: As the percentage of services’ value-added rises (falls) in relation 
to GDP in each developing country’s economy, the amount of FDI 
inflows rises (falls). 
 169
International Factors 
International factors play an important role on the agreement level, and can 
inhibit or enhance the possibilities for firm agreement with developing states.  FDI 
inflows indicate the extent to which agreement has been reached between firms and 
states.  These agreements are aided by some international and domestic factors that 
we explored on the policy level, and some new factors from each that are have stronger 
association to firms and their preferences. 
International stability.  As discussed in Chapter Two, stability is theorized to improve the 
prospects of FDI in developing countries.  On the international stage, stability is 
considered to be a peaceful international environment, or one that is free of war and 
conflict.  For this reason, external war is used as a variable that provides a measure of 
international stability.  The external war variable, like the internal war variable, was 
obtained from the Correlates of War (COW) project.  For this variable, we will consider 
the final two COW categories of war:  extrasystemic armed conflicts are those conflicts 
between a state and a non-state group outside its borders and interstate armed conflicts 
are those between two or more states.  A dummy variable, coded as 1 if the conflict is 
an extrasystemic or an interstate armed conflict and has reached 1000 cumulative battle 
deaths, and 0 otherwise is used in these estimations. 
H4-7: The amount of FDI inflows fall (rise) when developing countries are 
in a state of external war (peace). 
Institutional membership.  Just as membership in international institutions may play a 
role in determining domestic policies, membership may also play a role in influencing 
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FDI inflows.  Firms that see that developing countries are members of international 
institutions concerned with creating rules and norms of foreign direct investment may be 
more likely to invest in those countries because these norms and rules level the playing 
field and encourage transparency.  Employed in this capacity is a variable used in the 
domestic policy model, the institutional pressure index, described in Chapter Three. 
H4-8: Developing countries that have higher (lower) rates of membership in 
international institutions will have greater (less) FDI inflows as a percent of 
GDP. 
Proximity.  Proximity to developed countries also plays a part in FDI inflows.  Firms that 
can invest in countries that are nearer to their home bases can save on expenses that 
would be incurred over greater distances, especially if the investments consist of 
factories that produce or assemble and then ship the goods back to the home country or 
abroad to other countries.  Thus, more investment may be likely in countries that are 
nearer to home. 
H4-9: Developing countries that are closer (farther) from developed countries 
should see more (less) FDI inflows as a percent of GDP. 
Control Factors 
 Other characteristics may also present influences upon FDI inflows along with 
the political environment, the investment market and policies.  There are many possible 
influences, but of these, there are some that stand out.  These influences include the 
level of industrialization of each state, the size of the market, wages, corruption and 
region.  The following sections list those that that are included in the estimations. 
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Corruption.  A domestic characteristic that may be associated with foreign direct 
investment inflows is corruption.  There are two main views of the effects of corruption 
on FDI inflows.  The most common argument among researchers has been that 
corruption depresses FDI inflows because it places barriers against investment within 
the market and greatly decreases efficiency.  A smaller contingent of researchers 
argues that corruption aids the flow of the marketplace by allowing those investors that 
are willing to pay bribes to government officials to set up for business more efficiently.  
However, because corruption is widely seen as an impediment to investment and 
smoothly operating business, corruption should be negatively associated with FDI 
inflows. 
Corruption data is available for all countries in the dataset through the World 
Bank’s Governance Matters dataset.  The Governance Matters dataset measures 
governmental effectiveness, using a methodology called the unobserved components 
model to create six aggregate indicators from individual measures.  One of its six 
indicators is governmental control of corruption.   The corruption indicator is based on 
surveys of individuals and firms, and assessments of think-tanks, multi-lateral aid 
agencies, non-governmental organizations, and commercial risk-rating agencies.  The 
corruption measure in this dataset is modeled as a fixed effect in each panel based on 
the average of the Governance Matters Control of Corruption index from 1996-2005.  
The range of the variable runs from -1.55 to 1.35, with higher values corresponding to 
greater government effectiveness.  I assume that government corruption is entrenched 
and does not change much over time.  The values bear this out – the mean standard 
deviation across all countries in the sample over the time range of the sample is only 
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0.21.  It is expected that greater effectiveness in controlling corruption leads to greater 
FDI inflows. 
Wages.  A common argument about the globalization of business is that firms relocate 
manufacturing and services from developed countries where wage rates are higher to 
less developed countries with lower wages.  Their motivation for doing this is greater 
profits.  Developing countries are prime candidates for firm interest because they tend 
to possess a wealth of surplus labor, and we would expect that firm interest would 
correspondingly result in a higher rate of FDI inflows. 
Unfortunately, no reliable direct indicator of wages exists.  The International 
Labor Organization keeps wage rate data going back several years, but the wages are 
listed depending on how each individual country tracks them, and it appears there is no 
uniform way that countries report this data.  Some countries report hourly wages, some 
daily, some weekly and some monthly.  The dataset is full of missing observations.  In 
addition, each wage is listed in each country’s national currency, and with changes in 
exchange rates over time, converting wages to a meaningful uniform measure becomes 
very difficult. 
Proxies for wage data used in previous research have included education and 
per capita income, with per capita income generally serving as the most popular proxy 
for wages (Hejazi and Zefarian 2002, Zak and Knack 2001, Agarwal and Winkler 1984).  
Given the discussion in Chapter Two, relating to FDI policy, about the importance of 
direct measures of concepts, it is important to include some measure for wages in this 
study.  Educational data for developing countries is not generally available for all the 
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years covered in this research, but I am able to employ logged values of Gross National 
Income (GNI) per capita due to its availability for all countries in the sample. 
Property rights.  The extent to which countries protect and preserve property rights has 
been identified as a possible influence on FDI.  Greater property rights protections have 
been identified most commonly with democracies, but as discussed previously, those 
states that make changes toward greater property rights protections have been 
identified with a greater probability of receiving FDI than those states that do not. 
For that reason, property rights protections need to be included in any study of 
FDI.  However, getting property rights data for a sample going back into the 1970s is 
difficult since data collection on economic variables was conducted to the greatest 
extent in developed countries than in non-developed countries.  The Heritage 
Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom rates countries on 10 dimensions going back 
to 1995.  I used the property rights dimension, which runs a range from 0 to 100, and is 
defined as “an assessment of the ability of individuals to accumulate private property, 
secured by clear laws that are fully enforced by the state” (Beach and Kane 2008).  
Countries with scores approaching 100 are those countries that rate higher on property 
rights freedoms, and those closer to 0 have less property rights freedoms.  The 
countries in the sample range from the score of 10 for Haiti and Iran on the low end of 
the range to a score of 90 for Chile.  I model the average of the property rights scores 
for each country from 1995 – 2004 as a fixed effect. 
Market size.  Another economic characteristic that may be associated with FDI inflows 
is market size, which can work to a state’s advantage in attracting FDI.  Firms may seek 
overseas markets partly so that they can sell their goods with greater advantages than 
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at home.  Generally, larger markets have been associated with greater inflows of FDI.  
The variable used for market size is, like in the previous chapter, population.  The 
variable has been logged because of its right skew. 
Region.  As in the estimations in the previous chapter on the policy stage, regional 
dummies will be included to control for possible differences related to developing 
countries’ placement in geographical areas.  This not only controls for potential 
competition for FDI, but also should further disperse any overwhelming effects that any 
large developing country’s economy may have on the results.  The regions included are 
Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia, North Africa, Latin America, South Asia and Central 
Asia.  Central Asia serves as the excluded and therefore the comparison category since 
it has the least number of observations. 
Model Specification 
The model estimations were run using the statistical program Stata, employing 
OLS assumptions and using panel-corrected standard errors.  The sample consisted of 
57 countries over 29 years (1976-2004).  Panel-corrected standard errors yield better 
estimates than generalized least squares estimations, which have been known to bias 
standard errors downward and lead to erroneous conclusions of significance (Beck and 
Katz 1995).  As discussed previously, some variables were transformed where 
necessary to reduce problems caused by the state of their distribution.  The dependent 
variable, extractives variable and CO2 variables were transformed by right-shifting and 
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logging to minimize skew.  The population variable was left-shifted and logged for 
similar reasons.30
To model serial dynamics a lagged dependent variable is included on the right-
hand side.  Lagrange multiplier tests indicate the addition of this variable prevents serial 
correlation of errors.  In addition, to account for questions of causality, one-year lags of 
most of the independent variables, except for variables with constant values and 
regional dummies, were used on the right-hand side, allowing for the interpretation that 
previous year’s observation predicts the present year’s result. 
There were three estimations.  Estimation 2a tests determinants of FDI inflows as 
the percent of GDP including nationalism and omitting ideology.  Estimation 2b 
eliminates nationalism and includes ideology.  Estimation 2c includes all variables.  The 
general estimation equation for the models is as follows: 
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Results of Estimations 
The results of the estimations are recorded in Table 4-1, 4-2 and 4-3.  Three 
estimations were performed.  Estimation 2a omitted government ideology variables and 
included government nationalism, while Estimation 2b included the ideological variables 
and omitted the nationalism variable.  Estimation 2c included both nationalism and 
                                                 
30 For complete summary statistics of the variables discussed in this chapter, please refer to Appendix E.  Variables transformed for 
the estimations are indicated. 
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ideology in the test.  Overall the estimations performed well.  The R2 for the estimations, 
which measures how close the independent variables fit the proportion of FDI inflows as 
part of the overall economy, are 0.5399, 0.5288 and 0.5405 respectively, meaning 
roughly 52-54 percent of the variation of the dependent variable is explained by the 
independent variables within the estimations.  The lagged dependent variable in these 
three estimations is significant and its coefficient is positive. 
Hypothesis 4-1, the FDI equity hypothesis, received strong support in the in all of 
the estimations.  All of the categories of FDI equity had positive coefficients as predicted 
and in all estimations the highest category variable reached 0.05 significance or better.  
This significance in Category 3 indicates an interesting result.  Category 3, the least 
restrictive category, is positively significant when compared to the most restrictive 
group, Category 0.  Categories 1 and 2, representing gradations of restrictions on FDI 
equity, show no difference with the comparison group.  Apparently, developing countries 
that take the extra step to open their economies to foreign equity without restrictions, 
represented by Category 3, receive a boost in FDI inflows as a percent of GDP.  Those 
countries that place some to many restrictions on foreign equity, represented by 
Categories 0 to 2, do not see this boost. 
Hypothesis 4-2, the democracy hypothesis, proposed that democracies receive 
greater amounts of FDI inflows than non-democracies.  In all estimations, the regime 
variable was positive and significant as predicted, indicating that as one moves across 
the range of countries in the sample from less democratic to more democratic, and 
countries themselves move from less to more democratic, they see greater inflows of 
FDI as a percentage of GDP.  While this result does not support some recent 
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scholarship suggesting that FDI responds to autocratic regimes, it does support the 
more common finding that democracy is more conducive to greater amounts of FDI. 
Hypothesis 4-3, the leftist government hypothesis, was tested in Estimations 2b 
and 2c.  Neither of those estimations supported the premise that ideology of 
government has any effect on FDI inflows whatsoever.  In terms of leftist governments, 
the variable did not approach significance, and the sign of the coefficient was positive, 
which was opposite of what was predicted.  None of the other ideological variables were 
significant either, indicating that all ideological groupings had no appreciable differences 
with the comparison group, rightist governments. 
Nationalism (Hypothesis 4-4) was included in Estimation 2a and 2c and 
registered significant results when alone and when included with the ideological 
variables.  However, the results of nationalism were not as predicted.  The variable was 
positive and significant in both estimations in which it was included.  The result indicates 
that nationalist governments get greater amounts of FDI as a percent of GDP than non-
nationalist governments.  This appears to contradict conventional wisdom of nationalism 
as well as the results of other studies. 
 The variables representing domestic political stability yielded no significant 
coefficients in all the estimations, therefore giving little support to Hypotheses 4-5a and 
4-5b in these models to the domestic political stability hypotheses.  This suggests that 
FDI does not respond to issues of stability in developing countries, or that other 
conceptual measures of stability will better capture this relationship. 
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 Table 4-1: Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment Inflows in Developing 
Countries 
 Estimation 2a   
Variables Coefficient Robust S.E. P-value 
Logged FDI/GDPt-1 0.6485 0.0632 0.000 
Regime type t-1 0.0021 0.0009 0.016 
Nationalismt-1 0.0260 0.0106 0.014 
Regime durability t-1 -0.0001 0.0002 0.724 
Internal war t-1 0.0040 0.0086 0.640 
External war t-1 0.0169 0.0089 0.058 
International Institutional 
Membershipt-1
0.0491 0.0235 0.036 
Proximity to Developed Countries 0.0007 0.0076 0.918 
Agriculture value-added/GDP t-1 -0.0003 0.0009 0.696 
Manufacturing value-added/GDP t-1 0.0003 0.0010 0.809 
Logged Extractives value-
added/GDP t-1
0.0413 0.0205 0.044 
Services value-added/GDP t-1 -0.0001 0.0008 0.930 
Foreign equity category 1 t-1 0.0076 0.0087 0.384 
Foreign equity category 2 t-1 0.0116 0.0123 0.346 
Foreign equity category 3 t-1 0.0337 0.0159 0.035 
Logged GNI per capita t-1 -0.0180 0.0072 0.013 
Corruption 0.0239 0.0091 0.008 
Property Rights -0.0002 0.0003 0.495 
Logged population t-1 -0.0035 0.0034 0.305 
Sub Saharan Africa 0.0087 0.0197 0.659 
Latin America 0.0326 0.0122 0.007 
North Africa 0.0129 0.0195 0.510 
East Asia 0.0166 0.0162 0.307 
South Asia -0.0199 0.0137 0.146 
Constant 0.9464 0.2054 0.000 
 N=1255 R2=0.5393 
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Table 4-2: Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment Inflows in Developing 
Countries 
 Estimation 2b   
Variables Coefficient Robust S.E. P-value 
Logged FDI/GDPt-1 0.6407 0.0555 0.000 
Regime type t-1 0.0017 0.0007 0.011 
Left governmentt-1 0.0115 0.0111 0.299 
Center governmentt-1 0.0064 0.0117 0.581 
Other governmentt-1 -0.0028 0.0126 0.826 
Regime durability t-1 -0.0001 0.0002 0.826 
Internal war t-1 0.0005 0.0076 0.950 
External war t-1 0.0098 0.0105 0.351 
International Institutional 
Membershipt-1
0.0480 0.0219 0.028 
Proximity to Developed Countries -0.0019 0.0095 0.845 
Agriculture value-added/GDP t-1 -0.0006 0.0007 0.426 
Manufacturing value-added/GDP t-1 0.0004 0.0010 0.703 
Logged Extractives value-
added/GDP t-1
0.0201 0.0169 0.235 
Services value-added/GDP t-1 -0.0008 0.0007 0.271 
Foreign equity category 1 t-1 0.0083 0.0086 0.334 
Foreign equity category 2 t-1 0.0121 0.0110 0.272 
Foreign equity category 3 t-1 0.0342 0.0140 0.015 
Logged GNI per capita t-1 -0.0134 0.0065 0.039 
Corruption 0.0092 0.0088 0.296 
Property Rights 0.0001 0.0003 0.872 
Logged population t-1 -0.0064 0.0033 0.050 
Sub Saharan Africa 0.0087 0.0194 0.655 
Latin America 0.0263 0.0109 0.016 
North Africa 0.0210 0.0160 0.189 
East Asia 0.0146 0.0147 0.320 
South Asia -0.0136 0.0151 0.370 
Constant 1.0821 0.1930 0.000 
 N=1488 R2=0.5222 
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 Table 4-3: Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment Inflows in Developing 
Countries 
 Estimation 2c   
Variables Coefficient Robust S.E. P-value 
Logged FDI/GDPt-1 0.6468 0.0634 0.000 
Regime type t-1 0.0019 0.0009 0.026 
Nationalismt-1 0.0240 0.0102 0.018 
Left governmentt-1 0.0092 0.0114 0.420 
Center governmentt-1 0.0050 0.0123 0.687 
Other governmentt-1 -0.0032 0.0151 0.834 
Regime durability t-1 -0.0001 0.0002 0.669 
Internal war t-1 0.0043 0.0087 0.624 
External war t-1 0.0142 0.0090 0.114 
International Institutional 
Membershipt-1
0.0528 0.0246 0.032 
Proximity to Developed Countries -0.0048 0.0091 0.598 
Agriculture value-added/GDP t-1 -0.0002 0.0009 0.779 
Manufacturing value-added/GDP t-1 0.0001 0.0010 0.906 
Logged Extractives value-
added/GDP t-1
0.0397 0.0197 0.044 
Services value-added/GDP t-1 -0.0001 0.0008 0.930 
Foreign equity category 1 t-1 0.0090 0.0088 0.309 
Foreign equity category 2 t-1 0.0129 0.0123 0.296 
Foreign equity category 3 t-1 0.0351 0.0162 0.030 
Logged GNI per capita t-1 -0.0156 0.0074 0.035 
Corruption 0.0214 0.0091 0.018 
Property Rights -0.0002 0.0003 0.497 
Logged population t-1 -0.0031 0.0033 0.355 
Sub Saharan Africa 0.0042 0.0216 0.847 
Latin America 0.0291 0.0122 0.017 
North Africa 0.0132 0.0205 0.521 
East Asia 0.0192 0.0172 0.263 
South Asia -0.0243 0.0157 0.121 
Constant 0.9327 0.2002 0.000 
 N=1255 R2=0.5398 
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Of the variables representing the value-added in various economic sectors, the 
only variable to reach significance was the variable representing the extractives sector.  
The sign of the coefficient matched the prediction in Hypothesis 4-6c.  However, a 
possible mystery about this variable surfaces; the significance of this variable only 
appeared when the nationalism variable was included in the estimations, despite the 
fact that these two variables have a low correlation (-0.038).  The inclusion of the 
nationalism variable reduces the estimated sample by 193 observations, so missing 
observations may account for the significance of this variable. 
Some of the variables measuring international level factors were found to be of 
significance.  External war nearly reaches significance in Estimation 2a, but does not in 
the other estimations, and its sign is opposite to the prediction in hypothesis 4-7.  The 
variable measuring international institutional membership was significant across all 
estimations in the predicted direction of Hypothesis 4-8, indicating that membership in 
international institutions, especially those that promote norms and rules related to FDI, 
is associated with higher level of FDI in countries across the sample.  Proximity to 
developed countries appears to have little if any relationship to FDI inflows, providing 
little support for hypothesis 4-9. 
Some of the controls reached significance in the estimations as well.  Wages, as 
represented by GNI per capita, appears to be a robust predictor of FDI inflows, with 
greater inflows moving toward countries with higher GNI per capital.  Corruption 
reaches significance in the predicted direction in Estimations 2a and 2c, which may 
provide some indication that governments that are effective in fighting corruption receive 
more FDI as a proportion of their economies.  Surprisingly, property rights protections 
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did not reach significance in any of the estimations, despite the fact that it has been 
identified as an important variable in studies discussed previously.  Market size, as 
represented by population, gained significance in a negative direction only in Estimation 
2b, and therefore does not appear to be a reliable predictor of FDI inflows. 
Latin America was the only one of the regional variables to gain any significance 
at all, indicating that developing countries in that region may benefit from their location.  
When compared to Central Asia, the comparison group, Latin America’s coefficient was 
positive and significant across all estimations.  This may indicate that Latin America 
receives more FDI inflows than countries from other regions. 
Table 4-4 shows the predicted outcomes of FDI as a percent of GDP from 
Estimations 2c after varying each significant independent variable through its range. 
The dependent variable outcomes have been transformed back to the dependent 
variable’s original scale. 
Discussion 
The goal set for this chapter has been twofold.  The dissertation’s main focus has 
been to shed some light on the contribution of FDI policies to the FDI process.  In order 
to bring that illumination, the entire FDI process has been framed in the logic of two-
level games.  The previous chapter focused on the determinants of FDI policy, created 
on the domestic level, which sets the basis for eventual state agreement with firms over 
FDI.  This chapter takes the next step.  How does policy interact with political and 
economic factors to contribute to state-firm agreement and therefore inflows of FDI into 
developing countries?   
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Table 4-4:  Expected Outcomes of FDI Inflows Varying Significant Factors 
From Estimation 2c 
      
Variable Min -1 s.d Mean +1 s.d Max 
      
Regime 0.77 0.86 1.05 1.24 1.33 
Nationalism 1.05    1.10 
Intl. Institutional 
Membership 0.48 0.85 1.05  1.24 
FDI Equity Category 3 1.05    1.57 
GNI/capita 1.75 1.29 1.05 0.82 0.53 
Latin America 1.05    1.48 
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Since this firm-state agreement takes place outside the domestic political sphere, 
this environment constitutes the next level of agreement, and this chapter undertook to 
demonstrate that policy, formulated at the domestic level, affects agreement at the level 
of firm-state negotiation.  The outcome of agreements between firms and developing 
states, flows of FDI into developing countries, served as the object of investigation in 
this chapter. 
The estimations of FDI inflows and their determinants reveal two main findings.  
First, policy matters in developing countries when it comes to FDI.  How does policy 
matter?  While those countries that are less than completely open to foreign equity will 
receive FDI, those countries that have the most open policies will receive a boost in 
foreign investment inflows.  This finding underscores something that has been missing 
from many empirical studies of FDI – policies are an important part of the FDI story.  
Lack of data has precluded a large-scale study of FDI that includes policy prior to this 
dissertation, but development of the FDI Equity Index, introduced in this dissertation, 
has brought an important new tool to the study of foreign direct investment. 
The findings presented in this chapter further support the idea that FDI is not 
simply determined by domestic and international political and economic factors in 
isolation from each other, but follows a logic that resembles Putnam’s two-level games.  
International and domestic forces influence FDI policies.  These policies in turn 
influence flows of FDI along with some of the same and other different international and 
domestic forces.  Should one be interested in only domestic or international factors and 
their effects on FDI, by all means they can study them in isolation.  However, the full 
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story of FDI can only be told by considering FDI as a product of factors combining from 
both levels. 
FDI can only be fully understood if one relaxes the assumption that states only 
interact with other states outside of the domestic level.  Whether one considers firms as 
a player in the international community or one considers state and firm negotiation to 
belong in a realm separate from international relations but also outside the domestic 
purview of the state, the understanding that firm-state agreement is separate from the 
domestic sphere is essential.  Even though the environment of firm-state agreement 
occupies a separate sphere, it is influenced by domestic and international forces and in 
turn, has its own effects on the international and domestic environment.   
In the FDI story, states come to some agreements with other states over some 
aspects of FDI, but developing states are more likely to be in competition with each 
other over FDI and the foreign firms that invest.  On the other hand, the relationship 
between firm and state is much more complex.  Some competition is involved, centering 
on both firm and state’s desire to maximize their gains and minimize their costs.  Both 
firm and state in many cases have more incentives to come to agreement than to 
disagree, especially if they have any overlap in what they are willing to consider as 
acceptable agreements.  Instead of true competition, states and firms come to 
agreements on how to work together.  These agreements result in flows of FDI. 
Some of the findings in the estimations uphold what has been found in other 
studies.  Domestic political level factors that influence firm-state agreement include level 
of democracy in developing countries.  Democracies simply gain more FDI inflows as a 
percentage of GDP than non-democracies.  Democracies are friendly to and protective 
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of business, demonstrate transparency, have well-defined rules and laws, and 
constitute less risk for foreign firms than non-democracies. 
Other findings on the domestic level surprised.  Nationalism was shown to be 
positively associated with foreign direct investment.  This finding goes against much of 
the literature that addresses the role of nationalism in the world economy.  If nationalist 
governments are less enamored of the idea of an interdependent world economy, how 
do we explain this?  Shulman (2000) provides a possible answer for this puzzle.  He 
argues that nationalist governments face more complex choices and decisions about 
the international economy than they are generally given credit for.  Nationalist goals of 
autonomy, unity and identity can in some instances be achieved by strong foreign 
economic policies.  In addition, nationalist governments tend to rule smaller countries 
where FDI has a greater impact on the economy than in larger, more diversified 
countries.  Indeed, examining the dataset shows that developing countries with 
nationalist governments in the sample have a mean FDI as a percent of GDP of 2.17 
percent, while non-nationalist governments have a mean of 1.70 percent.  Finally, 
based on Putnam’s logic, nationalist governments may leverage some bargaining power 
with foreign corporations because the range of possible agreements they can consider 
is smaller, and therefore firms that want to invest must decide to take or leave what’s 
offered rather than negotiating better deals. 
 Similarly, the lack of a role for government ideology is also a surprising finding.  
Indeed, all ideological forms of government appear to have very little difference from 
each other when it comes to receiving foreign investment.  Some of the reasons for this 
finding may be attributed to methodological problems in the data that categorizes 
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government ideological forms.  In particular, the contingent of a large set of 
governments that cannot be classified as left, center, or right but simply occupies a 
category called “other” is a problem that cannot be overcome.  Either a greater effort to 
classify these “other” governments must be undertaken, or a new way of looking at 
government ideology must be created. 
Another surprise is the feeble performance of political stability variables in all 
models.  While political stability has had weak empirical success in other models of FDI, 
there has generally been agreement that a stable political environment enhances FDI 
flows.  However, internal war, external war and regime durability do not have any 
consistent significant effects on FDI in these estimations.  Does this mean that stability 
has no bearing on FDI?  The answer may lie in the problem of defining what is meant by 
political stability.  After all, democratic forms of government are also equated with 
stability, but what kinds of stability?  Democracies may be more likely to have certain 
forms of instability, such as strikes, riots, demonstrations and the like, which would not 
be tolerated in less democratic governments.  However, democracies are more likely to 
exhibit regime stability, as measured by the durability variable above. 
The findings on political stability may indicate that, despite Bollen and Jackman’s 
(1989) warning of conflating stability and democracy, the particular stability brought 
about by democracy is more important to firms than stability for its own sake.  After all, if 
foreign firms are more willing to send capital investment to democracies in developing 
countries, they get two benefits: more political stability and more open governmental 
decision-making.  Transparency in democracies allows firms to anticipate possible 
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changes in advance and adjust, rather than having to adjust immediately to the whims 
of an autocratic government. 
While this finding certainly merits more study, some possible answers may be in 
previous theories relating autocracy and democracy to development.  Long lasting 
autocracies might be considered more stable in ways attractive to firms.  Democratic 
political stability may come with policy instability.  As countries change governments 
peacefully, the policies that they propose, the new sets of regulations and restrictions 
they pass, and the demands they make on firms may prove to be unattractive over the 
long term.  Firms may invest in a developing democratic country under conditions at one 
time, and find that after elections the political landscape has changed.  FDI policies may 
change, as might all policies that affect the business environment in developing 
countries.  That being said, FDI equity policy in the dataset is remarkably stable, with 
changes in FDI equity restrictions occurring in only just over eight percent of the cases.  
However, if a wider range of policies that factor into firm decision-making were 
considered, a relationship such as proposed above may be found. 
The variables measuring the characteristics of the investment market performed 
weakly, except for perhaps the variable characterizing extractives.  It matters not 
whether developing countries are stronger in agriculture, manufactures, or services; 
these factors appear to be insignificant in both models.  Even though extractives were 
somewhat significant, the finding was not as robust as some of the other variables.  
Why might sectoral strengths have weak effects?  Despite the fact that more FDI 
worldwide is flowing into services, developing countries may not have the resources or 
the infrastructure to attract FDI into this sector like developed countries.  A lack of 
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resources to promote other sectors may compound this effect.  Countries that are 
strong in manufacturing appear to have no advantage when it comes to FDI inflows, 
which is surprising considering the amount of FDI that is invested in manufacturing 
around the world.  Perhaps this result indicates that manufacturing investment is truly 
diverse and not concentrated in one area.  The extractives sector, one of the oldest 
foreign direct investment sectors, is based in natural resources and investment in that 
area tends to be more fixed than other forms of investment because unlike 
manufactures, where a potential source of cheaper labor might be in the neighboring 
country or in another region, natural resources tend to be native to certain areas.  Once 
firms find a source of a natural resource, they are not likely to give up on it until it has 
been worked through, and they will be less inclined to let competition join them in 
extracting that resource.  Investment will likely be less than in other sectors, and 
relatively stable. 
Domestic level variables do not tell the entire story of FDI, however.  International 
level factors not only contribute to FDI policy, but with FDI policy they influence eventual 
agreements between firms and states, leading to FDI inflows into developing countries.  
In these estimations, international institutional membership is associated with greater 
amounts of FDI inflows.  International firms are more likely to come to agreements with 
those developing countries that belong to international institutions concerned with trade 
and investment because they institutionalize rules and norms of international business, 
leveling the playing field for firms among various countries. 
Controls included in the estimations show an extra level of factors that affect FDI 
inflows in conjunction with policies.  In general, the standard of living, particularly the 
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wage level, appears to matter in attracting foreign investment.  The results presented 
here suggest that FDI is attracted to low wage countries, much as has been reported in 
other research and reviewed previously.  I would suggest that developing countries with 
lower average incomes have a wider range of possible agreements with foreign firms, 
because the need for jobs outweighs the wariness of costs to FDI.  Some alternative 
explanations attribute somewhat darker designs for developing countries in attracting 
FDI.  It has been argued that some developing countries can artificially hold down 
wages in order to attract investment and compete with other low-wage countries and 
areas.  For example, there is evidence that in newly industrializing countries (NICs) in 
Asia, governments created incentives to lure foreign investment by artificially setting 
wage rates lower than the average real world wage determined by markets.  They then 
let wage rates slowly rise over time so that both firms and governments received 
benefits – firms in the beginning and governments over time (Dooley, Folkerts-Landau 
and Garber 2004).  The countries that want FDI have an incentive to keep wages low, 
while countries that do not place as high a priority on FDI can allow higher wages. 
The control of corruption also plays a part in the FDI story.  Countries are more 
efficient in dealing with corruption gain more FDI both as a percentage of GDP.  
Investment appears to seek out countries where business dealings are open and 
transparent, and where companies do not have to trouble themselves with unforeseen 
costs like paying bribes to get things done. 
Interestingly, the results do not support propositions that market size or property 
rights are important when it comes to flows of FDI.  Given that market size may allow for 
foreign investment to achieve greater local returns, this is a surprising result.  However, 
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this may also be a function of investment being placed in countries not to compete 
locally, but to manufacture and ship the finished products back to the home country or 
other developed countries.  In terms of property rights protections, which were also 
surprisingly insignificant, democracies have often been associated with greater property 
rights protections, and indeed there is a modest correlation (0.2341) between property 
rights protections and greater democracy in the sample.  This overlap between 
democracy and property rights protections may preclude the latter from gaining any real 
significance.  In addition, since the variable only accounts for an average of the years 
1995-2004, the lack of information on the preceding years may have some effect on 
how this variable performed as well. 
Of the regions, Central Asia, which consists of the country of Turkey, was 
excluded from the analysis as a basis of comparison given its limited observations.  
While regional differences are not overly present, an exception appears to be Latin 
America.  The results indicate that Latin American countries collectively receive more 
FDI as a percent of GDP than Central Asia, and indeed any of the other regions.  This is 
not a surprise.  Latin American countries were among the first to emerge from 
colonization, and therefore they have a long history of relations with both Europe and 
the United States.  In addition, the United States considers Latin America its back yard 
and has cultivated economic ties with most of its countries since the early 1800s.  Given 
this head start, firms from the developed world are familiar with Latin America, and have 
done business in its countries and with its leaders for a long time.  Even though Latin 
America and Sub-Saharan countries have the most open policies of any of the regions, 
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Latin America’s history, relative stability, and its stronger democratic tradition most likely 
makes it a more attractive investment opportunity. 
The Theory under Scrutiny: The Need for Case Studies 
Does policy matter to foreign investors?  In the face of the results of this chapter, 
it appears that policy, in combination with a variety of factors from both the domestic 
and international levels, has a great deal of influence on foreign direct investment 
inflows.  Statistics aside, the true test of any theory is not only predicated on what the 
general numbers say, but also what happens in individual countries.  Chapter Five will 
examine the theory of foreign direct investment that has been proposed in more detail 
by looking at the experiences of two countries, El Salvador and Nicaragua, and 
exploring the effects of policies on their FDI experiences.  I will consider the following 
questions:  What affects FDI policies in these two countries?  Does policy matter when it 
comes to the extent of FDI in their economies?  How do international and domestic 
influences interplay to produce not only FDI policy in these countries, but also FDI 
inflows?  The answers will help shed light on these questions in specific, local 
conditions. 
The case studies will take into account the countries’ similarities and differences 
in drawing a more complete picture of FDI policy and its effects on FDI performance.  
By delving more deeply into the phenomena of FDI policies in specific countries, I hope 
to find more specific answers to some of the outstanding questions about their creation, 
character, and influences. 
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Chapter Five 
FDI Policy in El Salvador and Nicaragua 
 The findings of the previous chapters reflect a general approach toward finding 
influences on FDI policies in developing countries, and how those policies may 
influence FDI inflows.  This study relies on quantitative studies to test relevant 
hypotheses.  While quantitative studies can provide fine evidence for possible causal 
relations between variables of interest, they cannot capture all variables of interest.  In 
particular, there may be variables and subsequent hypotheses that are missed in pure 
quantitative studies, no matter how exhaustive the list that the researcher prepares.  
Other variables of interest may not be quantifiable.  In the context of a more detailed 
examination of FDI policy, a complement to quantitative analysis may be appropriate.  
The utilization of case studies has long been a staple of social science research, and 
according to many scholars, qualitative case studies serve as an important complement 
to quantitative statistical studies.  According to King, Keohane and Verba (1994), 
quantification encourages precision, but does not necessarily produce accuracy 
because quantitative indexes produced for large scale statistical studies may not relate 
closely to the concepts that the researcher desires to measure.  Case studies can 
complement statistical studies because they can provide additional description and can 
lead to valid causal inferences. 
The overall purpose of this dissertation has been to discover what role policy 
plays in the FDI process.  I have looked for answers to the following general questions 
in order to discover how policy interacts with foreign direct investment.  What accounts 
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for the variation in FDI policies among developing countries?  How do policies influence 
FDI inflows? 
In Chapter Two I reviewed literature to argue that developing countries are of two 
minds about FDI.  These attitudes have been cultivated through exposure to prevailing 
thought during different time periods in their histories.  In the 1950s and early 1960s, 
developing nations were encouraged by an optimistic view of modernization driven by a 
Western desire to win the allegiance of developing countries from the Soviet Union.  
Modernization theory argued that all countries are on the path to modernity and 
embracing capitalism and free markets will bring industrialization.  By the end of the 
1960s, many developing nations had turned away from these prescriptions.  
Dependency theory argued that the developing world’s connections with the 
industrialized north were retarding its development and leading to greater inequality.  
Prescriptions included de-linking connections to the developed world, giving a greater 
role to the state in industrialization, and developing national industries to replace 
expensive and costly imports from the developed world with home-manufactured goods.  
But in the 1980s, after the rise of bloated state companies and debt crises partly 
predicated on massive borrowing made to finance those industries, a new 
modernization preaching free-trade and capitalism began to take hold.  Often enforced 
by international institutions that set conditions for debt restructuring, developing 
countries began to privatize their state-owned industries, reduce their social welfare 
programs and scale back state involvement in the economy in favor of free-markets and 
free trade. 
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As a result, states exhibited a blend of attitudes toward globalization, and on 
foreign direct investment, over the past thirty years.  This blend means that developing 
states’ attitudes occupy a spectrum between completely closed and completely open to 
FDI.  These attitudes are translated into their policies and at any point in time, 
depending on a coalition of factors, developing states’ policies will be more or less open 
to FDI. 
I argued that the factors that influence FDI policies follow the framework of two-
level games.  Developing countries create policies to control FDI on the domestic level, 
and bring these policies to the agreement process on the transnational level with 
international firms.  International and domestic factors affect both domestic level 
policymaking and the agreement process.  In particular, domestic factors include 
domestic politics, such as regime type, ideology and nationalism, and the domestic 
economic environment, such as potential alternatives to FDI for development and past 
experience with FDI.  International factors include international pressures and the world 
political environment.  I hypothesized that countries that are more democratic, non-
nationalist, and right leaning would have more open policies.  I proposed that 
international pressure, operationalized in the form of membership in international 
institutions with an interest in FDI and proximity to developed countries, would lead to 
more open policies.  I projected that alternatives to FDI, such as gross domestic 
savings, foreign aid, foreign borrowing, and maintaining a positive trade balance, would 
allow developing countries to pass more restrictive policies on FDI.  I also anticipated 
that past experience with FDI would affect countries’ future attitudes on FDI.  Countries 
that had strong past performances would continue to open to FDI based on their 
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experiences, and countries that had weak past performance would not see it as a viable 
option and remain closed. 
I also asked if these policies influenced FDI inflows.  I hypothesized that 
domestic factors such as current FDI policies, political factors, and international and 
domestic market characteristics act to create a push-pull influence on inflows.  I 
specifically hypothesized that open policies would influence greater FDI inflows, while 
more restricted policies would inhibit those inflows. 
 The next sections will examine these hypotheses in light of the specific 
experiences of El Salvador and Nicaragua.  I will highlight the cases of these two 
developing countries.  Why El Salvador and Nicaragua?  Both countries have had 
similar histories, yet many times both countries have had divergent experiences with 
FDI.  Both fought crippling and exhausting civil wars in the 1980s.  Both have had a 
long, complicated and often troubled relationship with the United States.  Both face the 
same political and economic difficulties, including the transition to democracy from civil 
war, the incorporation of a reactionary and guerrilla movements into the political 
process, and potential political pitfalls due to severe economic and political inequalities.  
Yet El Salvador’s government has wholeheartedly embraced economic development, 
but controlled it in favor of its national elite.  Nicaragua, on the other hand exemplifies a 
mix of wariness and openness to FDI, tempered by realities forced upon it.  These 
differences in two otherwise seemingly similar countries make them interesting case 
studies for FDI policy. 
 Figures 5-1 and 5-2 show the values of the FDI Equity Index and FDI inflows for 
El Salvador.  It can be seen that El Salvador shows a progression from more restrictive 
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Figure 5-2: FDI inflows
FDI equity policies to more open from 1976-2004.  While the overall amount of FDI as a 
percent of GDP has grown during that time, it has been characterized by mostly 
stagnant figures from 1976 to 1997, then a spike in 1998 due to a massive government 
privatization effort.  From 1999 to 2004, FDI inflows have increased at an uneven rate.  
The increase in FDI inflows has matched the increase in FDI equity openness, but other 
factors have also contributed to the increase. 
Figures 5-3 and 5-4 show the same data for Nicaragua.  Like El Salvador, 
Nicaragua has shown an increase in FDI Equity openness.  In fact, its policy change 
has been slightly more dramatic.  FDI inflows as a percent of GDP fell dramatically from 
1976 through 1980, when it reached zero.  It stayed at zero or close to it up through 
1991, and then began to rise rather dramatically from 1992 until 1999, when it began to 
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Figure 5-4: FDI inflows
fluctuate through 2004.  Some of the increase can possibly be attributed to policy 
change, but other factors will be considered and examined. 
The Context for Comparison 
 El Salvador and Nicaragua for much of their histories followed similar political 
and economic paths.  Both are rooted in the greater framework of the history of Latin 
America and particularly within the Central American region which gave them very 
similar early histories.  Most of what is considered Latin America, save Brazil, was 
colonized by the Spanish in the 16th century, who carved out their colonies in areas 
originally belonging to indigenous peoples.  These countries were rich in natural 
resources, which made them attractive for colonization, exploitation of those resources 
and abundant labor, and foreign investment.  The arrival of Spanish conquistadors 
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brought Europeans and a political and economic system based on a hierarchical model.  
Later revolts for freedom from this system which tied the colonies to the mother country 
brought independence for most of Latin America, including the Central American region.  
Constant turmoil between different factions in Latin America contributed to the rise of 
military intervention in politics in many of these countries, Central America included.  
Today, Latin America continues to be an area of contrasts where abundant wealth 
exists next to extreme poverty, and where potential always seems to be around the 
corner. 
 In this vein, both El Salvador and Nicaragua began life as Spanish colonies with 
the purpose of providing wealth for the growing Spanish empire.  Both countries gained 
independence after elite creoles began to chafe under the top-down, autocratic 
demands of the distant Spanish government, and both put into place republican forms 
of government, albeit representing only the elites, tied into an ideal vision of a unified 
Central American federation.  As I will explore in more depth, both countries gave up 
their republican representative governments in the 1930s and for the next few decades 
were ruled by governments dominated by the military.  The rise of a great number of 
civil groups in the 1960s led to greater political conflict throughout the 1970s, which led 
to devastating civil wars in both countries during the 1980s.  Following the civil wars, 
both El Salvador and Nicaragua opened their political systems, implementing 
democratic forms of government and involving a wider spectrum of their populations in 
the political process. 
Much of their economic histories have also been similar.  Both countries have a 
long history of dependence on agriculture as the primary commodity for export, 
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particularly after coffee was introduced in each country in the 1840s.  This cash crop 
helped define the power structures through land ownership in each country, setting the 
basis for future political conflict.  It also made each country attractive to foreign trade 
and investment.  Trade and investment in coffee led to the integration of each country 
into the world economy in the early 20th century, and each country set out on a course 
of industrialization.  However, the inequities in land ownership in each country caused 
similar problems of poverty and underdevelopment and set the seeds for future political 
conflict. 
Despite all these similarities, many questions can be asked.  Why do El 
Salvador’s and Nicaragua’s policy changes look remarkably similar?  Why do both 
countries have stagnant or moribund growth in FDI as a percent of GDP from 1976 
through 1990?  Why does Nicaragua’s growth in FDI as a percent of GDP rise much 
more rapidly than El Salvador’s?  The graphs do not reveal the differences in how El 
Salvador and Nicaragua came to view and establish policies toward foreign direct 
investment, particularly during the 1980s.  These differences were political, and involved 
both domestic level and international level factors, which influenced not only how each 
country viewed development but also how they put into place development strategies, 
including FDI. 
The first difference that influenced the trajectory of FDI policies in each country, 
especially throughout the 1980s, was the domestic political environment leading up to 
the civil wars in each country and the subsequent way the civil wars played out.  In the 
case of El Salvador, economic conditions combined with an awakening of civil society 
on the left, leading to military repression and an eventual rise of radical left-wing guerilla 
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groups bent on overturning the political and social order.  However, the government 
continued to be run by the military in league with the right wing, and economic goals 
remained the same.  These economic goals ensured that El Salvador’s FDI policies 
remained relatively open in comparison with other countries in the region, thus allowing 
El Salvador to rebound in investment after the end of the civil war. 
In Nicaragua, however, similar conditions led to radical left-wing groups taking 
political power away from the personalistic rule of one man, Anastasio Somoza, who 
operated independently from societal groups but whose actions often benefitted the 
elite.  Upon taking power, the leftist Sandinistas passed policies to implement their own 
agenda and erase most vestiges of the Somoza past.  Their agenda was at first one of 
restriction of FDI, but changed toward openness as economic realities became more 
apparent.  These policies of openness, however, did little to enhance Nicaragua’s 
attractiveness to international firms during Sandinista rule.  Foreign investment, while 
recently exceeding the level of El Salvador’s as a share of the economy, was 
completely moribund during the civil war and has traditionally lagged behind that of its 
neighbor. 
The second difference, which predates policy decisions from the 1970s onward 
(but has a great deal of influence on how each country viewed its potential place in the 
economic arena, on the international level and how firms viewed each country’s 
attitudes toward foreign investment) is the relationship that they have with world trading 
nd investment powers, particularly the United States.  Whereas El Salvador has tied 
itself to the world economy and has had close economic and political ties with the 
United States, Nicaragua has had a difficult relationship with world powers, except 
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perhaps the Soviet Union during Sandinista rule, and its relationship with the United 
States has a long and troubled history. 
Finally, the third difference between the two countries is the disparity in the 
relative strengths of each country’s domestic economy.  El Salvador, despite its 
devastating poverty and severe inequality, has managed to maintain the impression of a 
relatively high-performing economy friendly to foreign business.  Nicaragua, suffering 
the same problems with poverty and inequality, has had a consistently underperforming 
economy which has tended to depress investment.  Though both countries have low 
savings rates, high foreign debt, and have relied on foreign aid, Nicaragua suffers by 
comparison in these areas.  These differences in economic performance and strength 
have also affected FDI policies in each country.  I will examine each of these areas in 
detail below. 
Political Environment, Civil War and FDI 
 How have domestic level political factors influenced the FDI policies in El 
Salvador and Nicaragua?  In previous chapters, I demonstrated that domestic level 
political factors play a role in shaping FDI policies and in determining FDI inflows.  This 
has been true for El Salvador and Nicaragua.  In fact, both countries’ similar political 
histories have led them on similar paths, but at times their political histories have 
diverged.  This section will examine the two countries and the political structures that 
led to their civil wars, and contrast the FDI policies that emerged from these two paths.  
Despite the similar histories in the early 20th century until the late 1970s and early 
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1980s, the political structures begat very different civil wars, which in turn led back to 
similar policies for FDI in the present time. 
 El Salvador’s political history after independence helped it craft a political 
structure that centered around two elite parties with opposing views on the economy.  
The conservative party, representing the traditional landed families, favored economic 
nationalism that kept economic and political power largely under their control.  The 
liberal party was made up of merchants and business owners, favored free trade and 
openness to the world economy.  In 1871, the liberal position won out, and El Salvador 
traded on the worldwide market, utilizing its comparative advantage in agriculture.  The 
government intervened little in the economy, effectively ceding control of the market to 
the owners of capital. 
El Salvador kept tariffs low to ensure a market for British- and, after 1900, U.S.-
manufactured goods which, unfortunately, displaced locally made goods.  El Salvador 
also took a large amount of foreign loans toward projects such as an unrealized canal 
and railroads which established the first of its foreign debts.  However, an abundant 
supply of labor exceeded demand, and land consolidation by coffee barons and 
ranchers left many people landless or with too little land to allow them to subsist.  Any 
form of organization was not permitted, and often brutally suppressed. 
A turn of events occurred in the 1920s, when class-based organization led to the 
lower classes demanding a greater economic share in the wealth of the country.  In 
1931, a democratically elected president, Arturo Araujo, was overthrown in a coup on 
the grounds that he was unable to check the forces of popular uprising and his 
government was unable to deal with the effects of the depression.  The army installed 
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Hernando Martinez as president and began formal rule of the country, which it did not 
relinquish for another five decades.  In early 1932, aware of a pending popular uprising, 
the army arrested several leaders including Farabundo Marti (from which the rebel 
group turned present-day political party Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front, or 
FMLN, gets its name).  The uprising fizzled except in the western provinces, where the 
army brought its full force to bear upon the peasantry.  By many accounts the army 
killed upwards of 30,000 peasants (Taylor and Vanden 1982).31  The brutality of the 
“matanza,” or massacre, practically wiped out the country’s remaining indigenous 
population and effectively ended any more popular uprisings until the 1970s.  It also 
cemented the army’s pre-eminent power in the country, and served notice that the 
country’s ruling institution had little desire to implement any reformist measures. 
In the 1940s, El Salvador’s military government embarked on a program of 
industrialization, and by the 1960s, industrialization was in full swing, with foreign 
investment used to fund industrial goods produced for the Central American market.  
However, El Salvador’s old problem of severe economic disparity and a large rural 
landless population came back with a vengeance in the 1970s.  New groups began to 
organize for greater economic and political rights, and were greeted with much 
repression.  In 1980, El Salvador exploded into civil war.  Over the next 10 years, the 
FMLN and successive military governments, followed by centrist and rightist civilian 
governments (under Napoleon Duarte and then Alfredo Cristiani) waged a battle to a 
virtual stalemate, with the FMLN controlling large tracts of the northern countryside and 
wreaking havoc on the U.S.-funded Salvadoran army (Thomas 1987).  The inability of 
                                                 
31 Some estimates put this number lower, others higher.  Fisher (1982) states “at least ten thousands…”.  Little (1983) puts the 
number between ten and twenty thousand.  Ching (1998) says estimates vary from between fewer than ten thousand to more than 
thirty thousand in a country with a then population of 1.5 million. 
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the government to fully defeat the rebels, despite large amounts of aid from the United 
States, which was alarmed about a second possible leftist takeover (after Nicaragua) in 
Central America, was punctuated by severe brutality committed by the armed forces.  
Events such as multiple disappearances of leftist leaders at the hands of government 
paramilitaries, the army massacre at the village of El Mozote, the murder of Archbishop 
Oscar Romero, and the slayings of six Jesuit priests at the University of Central 
America shocked the world and had repercussions for El Salvador’s ability to attract 
trade and investment.  Eventually, with both sides exhausted and with the end of the 
Cold War reducing the importance of El Salvador in the eyes of the United States, 
peace accords were ratified in 1992 allowing the FMLN to become a full-fledged political 
party.  The FMLN took its place in the country’s legislature as the second largest 
political party and the Constitution of 1983, originally drafted to serve as the basis of 
democratic rule in El Salvador, appeared to finally live up to its promise. 
However, some say little has changed.  Despite some arguments that U.S. policy 
to build up the right-wing ARENA party and install it in power resulted in the removal of 
the army from political relevance and cemented democratic institutions.  But after two 
decades of democracy, the control of politics still largely rests with those allied with the 
most economically well-off in the country, though the FMLN holds enough power in the 
legislature to serve as a major impediment to ARENA legislative initiatives (Stanley 
2006).  In addition, leftist and alternative parties hold many local offices, leading to 
some tensions between federal and local branches of government.  However, the FMLN 
has also faced crises within its own party, as reformers fight for more transparent and 
party rules based on a democratic process, while orthodox members try to defend their 
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power base (Manning 2007).  Civil organizations are not as powerful as they once were, 
but can still muster enough mass protest to be heard and influence government policy, 
and are greatly aided by the FMLN’s support of progressive social movements 
(Stansbury 2006).  Crime, however, is a persistent threat to internal stability.  Gangs run 
rampant in San Salvador and other larger cities, and the U.S. State Department reports 
that El Salvador has one of the highest homicide rates in the world. 32  Crime may have 
future implications for El Salvador’s stability, as a study shows that Salvadorans are 
more likely to support a coup in response to higher crime rates, or at least strong 
government measures inimical to democracy. 
Nicaragua, in turn, followed a similar path in its early political development except 
for one important difference: the involvement of foreign countries in its political and 
economic affairs.  Nicaragua’s agriculturally based economy led to the rise of coffee as 
the largest agricultural export.  This in turn also strengthened the Conservative party, 
which was backed by the traditional land-owning families, favored economic nationalism 
and the role of the Catholic Church in the political sphere, and the Liberal party which 
was in favor of greater international commerce.  However, Nicaragua’s status as the 
largest of the Central American states, its position straddling the isthmus from both the 
Caribbean to the Pacific, and geographical features favoring easy transit between the 
two bodies of water made it very important to foreign business interests who were 
interested in building a canal.   
Seeking to take control of Nicaragua from the Conservatives, the Liberals invited 
a mercenary force under the leadership of American William Walker in 1855 to help 
them drive the Conservatives from power.  Walker instead set himself up as monarch of 
                                                 
32 United State Department of State, http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1109.html 
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the country, which discredited the Liberals and, after a force invaded from Costa Rica 
with backing from both the United States and Britain, led to Walker’s execution by firing 
squad in Honduras in 1960 and Conservative rule of Nicaragua until the 1890s. 
The United States’ concern over the Nicaraguan Liberal government’s courting of 
Germany and Japan to build a canal in its territory, in direct competition to U.S. interests 
in Panama, led to U.S. Marines landing on Nicaragua’s coast in 1912 and installing the 
Conservatives in power.  For the next 21 years, the United States would continue to 
have troops on the ground to both guard its interests and keep the Liberals and 
Conservatives from fighting a civil war.  A withdrawal was attempted once, but led to a 
larger intervention and U.S. oversight of the next two elections.  Nicaraguan 
governments at this time tended to toe the U.S. line, even if the policies favored were 
against the interests of the Nicaraguan people.  For example, Nicaragua gave the 
United States exclusive rights to build a canal in Nicaragua, even though the United 
States planned to do nothing of the sort.  They simply were protecting their interests in 
Panama.  The U.S. presence also led to civil strife, with a former general of the armed 
forces and member of the Liberal Party, Augusto Sandino, leading a home-grown 
resistance against U.S. occupation. 
U.S. intervention also led to the establishment of the Nicaraguan National Guard, 
which was trained and at first commanded by the U.S. military.  Upon leaving in 1933, 
the United States handed control of the National Guard to Anastasio “Tacho” Somoza.  
At the departure of the U.S. troops, Sandino ended his guerilla actions, but was 
assassinated not long after.  It was rumored that Somoza was an architect of the plan to 
have Sandino killed because Sandino wished to maintain his own military force in the 
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area of Nicaragua that he controlled.  Not long after Sandino’s death, Somoza forced 
the president of Nicaragua out of power, and took the presidency for himself.  The 
Somoza family would rule Nicaragua for almost 50 years.  Anastasio Somoza was 
assassinated in 1956, but his sons assumed power, with full power going to the younger 
Anastasio “Tacho II” Somoza after his brother Luis died of a heart attack.  According to 
Millett (2007, 466), the Somozas used control of the National Guard, manipulation of the 
Liberal Party and the image of a close alliance with the United States to maintain their 
power. 
In the early 1960s, a small Marxist-oriented guerilla movement sprung up in 
opposition to the Somoza regime.  The Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) was 
not well armed or well funded and did not have many members.  However, in the mid-
1970s, the Somoza regime had fallen out of favor with important elements of the civil 
and economic leadership in Nicaragua, as well as the leadership of the United States.  
The Sandinistas, meanwhile, had begun to temper their Marxist rhetoric and started to 
reach out to moderate opposition members.  A number of events, including the 
evacuation of Somoza to Miami for treatment of his heart, the murder of popular 
opposition newspaper publisher Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, and the successful FSLN 
capture of the National Palace, where they held a number of legislators and other 
government representatives hostage for two days while negotiating the release of many 
FSLN captives from prison and a half-million dollar ransom, convinced other 
Nicaraguans to oppose the regime more actively under the FSLN umbrella.  Somoza 
was eventually forced from power in 1979, and the FSLN set up a revolutionary 
government composed of a nine-member directorate.  The new government embarked 
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on a program of restructuring both the political and economic environments, starting 
with the nationalization of many of the business holdings of Somoza and his supporters. 
The United States under Carter had worked very hard to both force Somoza from 
power and bring about a moderate government in his stead.  Given the facts on the 
ground, the Carter administration offered tentative support to the new Nicaraguan 
government.  This only lasted until Carter’s defeat to Reagan in the U.S. general 
election of 1980.  Upon assuming office, Reagan’s administration, fighting the Cold War 
more actively, began to work both politically and economically to isolate the leftist 
Nicaraguan regime.  On the economic front, the United States embargoed trade and 
influenced multilateral lending agencies to cut off Nicaragua’s access to loans.  The 
Nicaraguan government was forced to seek out funding from the Soviet Union, Cuba 
and their allies.  On the political front, the United States poured aid into a group of ex-
Somoza supporters, former National Guard and Miskito Indians that were angry at the 
FSLN-led Nicaraguan government for displacing a number of their people from their 
traditional lands.  This group was labeled the Contras.  When the U.S. Congress, 
unhappy with the Contras’ progress and reports of their human rights violations, cut off 
funding to the guerillas, the Reagan administration used various backdoor means, 
including some illegal ones, to continue supplying the Contras.  The United States also 
illegally mined Nicaraguan harbors, and conducted espionage within the country. 
The civil war took a toll inside Nicaragua and affected both political and economic 
development.  Despite the military and financial aid received from the United States, the 
Contras were not able to mount a challenge that seriously threatened the Sandinistas, 
but the need to fund the war diverted government funds away from social reform 
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programs that the Sandinistas had envisioned and hampered the economy.  Inflation 
was rampant and almost unchecked.  Despite the civil war and the moribund economy, 
the Sandinistas rewrote the constitution, and in 1984 were re-elected in an election 
boycotted by opposition groups.  However, the war against the Contras and the slipping 
economy took its toll.  In 1990, the Sandinistas and their charismatic president Daniel 
Ortega were widely expected to win election again, but in a closely watched contest 
monitored by international observers, a coalition of opposition parties called the UNO 
won, propelling Violeta Chamorro into the presidency.  The new president and her 
allies, despite internal struggles among the disparate opposition elements, rolled back 
some of the Sandinista reforms and embraced neoliberal economic policies.  Though 
the economy did not recover as well as was expected, inflation was brought down to 
more manageable levels. 
Today, Nicaragua is once again under the presidency of Daniel Ortega, the 
Sandinista leader, re-elected after three election defeats to his opponents in the 1990s 
and early 2000s.  However, Ortega has to contend with an opposition legislature and 
has further removed himself from his past embrace of Marxist principles.  In particular, 
he has promised to maintain private property rights and continue to reach out to foreign 
investors. 
What effects did these domestic civil wars and the politics surrounding them have 
on the development of foreign direct investment policies in Nicaragua and El Salvador?  
In turn, was there spillover from these domestic level events into each country’s ability 
to attract foreign investment and reach agreement with international firms?  Was overall 
investment affected? 
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In the case of El Salvador, domestic upheaval appears to have had some effect 
on the development of FDI policies.  El Salvador has not historically received great 
amounts of FDI, though it has long had experience with foreign investors in its 
economy.  In addition, its ability to receive foreign direct investment was inhibited by the 
civil war, and by a reliance on foreign and military aid through the 1980s that was 
funneled into fighting the FMLN insurrection. 
Fighting the war and defeating the guerillas, not foreign investment, was first on 
the government’s agenda throughout the 1980s.  Foreign investment policies remained 
as they were before the civil war.  In 1979 when opposition organization began to gain 
strength, and in 1981 and 1982, during the first years of the civil war, El Salvador 
showed negative inflows of FDI as capital fled the country.  Through subsequent years 
until 1997, its FDI inflows never rose above around $48 million (constant 2000 U.S. 
dollars) despite the end of the civil war in 1989, and the adoption of a number of policies 
at the war’s end designed to stimulate foreign investment. 
For example, the Foreign Investment Development and Guarantee Law, adopted 
in 1988, offered 10 year tax exemptions on income taxes to firms exporting 25 percent 
of their non-traditional products, and a 10 year duty exemption on machinery, 
equipment and raw materials.  Foreign companies in the industrial sector were given 
unrestricted remittances of net profits, while those in the commercial and service 
sectors were granted remittances of profits up to 50 percent of registered foreign 
capital.  Other incentives were permission for foreign investors to establish U.S. dollar 
accounts and use them to obtain local financing, and unrestricted remittance of funds 
from liquidation, royalties and fees for use of foreign patents. 
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Two years later, the 1990 Foreign Investment Promotion and Guarantee Law 
offered unrestricted remittance of profits and return of capital.  The Export Reactivation 
Law and the Free Trade Zone Law, both adopted the same year, granted additional 
benefits to exporting firms such as a total exemption from the stamp tax, a number of 
rebate opportunities, and additional fiscal incentives to companies operating in free 
trade zones.  However, El Salvador continued to maintain strict controls on foreign 
banks, and foreign investment was still prohibited in key utilities and in foreign exchange 
houses. 
FDI policies and foreign investment inflows have been influenced by the end of 
the war and the integration of the former leftist guerrillas of the FMLN into the political 
process.  In 1992, after more than a decade of civil war, El Salvador’s warring factions 
signed peace accords, integrated the FMLN into the political process, and paved the 
way for fair and free elections.  The 1994 elections were roundly hailed internationally 
as fair and free, with the right-wing ARENA party gaining the most seats in the 
Assembly and also gaining the presidency, but with the FMLN establishing itself as a 
true opposition party.  In subsequent elections, the FMLN gained strength.  To this point 
it has never gained the presidency of the country, but it currently holds more seats in 
the Assembly than any other party.  The presidency, however, is held by the ARENA 
party, and with its smaller party allies in the Assembly is able to pass important 
legislation. 
 While the process appears to be more democratic than during and before the 
civil war, there are some questions about the nature of El Salvador’s democracy.  Is El 
Salvador truly a democracy, or do the trappings of elections conceal something less 
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than democratic?  And how has this apparent democratization of the country affected its 
policies and its investment status? 
 Let us look at the second question first.  Since 1997, Freedom House has rated 
El Salvador as “free” despite some misgivings about various aspects of its political and 
economic situation.  It cites, among positives, the right to freedom of association, 
academic and religious freedoms, a decline of human rights violations, and its recent 
history of free and fair elections.  It cites concerns with corruption, crime, and occasional 
discrimination against women.  Additionally, the Polity IV project has rated El Salvador 
as six and presently a seven on its ten point scale of democracy, indicating that El 
Salvador has more work to do if it is to reach a status as a strongly democratic country. 
 Yet questions remain about the strength of El Salvador’s democracy.  While El 
Salvador has a basis of strong institutions that can sustain democracy, some important 
institutions that are important for democratic development, such as the judiciary, are 
perceived as lacking independence from the government and are not highly regarded by 
the people (Dodson and Jackson 2004).  In addition, El Salvador lacks a political center 
in its Assembly, and power is split fairly evenly between the ARENA party and its allies 
and the FMLN.  Without any strong centrist parties to moderate, stalemate in Assembly 
often occurs.  This polarization extends down into civil society, with strong groups on 
the right and the left supporting the parties that ideologically agree with them.   
Barnes (1998) argues that this polarization has created a democratic deficit in El 
Salvador.  In particular, Barnes laments the absence of a center-left party, which he 
argues would blunt the more radical vision of the FMLN and create more areas for 
compromise.  Without such compromise, El Salvador has been left with years of a ruling 
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right-wing that is stymied by an obstructionist left, and as has been occurring, a lack of 
interest in the polls at election-time.  However, he sees promise in El Salvador’s 
attempts to create democracy because of certain institutional structures, such as an 
efficient transportation system and a relatively high education rate, that make the 
possibility of a real democracy within reach. 
In terms of the economy, these conditions tend to create two very different views 
of development in the country, with little common ground between them.  In addition, 
most money for development projects from outside the country, particularly the United 
States and international institutions, tends to flow through groups aligned with those on 
the right.  Development from the right tends to focus on a top-down approach, with 
those with economic and political power (often the same people) deciding what is best 
for the country’s development.  Left-oriented development tends to get its impetus from 
community involvement and participation, but is difficult to implement because of a lack 
of funding, though some does come from European sources (Foley 1996). 
There are differing opinions in the country, particularly on the left.  One observer, 
Dr. Salvador Árias, an economist and a member of the Assembly with the FMLN, 
argues that El Salvador is not a democratic country, because it doesn’t have a “real” 
process for transferring power and that there is little separation between the 
mechanisms of state under the present ruling ARENA party.  He added that the current 
government and those on the right tend to favor the quick attraction of foreign 
investment.33  Dr. Guillermo Ramirez Alfaro, an economist at San Salvador’s 
Technological University, says that democracy has no effect on foreign direct 
investment policies.  He cites three other factors, El Salvador’s lack of resources, a lack 
                                                 
33 Interview with author, 7 June 2007. 
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of political stability, and the absence of a unitary economy to use investments toward 
development, as more important.34
However, Roberto Góchez, an economist at the University of Central America, 
points toward political factors as having an influence on the government’s stance toward 
FDI.  The rightist government, according to him, is in the process of opening to FDI and 
deregulating and has made an agreement to take any investment disputes to 
international courts.  He says El Salvador has already lost a case in international 
tribunals pertaining to electricity distribution.35  Dr. Álvaro Trigueros of FUSADES, a 
non-profit think tank in San Salvador, asserts that the arrival of democracy signaled the 
arrival of El Salvador’s new economic model, developed by FUSADES and similar to 
the Chilean model.36 And Juan Carlos Rivas Najarro, of the Ministry of Economy of El 
Salvador, argues that the peace treaty with the FMLN, their entry into the political 
system and the current balance in government has helped foreign investment.  El 
Salvador, he points out, has the lowest savings and loan interest rates in Central 
America, and provides enterprises with the macro-economic stability they need.37
The large scale studies in Chapters Three and Four indicated that nationalism 
has an effect on FDI, with nationalism positively related to FDI inflows as a percent of 
GDP.  For El Salvador, nationalism is only just beginning to play a part in domestic 
politics with the acceptance of the FMLN into the political system.  The governments 
that have ruled El Salvador, military, centrist and right wing, have tended to be 
outwardly oriented in terms of trade and investment, but reserving most of the benefits 
of the economy for the wealthy class at the top of the economic pecking order.  In many 
                                                 
34 Interview with author, 25 May 2007. 
35 Interview with author, 1 June 2007. 
36 Interview with author, 30 May 2007. 
37 Interview with author, 29 May 2007. 
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ways, El Salvador resembles the tripartite alliance so well described in Evans (1979) 
between state, local outwardly oriented elites and international business.  With the 
addition of the FMLN to politics, however, and the possibility that they will one day take 
power, nationalist rhetoric has begun to be heard in the halls and chambers of the 
assembly with discussions of reducing ties to foreign investment and increasing 
protections for national businesses.  While nationalism has not played a part in El 
Salvador’s economy since 1976, there are chances that it could in the future.  If the 
predictions of the model studied here are correct, that may actually increase FDI in El 
Salvador in the long run. 
Do domestic political factors have an effect on foreign direct investment policies 
and on actual investment in El Salvador?  It depends on who is commenting.  The 
conclusions appear to suffer from the same polarization as the politics in the country.  
The right wants to tout its economic successes, and points toward democracy and its 
own policies as important keys in the development of El Salvador.  Right-of-center 
commentators say that the government is more open to FDI, and point to its 
privatization programs and its open policies.  They paint the left as being hostile to 
foreign investment.  They argue that the left does not care about the business 
environment.  They argue that the left sees multinational corporations as evil, and 
therefore will tax larger businesses, regulate foreign investment and create 
disincentives for economic development.  The left paints a picture of the emperor having 
no clothes.  They argue that the Salvadoran government has given away everything to 
foreign multinationals which enter El Salvador, but contribute very little to the 
development of the economy.  They argue that FDI must contribute more than just quick 
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profits to the wealthy.  They envision a greater role for the state in deciding the country’s 
economic future, including making investments in its own social programs.   
This debate in El Salvador of whether the state or the private sector should be in 
charge of development and even basic services is a very hot issue – recently, 
demonstrations broke out when the government announced that it was privatizing the 
water system of the town of Suchitoto.  Some members of the non-governmental 
organization CRIPDES were arrested while driving to a demonstration protesting the 
privatization of the water system in the town of Suchitoto and charged with acts of 
terrorism carrying possible sentences of 60 years (Mezzacappa and Towarnicky 2007).  
The debate will only get stronger in the coming year.  In 2009, the presidency of ARENA 
party president Antonio Saca will come to an end.  For the first time, the FMLN has 
united around a candidate that does not hail from the party’s guerrilla old-guard.  Their 
candidate, Mauricio Funes, is an early favorite for the presidency with a 75 percent 
approval rating.38  The ARENA party does not appear to have united around a cohesive 
candidate at this time.  If Funes wins the presidency, it will test the right’s commitment 
to democracy, and possibly mark the first time since the 1930s that the country will 
peacefully transfer power to the left.  Should that happen, there could be implications for 
FDI, perhaps even a movement away from FDI as a development strategy, as has 
happened recently in other Latin American countries, such as Venezuela, Ecuador and 
Bolivia, where the left has gained power.  However, it will also mark a turning point in El 
Salvadoran politics.  Whichever side is in power should have a significant impact on the 
policies and inflows of FDI in the future El Salvador. 
                                                 
38 Bulletin 22(2), University Institute of Public Opinion (IUDOP) of the University of Central America. The text of this bulletin can be 
found at http://www.uca.edu.sv/publica/iudop/Web/2007/Boletin-2-2007.pdf 
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Like El Salvador, the story of Nicaragua’s investment policies and foreign 
investment performance involves a civil war and an opening to FDI following the war’s 
end.  From 1936 until 1979, Nicaragua was under the personalistic rule of the Somoza 
family, which suppressed democratic forces within the country and ran the economy as 
if it was their personal estate.  Under the Somozas, whose politics were right-wing and 
centered on a Nicaraguan nationalism limited to themselves and their friends and allies, 
the government pursued state-led industrialization with the Somoza family’s hand in 
practically every business venture.  The Somozas cultivated ties with the United States 
and other foreign aid donors.  They also courted U.S. businesses, and most likely dealt 
with them like they dealt with any business – granting favors in exchange for personal 
gain. In the 1970s, the Somozas began to expand their holdings in domestic agriculture 
and industrial activities, crowding out other Nicaraguan businessmen.  According to an 
article in Business Week (1978), one American businessman operating in Nicaragua put 
it very succinctly, commenting that "…you just don't do business here without offering 
the general a share in it from the beginning.”
In the 1970s, Nicaragua, like many other Latin American countries, followed the 
import-substitution-industrialization model of development, and its foreign investment 
policies of the time reflected its goals.  In 1976, under the Somoza regime, Nicaragua 
actively promoted itself as an offshore assembly location for foreign corporations, and 
established free trade zones to lure foreign companies.  Nicaragua offered generous 
incentives in the free trade zones, including duty exemptions on imported machinery, 
tools and parts, unlimited raw materials imports, exemptions from income taxes on 
profits from exports, and special concessions for businesses that made commitments 
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for 10 to 15 years (Exporters Encyclopedia 1976).  However, the Investment Law of 
1955 did not specify that 100 percent foreign ownership was allowed, and the Somozas 
and their allies controlled or had a hand in the majority of the country’s economic 
activity. 
 In 1979, the Somoza family was forced from power by the Sandinista National 
Liberation Front (FSLN).  The FSLN was one of a number of groups that had arisen to 
oppose the Somozas after the 1972 earthquake, when a massive outpouring of aid from 
the developed world was pocketed by the Nicaraguan leader.  In 1980, the new 
Sandinista government nationalized all Somoza family holdings and any abandoned 
businesses were claimed by the state.  The Sandinistas also declared that Nicaragua’s 
natural resources were also property of the state.  The following year, the government 
nationalized the sugar industry and also export-commodities such as rum and instant 
coffee.  The government also announced a takeover of any idle land of over 349 
hectares in key states and unused land of over 698 hectares elsewhere.  Even though 
the government wanted to maintain the impression of free enterprise in Nicaragua, as 
late as 1988 the government was taking over private businesses (Kinzer 1988). 
 The Sandinista uprising eliminated the corrupt Somoza era government.  
Originally tied to Marxist doctrine, the Sandinistas softened their stance to win more 
allies to their cause in the last few years of the Somoza regime.  One view is that the 
FSLN wanted to prioritize the needs of the working class, while still allowing for 
capitalism and the free market (Roche 2006).  Regardless, their ascent into power 
changed business as usual and led the Reagan administration, worried about Soviet 
and Cuban influence, to put economic pressure on the country.  Despite their nationalist 
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language regarding the economy before they came to power, the Sandinistas tried to 
calm foreign investors.  “The Nicaraguans, who realize that the smartest thing in the 
world for them to do is act responsibly, have been making their payments on time,” 
stated an American businessman (Gilpin 1983).  To get around the U.S. economic 
pressure, the Sandinistas also attempted to diversify their trading sources, according to 
the same article, by opening up to greater economic relations with Cuba and the Soviet 
bloc. 
 Regardless of their leftist orientation and their nationalist rhetoric, the Sandinistas 
appeared to realize early that they could not simply jettison their ties with foreign 
corporations.  Despite the Sandinista expropriation of businesses formerly owned by the 
Somoza family, the government planned to maintain a private sector, and allow foreign 
investment on a controlled basis with guarantees against state takeovers (Economist 
1979).  Nicaragua, faced with negative growth and declining domestic investment for 
the first time since the Sandinistas took power and desperate for foreign investment and 
bank credits, took action to try to make the country more attractive to foreign investors 
(Business Week 1983).  In an effort to stimulate private Western investment and 
address a lack of confidence in the economy, the Sandinistas struck a more moderate 
tone after the 1985 elections (Volman 1985).  They openly courted FDI and trade, but 
foreign nations and companies exercised caution (Adkins 1985b).  The United States, 
due to its fears of a communist takeover in Central America leading to a Soviet foothold, 
openly discouraged any type of investment in the country and in 1985 set up a trade 
embargo against the country.  This did not completely dissuade trade with Nicaragua.  
As the only Central American nation that was a member of the General Agreement on 
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Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the precursor to the World Trade Organization, Nicaragua 
pushed for hearings at that international body to discuss the legality of the U.S. 
embargo and openly courted European, Canadian and Eastern bloc trade (Foster 
1985).  In 1985, trade with the Soviet Union tripled (Shabad 1985).  Despite the caution, 
foreign companies, including American firms, that were already established in the 
country did not leave.  A partial list of foreign companies doing business in Nicaragua in 
1985 includes Exxon, IBM, Monsanto, and Nabisco.  A spokesman for IBM declared 
that the company had “no complaints about doing business in Nicaragua” (Adkins 
1985a). 
Under the FSLN, the foreign investment law was overhauled in 1987 for the first 
time since 1955.  The Sandinistas did not bother to change the most basic laws 
regarding foreign investment but appeared to make individual deals, and negotiate 
individual incentives, with foreign corporations.  In 1987, 100 percent foreign ownership 
was allowed in some areas, a degree of ownership not even set in law under the 
Somozas.  Notwithstanding their efforts, the Sandinista takeover caused a complete halt 
to foreign investment in Nicaragua.39  From 1980 to 1991, figures from the World 
Development Indicators show that except for 1990, when about $880,000 of inflows 
were recorded, no new foreign investment came to Nicaragua – literally, the entries for 
foreign direct investment inflows in dollars and in percent of GDP from 1980 -1989 and 
1991 show absolutely zero FDI inflows.  The Multinational Monitor, a publication of the 
Multinational Resource Center, documented the difficulties of the Sandinista 
government in convincing foreign capital to invest in the country.  Charles Roberts 
(1980) writes of the Sandinistas’ cautious attitudes toward foreign investment due to 
                                                 
39 Source:  World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
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past experience where, under Somoza, foreign investment mostly produced luxury 
goods with high import contents, and where the government made no effort to harness 
any returns from foreign investment for the country’s development through taxes and 
regulations.  Foreign banks were viewed with particular suspicion by the Sandinistas 
because they kept Somoza supplied with capital and, as his political opposition 
increased, he borrowed more heavily to keep himself in power.  The Sandinista 
government envisioned at that time a mixed economy, with more controls on FDI. 
That mixed economy never came to fruition under their rule.  In 1990, the 
Sandinistas lost the elections, and the new government moved quickly to enshrine free 
market policies in law. The unexpected victory of the coalition of anti-government 
parties called the National Opposition Union (UNO) in a tightly fought, free and fair 
election brought the first trappings of full democracy to Nicaragua and a moderate 
government into power under Violeta Chamorro, but it proved incapable of turning 
around the economy.  The government embarked on a campaign of privatization of 
state-run companies, opening the doors to trade and investment and receiving a 
resumption of trade and aid from the United States.  Successive governments drifted 
farther to the right, but also proved unable to solve Nicaragua’s economic woes.  One 
administration, led by President Arnoldo Aleman, was so corrupt that he was arrested 
under the administration of his hand-picked successor, Enrique Bolanos. 
  By 1992, a new law on foreign investment had been passed that allowed 100 
percent foreign ownership in most areas except telecommunications, energy, insurance, 
water and sewage and a few other small sectors. 100 percent remittances of profits 
were allowed.  While the new government did not give explicit incentives for investment, 
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they did provide for dispute settlement through arbitration, specified no export 
requirements, and began a privatization process for government-owned agencies where 
foreign bidding was allowed.  In addition, Nicaragua began opening new free trade 
zones, both public and private. 
 The return of Daniel Ortega to the presidency may signal a leftward shift in the 
country in keeping with trends in many other countries in Central and South America.  
Unlike before, the Sandinistas do not control the legislature, and so Ortega will have to 
deal with a hostile Congress.  Ortega has toned down his former Sandinista rhetoric.  
After his 2007 election, he was quoted as saying that the launch of a $35 million venture 
capital and private equity fund by Latin American Financial Services (Lafise) “…is one 
more step that proves we are committed to respecting private property and foreign 
investors and that we are a government of reconciliation and national unity" (Repo 
2007).  He does not sound like a revolutionary Marxist.
In the long run, FDI policies and inward FDI flows were both affected somewhat 
differently by the domestic political upheaval.  Both countries took slightly different paths 
to greater FDI openness.  The military government in El Salvador first relied on import-
substitution-industrialization until the civil war.  Once the civil war started, it placed 
prime importance on defeating the guerillas. Its path to FDI openness did not start until 
the conclusion of their civil war, when development began to be a concern again.  The 
Salvadoran government has managed to push through legislation since the early 1990s 
that has been friendly toward foreign investment, but it faces a strengthening left that is 
very skeptical and wary of the influence of foreign corporations and their presence in the 
Salvadoran economy.  And while FDI has been increasing slowly, particularly because 
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of privatization efforts initiated by the Salvadoran government, the threat of political 
instability and rising problems with gangs and crime continue to inhibit investment.  In 
addition, competition from other nations both within and outside the region makes it 
more difficult for this small nation to make itself noticed. 
Nicaragua’s FDI policies were very affected by domestic political factors and its 
civil war.  The Somozas treated the Nicaraguan economy as their personal business, 
and limited foreign investment inasmuch as they could profit from it.  The Sandinista 
takeover brought in a government that had a Marxist and nationalist view of the 
economy, but which had also inherited the economic mess left by the Somozas.  These 
hard facts first encouraged the Sandinistas to look to the Soviet Union, and when the 
Soviets were unable to provide much in the way of economic aid and investment, to try 
to develop any way possible.  Therefore, Nicaragua began to open to 100 percent 
foreign equity ownership during its civil war.  These policies were a product of a 
government trying to balance a need for development with wariness toward foreign 
influence, and all in the face of a hostile guerilla movement funded by one of the most 
powerful nations in the international arena.  However, these policies had little initial 
effect on FDI, and Nicaragua only saw increases after the Sandinistas were ousted from 
political power and its successors brought even more openness to the economy.  By 
that time, Nicaragua had lost its strategic value because of the end of the Cold War, and 
like El Salvador, it must now compete for FDI.  With foreign investment rising, 
Nicaragua must convince investors that its democracy is stable and that it can control 
corruption. 
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The International Arena and FDI 
The domestic political arena was not a solitary influence on FDI policies and 
inflows in El Salvador and Nicaragua.  Each country has a place in the international 
environment.  The relationships that each has forged, the institutions that they have 
joined, and other aspects of the international arena also have an influence on the 
development of FDI policies and the willingness of firms to consider El Salvador and 
Nicaragua for investment.  In particular, the relationship each country has had with their 
closest superpower neighbor, the United States, has made a large difference in how 
each country has created its policies.  For the decade of the 1980s, each country’s 
relationship with the United States was profoundly different, and their policies were as 
much a reflection of that relationship as they were a product of the political realities 
within each country.   
The first factor to be considered is the effects of international institutions on FDI 
policies and FDI inflows, examining El Salvador’s and Nicaragua’s relationship to five 
international institutions with FDI as a focus.  These institutions are the International 
Finance Corporation, the Multilateral Insurance Guarantee Agency, the World Trade 
Organization, the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, and 
the World Intellectual Property Organization.  Another factor for these two countries is 
their proximity and relationship to the United States.   
El Salvador has experience with both.  While not contiguous with the United 
States or its economic zones, El Salvador endures political and economic pressure from 
its neighbor to the north.  Since around 1900, the United States has exerted profound 
political and economic influence in Central America, including El Salvador, directly and 
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indirectly affecting its development.  The United States has been a source of foreign 
and military aid, the latter coming especially during El Salvador’s civil war and during 
the civil war in neighboring Nicaragua.  Edwin G. Corr, former chief of mission to El 
Salvador, lists a number of reasons the United States was concerned about the civil war 
in El Salvador, including that Nicaragua’s Sandinista government was backed and 
financed by the USSR and Cuba, and that the El Salvadoran FMLN was trained and 
financed by Cuba and supported by the USSR and Nicaragua.  He argues that one of 
the reasons El Salvador’s conflict became, in the words of an FMLN participant, “the 
first revolution in Latin America won through negotiation,” is because the United States 
supported a moderate government in El Salvador, supported efforts to consolidate 
democracy in the country, worked to end human rights abuses, and foster the country’s 
economic growth (Corr 1995).  He glosses over the very high amounts of United States 
military aid to El Salvador to defeat the FMLN guerrillas.  This military aid grew from $10 
million in 1980 to $283 million in 1984, and total United States military and development 
aid to El Salvador between 1980 and 1988 totaled $3.9 billion (Pearce 1998).  While 
many left-of-center commentators would dispute Corr’s version of the United States’ 
efforts, he highlights the important role the United States played during the civil conflict 
and in El Salvador’s development strategies.  Indeed, some El Salvadoran nationals I 
spoke with informally in the country are convinced that if the Salvadoran people elect a 
government headed by the FMLN, the United States will invade, or at least use the CIA 
to overthrow it, given the United States’ close ties with the right-wing ARENA 
government.  Suspicions of the United States and its ability to influence events in El 
Salvador obviously still run high. 
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The United States has had an important role in the El Salvadoran economy 
through its Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), which grants preferential, duty free entry to 
products manufactured in El Salvador and other regional countries.  The Central 
American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) has replaced CBI with tariff-slashing across 
the board.  CAFTA has caused much debate in both El Salvador and in the United 
States.  In a talk with a delegation of students in San Salvador in May of 2007, César 
Villalona, a left-leaning Salvadoran economist, said that CAFTA promised four things: 
more El Salvadoran exports to the United States, facility for greater foreign investment 
in El Salvador, more jobs in El Salvador, and lower prices.  He rated the first year of the 
agreement in terms of those four promises.  In 2006, he said, exports to the United 
States from El Salvador went down 2.5 percent because of diminished exports from the 
maquiladora sector and greater competition from China.  Coffee, sugar and ethyl-
alcohol exports went up slightly, but imports from the United States increased by five 
percent, thus increasing the trade deficit with the United States.  Foreign investment 
went down sixty percent from 2005-2006, from $517 million dollars to $204 million 
dollars, though U.S. investment in El Salvador rose by $10 million dollars in 2006.  To 
compare, he said Costa Rica, which has signed but not implemented the agreement, 
gained $1.6 billion in foreign investment.  Villalona said that prices increased in El 
Salvador after CAFTA was signed, and unemployment increased also.40  
People I interviewed on the left say that CAFTA has damaged El Salvador’s 
ability to compete as it must against larger countries in the region such as Mexico and 
the United States, and has even hampered El Salvador’s ability to compete out of its 
                                                 
40 This statement by Villalona has an imperfect fit with the data.  While the urban unemployment rate rose from 6.5 percent to 7.3 
percent from 2004 to 2005, it fell to 5.7 percent, according to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC), Preliminary Overview of the Economies of Latin America and the Caribbean 2006.  There were many job losses in the 
maquiladora sector, however. 
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region against countries like China.41  One self-described centrist said that El Salvador 
needs integration with other Central American economies, but not through CAFTA.42  
Interviewees on the right did not specifically mention CAFTA, but pointed out how much 
El Salvador has opened its markets and focused on free trade and how these measures 
would help El Salvador’s economy overall.43
Various international institutions also exert a fair amount of influence over El 
Salvador’s fortunes.  Pearce (1998) identifies a number of ways in which, post civil-
conflict, the international community uses its authority to sway El Salvadoran policy.  
The United Nations was instrumental in monitoring the peace accords and helping 
parties move through hurdles and roadblocks.  The World Bank and other economic 
institutions have supported Salvadoran policies toward economic adjustment, 
stabilization and growth.  The World Bank has considered and funded 48 projects in El 
Salvador since 1949, of which six projects are currently active.  Those projects include a 
land-tenure administration project, an environmental management program to increase 
sustainable conservation and use of El Salvador’s ecosystems and forests, a judicial 
modernization project, an earthquake emergency reconstruction project, a project for 
biodiversity in coffee growing areas, and a technical assistance project for public sector 
modernization.44  However, World Bank structural adjustment programs may have hurt 
El Salvador’s post-war economy (Paris 1997).  In particular, they limited El Salvador’s 
public expenditures, which constrained its ability to fund its peacebuilding programs, 
compromised the government’s social services, and may have even lead to a recession.  
                                                 
41 Interviews with Salvador Árias, 7 June 2007 and Roberto Góchez, 1 June 2007 
42 Interview with Guillermo Ramirez, 25 May 2007 
43 Interviews with Juan Carlos Najarro, 29 May 2007 and Alfaro Trigueros, 30 May 2007 
44 World Bank, http://web.worldbank.org 
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Whether the World Bank helped or hindered El Salvador’s economy, its ability to 
influence policy is clear. 
Private sector enterprises in El Salvador can receive investment from the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), a program of the World Bank.  El Salvador has 
been a member of this organization since 1956.  The IFC’s stated goals are to promote 
sustainable private sector development, address constraints to private sector 
investment in infrastructure and social services like health and education, and 
developing financial markets.  Since 1995, the IFC has invested in sixteen projects in El 
Salvador, including a $30 million revolving credit account for Taca Airlines to make pre-
delivery payments on new Airbus A-320 airplanes, a $25 million corporate loan for the 
establishment of a new MetroCentro shopping mall in San Salvador, and two loans of 
$45 million and $65 million to help fund an AES (a U.S. energy company’s) project to 
upgrade rural electric distribution networks.  One attractive aspect of the IFC’s funding 
is that it does not demand any repayment guarantee from the government.  However, it 
too exerts an influential position on government policies and investment inflows.  Not 
only does its financing help establish the validity of investment projects, but it also offers 
a range of advisory services that include prescriptions for simplifying business 
regulatory structures. 
El Salvador became a member of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(MIGA) in 1991, which helps guarantee foreign investment projects from political risk.  In 
2006, MIGA provided $1.8 million in guarantee coverage for a project by a Canadian 
biothermal company, Biothermica Energy, Inc., which looks to capture methane gas at a 
municipal waste dump in San Salvador, and a $3.15 million guarantee to a Costa Rican 
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company, Corporación Interfin S.A., which looks to expand its leasing portfolio in El 
Salvador.  These guarantees provide the companies with insurance against risk, such 
as transfer restrictions, expropriation, and war or civil unrest.  Other coverage was 
provided in 1996 to Citibank and in 1992 to AVX Corporation.  MIGA also provided El 
Salvador with technical assistance from 2000-2005 to develop and restructure the 
PROESA investment promotion agency. 
There appears to be a two-way relationship between MIGA and its member 
countries.  For example, in El Salvador, MIGA’s coverage and technical assistance are 
a result of FDI policies that meet MIGA’s approval that have been passed by El 
Salvador’s government.  Yet, MIGA assists El Salvador, in terms of the PROESA, for 
example, in implementing its policies and even redefining them.  In addition, MIGA 
influences policy by holding countries accountable to minimum standards by 
investigating and sanctioning countries that engage in corrupt or fraudulent practices 
when dealing with foreign investors.  Such a membership has another effect.  It makes 
foreign investors more confident in El Salvador, and more likely to invest there. 
Since 1984, El Salvador has belonged to the International Center for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), which was established by the Convention 
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States.  The ICSID serves as an aid to member states when they or their members 
have an investment dispute with foreign investors by offering a location and resources 
for arbitration.  The arbitration is judged by representatives of other member states, who 
are not party to the dispute.  While the member states are not required to use the 
ICSID, once the case is submitted to the ICSID the member states must see the 
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arbitration through and abide by the decision that is rendered.  How does this relate to 
FDI policy and FDI inflows?  Individual country policy must allow for the dispute 
mechanism to be used.  In the case of ICSID, this dispute mechanism is initially 
voluntary.  To date, El Salvador has concluded one case in 2004 using the ICSID, 
Inceysa Vallisoletana S.L. v. Republic of El Salvador.  In that case, an award was 
rendered to the company.  El Salvador currently has no pending cases with the ICSID.45
This form of dispute arbitration is increasingly being written into regional and 
bilateral trade and investment agreements.  The North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), for example, removes investor-state disputes from national courts and 
resolves them by arbitration.  Similarly, the newly signed Dominican Republic-Central 
American Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA) does the same.   In fact, in 2007 
Guatemala was sued by the Railroad Development Corporation (RDC) for “an indirect 
expropriation of [RDC’s] assets and direct interference with its contractual rights.”46  
This action was believed to be the first to invoke Chapter 10 of the CAFTA investor-
state dispute resolution process, and it takes the Guatemalan courts out of the 
resolution of the dispute.  For investors, the dispute arbitration process gives assurance 
that the decision will not be decided in national courts, where nationalist tendencies may 
hold sway.  Rather, an impartial international panel will make a decision, and these 
decisions will have the force of law in many countries because, as in the case of El 
Salvador, international treaties supersede domestic law.47  However, national courts are 
often the only way for local groups affected by these disputes to be heard.  International 
                                                 
45 ICSID website, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/conclude.htm 
46 From Press Release issued 13 March 2007 by Greenberg Traurig, LLP, as posted on MarketWire:  
http://www.marketwire.com/mw/release.do?id=723395&k=rdc 
47 United States Trade Representative, “2006 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers: El Salvador”: 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2006/2006_NTE_Report/ 
asset_upload_file785_9242.pdf 
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arbitrators often do not hear the concerns of these groups and therefore those concerns 
are not included in the decisions of the panels.  Regardless, those countries that allow 
international panels to act as the law, at the expense of their own sovereignty, have 
enhanced reputations in the eyes of foreign investors as being friendly to business. 
El Salvador has been a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO), a specialized agency of the United Nations, since 1979.  Intellectual property is 
defined by WIPO as creations of the mind, and these creations are classified into two 
categories: industrial property, which includes inventions, trademarks, designs, and 
geographic indications of source; and copyright, which includes literary and artistic 
works and architectural design.  WIPO exists “with a mandate from its Member States to 
promote the protection of IP throughout the world through cooperation among states 
and in collaboration with other international organizations.”48  WIPO has five core goals, 
among which are: to promote an intellectual property (IP) culture; to integrate IP into 
national development policies and plans; and to develop international IP laws and 
standards.  This organization, therefore, not only has a mandate to promote and 
encourage policies within member countries but also brings the force of the international 
community and its opinions and mores to bear.  In addition, developing countries that 
sign regional agreements, especially with developed countries, may need to accede to 
intellectual property requirements.  The CAFTA agreement requires its member states 
to enforce intellectual property agreements agreed upon in previous international 
agreements, including WIPO.49  Countries like El Salvador take these agreements 
seriously in order to be seen as investor friendly.  While I was in El Salvador in May of 
                                                 
48 “What is WIPO, from the WIPO website: http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/what_is_wipo.html 
49 DR-CAFTA Agreement Text, United States Trade Representative website: http://www.ustr.gov 
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2007, El Salvador cracked down on pirated CDs and DVDs sold by small vending stalls 
in its market area in downtown San Salvador, causing a riot that led to the arrests of a 
number of individuals.  President Antonio Saca later announced that the arrested rioters 
would be tried under the anti-terrorism law.50
  In 1995 the World Trade Organization (WTO) was formed, building on its 
predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).  A number of 
agreements addressing intellectual property were already in force, such as the Paris 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property dating from 1883, the Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works dating from 1886, and the 
World Intellectual Property Organization dating from 1979.  The Uruguay negotiating 
round that brought the WTO into being addressed areas that were inadequately covered 
or not addressed by previous agreements.  The WTO Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, or TRIPs, was part of the final agreements of the 
Uruguay Round.  El Salvador ratified the agreement in 1995. 
The TRIPs agreement expects that governments will both have intellectual 
property laws, and also enforce those laws.  The agreement gave time limits to 
governments that signed it allowing them a period of years in which to phase-in the 
proper laws, and additional time for those countries that needed it to deal with specific 
difficulties that might occur because of immediate deleterious effects of intellectual 
property legislation.  In this way, the WTO agreement influenced, and continues to 
influence, policy in developing countries. Force of world opinion is important.  Those 
countries that take the necessary step to pass and implement legislation on intellectual 
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property, and enforce those laws in a timely manner, are seen to be friendly to 
investment.  In a country like El Salvador, where the constitution mandates that 
international agreements trump national legislation, the enforcement of legislation 
guaranteeing intellectual property becomes a grave political issue, with the country 
caught between maintaining its international obligations on one hand, and dealing with 
economic conditions of poverty on the other, where vendors scratch out a living selling 
pirated music, video and software. 
 The international environment has also been a daily concern in the fortunes of 
Nicaragua, and has a long and complicated history.  International influences take the 
form of membership in international institutions and pressure from the United States.  
These factors have exerted an influence on Nicaragua’s foreign direct investment, both 
policies and inflows.  Even more so than El Salvador, Nicaragua’s main international 
pressure has come from one source, the United States.  The United States has not 
hesitated to use most means at its disposal to protect its economic interests in 
Nicaragua throughout that country’s history.  Its means have included armed invasion 
and occupation, maintenance of puppet regimes and using those regimes to force 
through laws contrary to Nicaragua’s interests, giving financial and political support to 
successive oppressive dictatorships, using covert and overt actions to bring down 
governments not to its liking, employing political and economic isolation, manipulating 
international organizations in order to adversely influence aid and funding initiatives in 
Nicaragua, and funding of Nicaraguan opposition political groups. 
Nicaragua’s nascent independence in the early part of the 19th century was 
clouded by both territorial and political disputes with its neighbors, and it banded 
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together with the other new Central American nations to repel political and territorial 
incursions by Mexico.  Unlike El Salvador, Nicaragua’s status as the largest of the 
Central American states, its position straddling the isthmus from both the Caribbean to 
the Pacific, and geographical features favoring easy transit between them made it very 
important in the eyes of first British, and then United States business interests in 
building a canal.  The United States and Britain almost came to armed conflict over 
Nicaragua, in the 19th century, and capitalists from both countries competed for 
business in the area. 
 The intervention of the United States in Nicaraguan affairs and the installation of 
the Somoza family to preserve Nicaragua’s relationship with the United States and 
protect U.S. interests were documented earlier in the chapter.  However, by the 1970s, 
it became clear that the Somoza regimes excesses were leading to popular unrest and 
the United States recognized the danger that communist ideas could gain popular 
currency.  After 1976, during the last years of the Somoza regime, the United States 
under the Carter administration walked a balancing act with Nicaragua, trying to ease 
Somoza out of power and replace him with a group of moderate anti-Somoza business 
leaders.  The United States hoped that with this new regime, the suddenly strong leftist 
forces would be kept out of power and the United States would maintain its close 
economic and political ties.  The rise to power of the Sandinistas destroyed that hope 
for the United States, and from 1980 through 1990 under the Reagan and Bush 
administrations, it embarked on a ten-year campaign to undermine the Sandinista 
regime by funding the Contra rebels and cutting back trade and commerce.  The efforts 
to support the Contra rebels were ineffective in ending Sandinista rule, but U.S. 
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economic measures had greater effects, exacerbating problems in an already shaky 
Nicaraguan economy.  Largely on the basis of the ordinary Nicaraguan’s economic 
woes, the Sandinistas lost the 1990 elections, aided by U.S. funding to anti-Sandinista 
political forces. 
 The subsequent years have seen Nicaragua lose much of the strategic 
importance that it had during the Cold War.  International institutions began to exert 
their pressures on the Nicaraguan government.  The IMF, for example, continued to 
withhold aid to Nicaragua until the government promised to cut taxes or curtail 
government spending (Fidler and Scanlan 1993). The United States, in the meanwhile, 
began targeting the region, rather than individual countries, as partners in a regional 
trading bloc.  In 2005 it hammered out the CAFTA between five Central American 
nations and the Dominican Republic.  The deal was inked amid promises that the 
market for Central American exports in the United States would rise.  However, there 
may be a number of ways in which the deal benefits the United States at the expense of 
countries such as Nicaragua.  First, Central American farmers will be competing against 
heavily subsidized U.S. farmers.  Second, development based on the CAFTA model will 
depend on extremely low wages and a lack of enforcement of environmental standards.  
Third, governments will have their authority to ensure basic services undermined by 
aspects of the agreement.  Finally, provisions in the treaty will make it difficult for 
countries to escape their debt burdens and recover from financial crises by limiting their 
ability to favor domestic creditors at the expense of foreign creditors.  This means that 
Nicaragua may need to make hard choices between paying wages and salaries, forgo 
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using preferential terms to domestic creditors to aid recovery, and may face damaging 
“investor-state” lawsuits should they try. 
 Nicaragua has relationships and memberships with international institutions 
related to trade and investment.  Nicaragua has been a member of the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC) since 1955, the World Intellectual Property Organization 
since 1985, the Multilateral Insurance Guarantee Agency (MIGA) since 1992, the 
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and the World 
Trade Organization since 1995. 
 The International Finance Corporation is a world body that attempts to promote 
and address issues pertaining to private sector development in member countries 
without demanding repayment guarantees from member governments, and offer 
prescriptions for easing government regulatory structures.  Since 1998, the IFC has 
invested in seven projects in Nicaragua, and there are proposed investments in three 
more.51  The projects involving foreign investment include loans to a German company 
that set up micro-financing opportunities for small entrepreneurs, and a proposed loan 
to a Guatemalan company, Pantaleon Sugar Holdings, the largest sugar producer in 
Central America, that wishes to expand and upgrade its Nicaraguan subsidiary.  Unlike 
El Salvador, however, most of the IFC projects involve local business enterprises, 
possibly indicating the persistent lack of foreign investment in Nicaragua. 
 Nicaragua also has made use of its membership in the MIGA.  MIGA insurance 
coverage is an indicator that Nicaragua’s FDI policies meet world standards of 
openness and that there is less risk of those factors that would harm investment, such 
as civil strife or government expropriation.  The relative lateness of foreign investments 
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covered by MIGA in Nicaragua as compared to El Salvador may attest to the country’s 
difficulties in satisfying MIGA in regards to its FDI policies, but since 2000 it seems that 
MIGA has been inclined to provide coverage for some foreign investments.52  MIGA 
covered its first foreign investment project in Nicaragua in 2000, an investment by a 
Cayman Islands company in a government-owned geothermal plant, Ormat 
Momotombo Power Company, for the rights to expand and manage the plant for 15 
years.  A year later, MIGA guaranteed a $63.3 million loan by an Israeli bank to the 
same plant. 
 In 2002, MIGA guaranteed a Spanish company’s investment in a Nicaraguan 
electrical distribution plant as part of the Nicaraguan government’s privatization efforts.  
The Spanish company’s investment gave it distribution rights to the western half of 
Nicaragua.  In 2003, MIGA guaranteed a Costa Rican company’s investment in and 
loan to a Nicaraguan company specializing in leasing of industrial, agriculture, 
transportation, and construction equipment.  In 2006, MIGA issued additional 
guarantees for this investment. 
 In the case of investor-country disputes, Nicaragua has made use of its 
membership in the ICSID. To the present, Nicaragua has concluded one case in 2006 
with the ICSID, Shell Brands International AG and Shell Nicaragua S.A. v. Republic of 
Nicaragua over trademarks, which was discontinued and evidently settled before the 
arbitration hearing could end.53  Nicaragua has no pending cases with the ICSID.  Like 
El Salvador, Nicaragua is also a party to the DR-CAFTA agreement signed with the 
United States, and therefore investor-state disputes within the context of that agreement 
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will be submitted to arbitration, pleasing investors but removing cases from Nicaragua’s 
national courts and entailing a net loss of sovereignty for Nicaragua over a portion of its 
economic fortunes. 
Nicaragua’s membership in WIPO indicates the government’s willingness to 
protect intellectual property in conforming to the core goals of the organization.  Thus, 
Nicaragua has some international pressure on this issue.  The signing of DR-CAFTA 
further puts pressure on Nicaragua, according to a press release by the U.S. State 
Department (Africa News 2006).  The press release states that the United States will 
provide funding to the DR-CAFTA signatories to help them enforce their intellectual 
property laws.  Intellectual property rights are often brought up in the context of art-
specific issues, such as pirated DVDs and CDs, but they can come up in a variety of 
situations.  The aforementioned dispute resolved by the ICSID, Shell Brands 
International AG and Shell Nicaragua S.A. v. Republic of Nicaragua, grew out of a 
Nicaraguan court settlement against Shell Oil Company and other defendants such as 
Dow Chemical and Dole Foods in favor of farmers harmed by an agricultural chemical 
called DBCP.  The government later tried to embargo Shell’s products, leading Shell to 
file suit against the government under the Netherlands-Nicaragua investment protection 
treaty for expropriation of its trademarks.  As stated before, the case was brought before 
the ICSID but was settled before the arbitration was complete (Pensions Management 
2007).  Even more recently, Nicaraguan entities have been named in four international 
cases involving internet domain names, showing the whole new area of intellectual 
property that is on the horizon for developing countries. 
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Further adherence to intellectual property concerns comes in the form of 
Nicaragua’s membership in the WTO, and its TRIPs agreement, which guarantees a 
level of transparency of individual country laws on intellectual property rights.  Under the 
agreement, the WTO “requires Members to notify the laws and regulations made 
effective pertaining to the subject-matter of the Agreement (the availability, scope, 
acquisition, enforcement and prevention of the abuse of intellectual property rights).”54  
In addition, in 2001 Nicaragua submitted answers to a questionnaire given out by the 
WTO on its legal framework for the enforcement of intellectual property rights within the 
country.  Nicaragua’s good faith adherence to the goals and the requirements of the 
WTO, along with a stated willingness to enforce its intellectual property laws, gives it 
credibility as a country that is friendly to foreign investment. 
International level factors have influenced the foreign direct investment policies of 
each country, and the ability of each to draw foreign investment inflows.  The presence 
of international institutions and powerful neighbors like the United States have meant 
that El Salvador and Nicaragua have been steadily pushed toward maintaining open 
trade and investment relations with the outside world.  In particular, the United States 
has lavished much attention on both countries.  This attention has been mostly to 
defend U.S. economic and international interests.  In the 1980s, during each country’s 
civil war, the United States played very different roles.  In El Salvador, lavish foreign 
economic and military aid was meant to maintain the military government as a bulwark 
against further leftist gains in Central America.  That aid allowed El Salvador to ignore 
issues of development and to concentrate its resources toward defeating the guerilla 
movement.  This meant that little action was taken toward FDI because El Salvador did 
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not depend on it because of a heavy flow of foreign aid.  Policy remained unchanged, 
and inflows of FDI stagnated.  The conclusion of the civil war and the integration of the 
leftist groups into the political process put the spotlight back on development, and the 
government began to refine and open its policies in order to satisfy international 
commitments.  It also considered other ways of bringing in foreign investment, such as 
privatization.  El Salvador additionally signed the CAFTA agreement, opening trade and 
investment between the United States and the countries of Central America, despite the 
opposition of many on the left. 
In Nicaragua, the fall of Somoza and the takeover of government by the 
Sandinistas left the United States in an adversarial role.  It funded the opposition 
Contras in their civil war against the government, and at the same time tried to 
discourage U.S. and Western companies from doing business there.  Combined with 
the Nicaraguan government’s Marxist orientation and attempts to undo the legacy of the 
Somozas, foreign direct investment policy did not change, and investment declined to 
zero.  Only after the Sandinista government realized that it could not completely divorce 
itself from the world economy and that it had few resources of its own to invest in 
economic development while fighting the Contras did it begin policy steps to make itself 
attractive to foreign investment. 
Each country’s relationship with international institutions concerned with trade 
and investment has also exerted influence on their FDI policies and inflows.  As 
members of these institutions, both El Salvador and Nicaragua agree to abide by the 
rules and norms of the organizations that they belong to.  In general, these 
organizations are oriented toward greater openness to global trade and investment.  
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Military governments in El Salvador, and later the right-wing ARENA party, have 
generally been open to these agreements and institutions, and have therefore enjoyed a 
status as a country friendly to foreign investment.  Nicaragua has had a more 
complicated relationship with these institutions largely because of the Sandinista 
government, but the Sandinistas learned early that the agreements signed by the 
Somoza regime could not be ignored lest they shred every bit of Nicaragua’s credibility 
on the world stage.  The post-Sandinista era has seen the government further open its 
economy to the world market, particularly through the signing of DR-CAFTA.  As both 
countries begin the 21st century, pressures on them to maintain open policies toward 
trade and investment will likely continue. 
The Domestic Economy and FDI 
 Domestic and international politics are not enough to explain the development of 
FDI policies and the rate of FDI inflows in Nicaragua and El Salvador.  The domestic 
economy also has influence over both policies and inflows.  In the case of policies, 
economic realities define the scope of the need for development.  In this there have 
been some similarities and differences between the countries.  Both countries have high 
foreign debt and stagnant domestic savings, and both have relied heavily on foreign aid.   
In El Salvador, the spotlight has been on the extreme disparities of wealth 
between classes in society.  These disparities have created social conflict, and have 
contributed to the growth of crime and gangs, which has the tendency to depress FDI.  
The government tends looks at foreign direct investment as necessary for development, 
and also as wealth generation for the upper class, and therefore passes FDI policies 
 243
that fit its goals.  In Nicaragua, disparities of wealth exist but the country has historically 
had a smaller economy than El Salvador and a smaller upper class.  Until the rule of the 
Sandinistas, wealth tended to be concentrated in the hands of the Somoza family and 
its allies, and was redistributed after his fall from power.  Still, many problems remain for 
Nicaragua.  Poverty, rising crime, and lack of investor confidence continue to plague 
Nicaragua’s development. 
El Salvador began its official existence as a colony of Spain.  Its early story was 
one of a struggle between criollos, the children of Spaniards and members of the 
indigenous populations of the area, and ladinos, pure-blood Spaniards, to control the 
decision making process under the Spanish crown.  As the Spanish crown became 
weaker, many Central American colonies, notably Mexico and Guatemala, became 
independent.  Both Mexico and Guatemala wanted El Salvador to join them, but El 
Salvador rebuffed them in favor of a proposal of a united Central American federation.  
While the dream of a federation also did not materialize, El Salvador remained one of 
the idea’s most fervent supporters in the subsequent decades. 
 El Salvador’s initial economy, developed during colonial times, was based on the 
cultivation of indigo for dyes in weaving.  The introduction of synthetic dyes killed this 
industry in the first half of the 19th century.  In 1840, coffee was introduced as a 
cultivable crop.  It thrived especially on the high slopes of El Salvador’s volcanic 
landscape, and led to a new structure of power as individuals and families began to 
convert their newfound wealth into economic and political power.  Coffee has continued 
to be El Salvador’s most important export to the present day, even as other cultivable 
crops were introduced over the subsequent decades.  Presently, cotton, sugar, prawns, 
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and cattle all occupy important places in El Salvador’s economy, but still lag behind 
coffee as El Salvador’s primary product. 
El Salvador has for most of its political history been a fervid supporter of free 
trade.  After political battles between groups with a liberal, pro-free trade outlook and a 
conservative, economic nationalism focus, the liberal position won out in 1871.  El 
Salvador traded on its comparative advantage in agriculture, and adhered to little 
government intervention in the economy, effectively ceding control of the market to the 
owners of capital.  The government kept tariffs low to ensure a market for British- and, 
after 1900, U.S.- manufactured goods which, unfortunately, displaced locally made 
goods.  El Salvador also took a large amount of foreign loans toward projects such as 
an unrealized canal and railroads which established the first of its foreign debts.  
However, an abundant supply of labor exceeded demand, and land consolidation by 
coffee barons and ranchers left many people landless or with too little land to allow 
them to subsist.  Any form of organization was not permitted, and often brutally 
suppressed, such as the massacre by the military of the lower classes in the 1932 
uprising to protest the removal of the democratically elected Araujo from the presidency. 
During the 1970s and 1980s, immediately before and during the civil war, the 
government, cognizant that economic disparity and landlessness was a political 
problem that needed to be resolved, undertook modest efforts at land reform.  Some 
land was redistributed, but for the most part, the lands of the wealthy were left 
untouched.  These actions were only enough to delay the civil war, and when it started, 
did little to change anything. 
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In the late 1990s, El Salvador dollarized its economy, which instantly raised 
prices for many ordinary consumers through a process of “rounding up,” making it 
difficult for a large segment of the population that already had enough trouble making 
ends meet.  Indeed, Towers and Borzutzky (2004) write that dollarization was 
undertaken so that certain benefits, fiscal discipline, a decline in interest rates, better 
terms of trade and increased development through foreign investment would follow.  
However, they argue the decision was actually a product of the political polarization now 
enshrined in Salvadoran institutions.  The government’s unstated reasons for 
dollarization were to serve the Salvadoran financial community, particularly supporters 
of the ruling party, and the result has been little effect on development and an 
exacerbation of inequality in a country that already ranks sixth highest in the world on 
indicators of inequality.  Indeed, the economic situation for most people has changed 
little since the first stirrings of unrest in the 1970s. 
As can be ascertained by its history, El Salvador has largely depended on a 
monoculture crop for export.  This reliance on one crop, first indigo and then coffee, 
meant that most arable land was given over to production of the crop and that El 
Salvador needed to import most of its basic necessities including foodstuffs.  Because 
of the expense of imports, the poorer segments of society, mostly landless or living on 
subsistence plots, often could not afford them.  Today, this situation has hardly 
changed.  El Salvador still imports most of its food and necessities, which hurts majority 
of the population that is poor. 
Today, in many ways El Salvador outwardly looks like a modern state.  After 
three decades of rule by the rightist ARENA party, modern shopping malls have sprung 
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up in the major cities and El Salvador is connected with the rest of the world through 
finance, high-technology and media.  Yet, there are still vast areas that are 
underdeveloped and undeveloped.  The control of politics still largely rests with those 
allied with the most economically well-off in the country.  Many people live on very little, 
especially in the rural areas.  Landlessness is an endemic problem.  Large amounts of 
the population suffer extreme poverty, which has given rise to exploitation of rural labor, 
particularly in the maquiladora sector, and has contributed to an exploding crime 
problem.  Gangs run rampant in San Salvador and other larger cities, and the U.S. 
State Department reports that El Salvador has one of the highest homicide rates in the 
world. 55
Yet, El Salvador’s government looks to FDI as a source of development.  
Underlying the problems with poverty and relating directly to foreign direct investment 
are El Salvador’s precarious positions on macroeconomic issues, such as sub-par 
investment levels, a low savings rate, rising external debt and an increasing trade deficit 
blunted by large amounts of foreign aid, especially in the 1980s.  Even today, El 
Salvador receives almost $500 million from the State Department under its Millennium 
Challenge Account program, which aims to help alleviate poverty by choosing to aid 
countries that score well on key indicators, including political freedoms and rights.56  
More recently remittances from Salvadorans living abroad have contributed almost 20% 
of the country’s GDP, aided by the country’s adoption of dollarization which makes 
currency conversion unnecessary (Luxner 2007).  The country’s savings rates from 
1980 onward have plummeted, its foreign debt has risen, and its trade balance has 
                                                 
55 United State Department of State, http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1109.html 
56 From a November 29, 2006 press release from the Millennium Challenge Corporation:  
http://www.mcc.gov/press/releases/2006/release-112906-elsalvadorsigning.php 
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been negative for the past 30 years.  El Salvador has had a long history with FDI, but 
historically has not received large amounts of FDI.  From 1976 to 2004, El Salvador 
averaged only about one-tenth of the mean FDI of sample countries collected for this 
study, and if China is excluded, it still only averaged about one-seventh of the mean FDI 
inflows for the rest of the countries. 
.  In particular, foreign debt from outstanding loans is a very significant and 
difficult situation for developing countries.  For El Salvador, foreign debt has not been a 
crippling problem as it has for its neighbors, but it still has had important ramifications 
for the country and for its ability to implement economic policies.  El Salvador’s first 
experience with foreign debt was with British lenders in the 18th century and the 
beginning of the 19th century, who made credit available to large coffee growers.  The 
experience soured the country on foreign lending, but all of the loans by British lenders 
were paid off over time.  Always an agrarian-based economy concentrating on one 
principle crop throughout its history, El Salvador began to try to diversify in the 1940s, 
embarking on an economic and modernization and industrialization program.  The 
economy of El Salvador grew very rapidly in the 1960s, though the benefits of the 
growth, like in many Latin American countries, were unevenly distributed across the 
economic spectrum of the country (Booth, Wade and Walker 2006, 98). 
However, the slowdown in most of the economies of Central America that began 
in the 1970s with the oil crisis and the failure of the ISI policies of the Central American 
Common Market led to an important development in regards to El Salvador’s external 
debt.  Rising oil prices in the 1970s, plus the failure of the Central American Common 
Market and import substitution policies led to increased foreign debt across Central 
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America.  From 1980 to 1990, external debt almost doubled in the Central American 
region to $25 billion, and 30 to 40 percent of export income was used to service the 
debt in the region (Barry 1991, 15).  El Salvador also saw a rise in its external debt, 
from 15.9 percent in 1976 to 46.7 percent in 2004, and had to enter into structural 
adjustment programs (SAPs) as a condition of re-servicing its debts and maintaining its 
access to credit with international lending institutions.  These SAPs mandated 
government austerity programs.  The government cut many public services such as 
education and health care as well as putting new taxes in place.  Unfortunately, many of 
these taxes put more pressure on ordinary consumers.  Taxes on the wealthier 
segments of society often go unenforced despite government promises to rectify the 
situation.  The structural adjustment programs, in the words of one author, put the IMF 
in the position of supervising economic policy in El Salvador (Murray 1991, 83), 
including maintaining open policies toward foreign investment. 
Foreign aid has also been a large component of El Salvador’s economy.  U.S. 
aid has been a staple of the Central American economic puzzle since Kennedy’s 
Alliance for Progress programs were established during the 1960s to help maintain 
stability in Latin America and thwart Soviet ambitions, Especially from 1979 through 
1992, and most specifically during the latter years of the civil war, U.S. economic and 
military aid poured into El Salvador.  United States policy was geared around concerns 
that El Salvador would go the way of neighboring Nicaragua if it fell into the FMLN 
hands.  U.S. aid ensured that the El Salvadoran government would not fall, and that it 
would be able to continue the war and, hopefully for the United States, defeat the 
guerillas.  However, the end of the Cold War in 1989-90 and the defeat of the 
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Sandinistas in Nicaraguan elections meant that the El Salvador lost its importance in 
U.S. foreign policy.  The United States, along with the rest of the world, pushed for a 
negotiated solution. 
The importance of foreign aid to El Salvador during the civil war is evident in the 
statistics of the period.  From the period of 1980 to 1990, El Salvador averaged almost 
99 dollars per person per year in foreign aid, most of that from the United States.57  This 
aid represented a jump from 1.3 percent of gross national income (GNI) in 1976 to a 
high of 11 percent of GNI in 1987.  Currently, foreign aid has fallen to pre-civil war 
levels. 
El Salvador’s foreign aid during the 1980s served as a replacement for the lack 
of investment that occurred during the civil war.  However, whether El Salvador’s 
government responded to this influx of foreign aid by keeping FDI policies closed is 
difficult to know.  Most likely the government was more interested in fighting the civil war 
and later bringing it to a conclusion than putting a lot of energy into FDI policies.  This 
use of foreign aid does not necessarily fit with the idea of foreign aid as an alternative to 
FDI, even though the result is the same.  If foreign aid was put toward building up 
domestic entrepreneurship and business, then it would be an alternative to foreign 
investment.  However, if foreign aid was only used to fund the efforts of the government 
to defeat the FMLN, it does not qualify.  What is clear is that during the civil war, FDI 
policies were not touched.  They remained the same somewhat restrictive policies that 
were in place before the war began.  Only after the war was over and El Salvador’s 
right-wing governments began putting neoliberal economic policies in place did FDI 
                                                 
57 Data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
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policies become more open. Even so, FDI inflows took some time to respond to the new 
policies, perhaps because of firm wariness about the stability of the country. 
Another alternative to foreign investment, domestic savings, has not been much 
of an answer for El Salvador.  On first glance, one would think that low domestic 
savings is the problem.  El Salvador’s domestic savings rate has declined in the past 
thirty years, from a high of 24 percent of GDP in 1977 to a low of -1.36 percent in 2004.  
Why the low savings rate?  Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco (2006), note that the results 
of Washington Consensus programs of development are highly varied.  The 
Washington Consensus was a particular set of prescriptions advocated by neoliberal 
economists during the 1990s.  They called for governments to scale back their activities 
in the market place, promote free market and free-trade policies, and reduce social 
welfare programs.  The Dominican Republic, for example, has had dynamic growth 
since implementing those programs, while Brazil and El Salvador have not.  In 
examining why El Salvador has not achieved sufficient growth levels, Hausmann et al. 
argue that El Salvador does not necessarily have a savings problem.  In fact, 
remittances provide a possibility for greater savings, but remittances may spur higher 
consumption rather than savings (IMF 2005).  They believe that El Salvador’s problem 
is a lack of productive investment, which makes it a low return country. 
The issue of remittances is a potential variable that surface in many 
conversations about the economies of Central America.  Remittances are wages earned 
in one country by migrants and then sent back to relatives in their home country.  
Remittances can serve as a development alternative to FDI if they are channeled into 
productive investments in the home country.  As of 2002, 873,000 Salvadorans lived 
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legally in the United States, according to the U.S. Census Bureau, though the number 
may be closer to 2.5 million when illegal immigration is taken into account.  According to 
the U.S. State Department, in 2005 remittances from legal and illegal Salvadorans in 
the United States were sent to 22.3 percent of Salvadoran families, and they totaled 
$2.8 billion dollars.58  Total remittances constituted 17 percent of El Salvador’s GDP in 
2005.  59   Remittances have become the top income generator for the country. 
According to some observers, remittances help make up for the country’s large 
trade deficit, and may allow the country to afford more imports.60  However, others do 
not see remittances as the answer to the country’s woes, and argue they do not totally 
make up for the country’s trade deficit.61  Indeed, Salvadoran migration splits up 
families, with men often leaving their wives and children to travel to the United States to 
find work.  Women make the arduous trip less often, preferring to stay in El Salvador 
and seek work there.  They usually move to the city to find work in the maquiladoras.  
Salvadorans migrate mostly to make up for the lack of opportunities available in El 
Salvador, especially the rural areas, but also to mitigate risk from economic shocks and 
natural disasters (Halliday 2006).  The amount of remittances usually depends on the 
migrant’s job status, education, familial relationships, time spent in another country, and 
whether there are other members of the migrant’s immediate family also abroad and 
remitting funds home (Funkhouser 1995). 
According to Popkin (2003), with 29 percent of the total Salvadoran population 
living outside El Salvador, remittances supply hard currency to El Salvador and provide 
                                                 
58 US Department of State Background Note: El Salvador, January 2007: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2033.htm 
59 October, 2006 World Bank Country Brief: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/LACEXT/ 
ELSALVADOREXTN/0,,menuPK:295253~pagePK:141132~piPK:141107~theSitePK:295244,00.html 
60 Interview with Alvaro Trigueros and Juan Carlos Rivas. 
61 Interview with Salvador Arias. 
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the largest source of foreign exchange to the country’s economy.  El Salvador’s 
government has ample reason to foster this alternative source of development, because 
remittances also serve as a way to keep its population alive in the absence of adequate 
social programs within the country.  El Salvador’s government promotes remittances by 
attempting to lobby its migrant population outside the country to help El Salvador’s 
economy, encourages migrants to import goods from El Salvador, and urges migrants 
to invest in private and government sector development projects in El Salvador.  With 
the debate of recent anti-immigration laws in Washington, DC, the Salvadoran 
government has taken an active role in trying to lobby the U.S. government to allow 
Salvadorans to stay in the country lest its access to this vital resource be reduced or dry 
up completely. 
Would a better trade balance help spur development in El Salvador?  Imports 
have risen, and El Salvador’s trade deficit with the rest of the world has grown to 
consistently average between 15 and 17 percent of its gross domestic product between 
2000 and 2004.62  In particular, its trade deficit with its primary trading partner, the 
United States, grew from $585 million in 1998 to $1.08 billion in 2006.63  A greater 
reliance on imports means fewer resources for home-grown development projects.  The 
World Bank, in a 1996 study, argued for El Salvador to institute more outward-oriented 
export policies.  Their concern was highlighted by the fact that though imports were not 
rising at a large rate, the trade deficit was widening due to declining exports and 
increasing remittances leading to consumption of imported goods.  The cause of the 
declining exports was attributed to lower exports of traditional goods such as coffee, 
                                                 
62 World Bank World Development Indicators 
63 Banco Central de Reserva El Salvador: http://www.bcr.gob.sv/ingles/estadisticas/se_balanzacom.html 
 253
cotton, sugar and shrimp.  In addition, firms in El Salvador were purchasing a far greater 
amount of their inputs from abroad than from home (49 percent to 12 percent) and that 
they were not operating at full production capacity because of low demand.  More 
outward oriented export policies, the World Bank said, would consolidate the peace 
process by sustaining current levels of economic growth, lead to more rapid economic 
growth, and lead to a better quality of welfare for its population. 
However, many of the economists and politicians I spoke with in El Salvador, 
particularly those on the left of the political spectrum, were extremely concerned and 
critical about the expanding trade deficit.  Economist and politician Salvador Arias, for 
example, argued that the trade imbalance was not useful at all for development and that 
remittances were not enough to either attend the deficit or avert a crisis if there were no 
changes.64  Economist Cesar Villalona argued that the country’s insistence on exporting 
its primary agricultural products takes farmland away from local food production, and 
means that El Salvador must depend on food imports.  He argued that CAFTA actually 
increased imports from the United States by 5 percent and increased the trade deficit as 
well.65
Those on the right that I interviewed tended to downplay the trade imbalance.  
For example, Alvaro Trigueros of FUSADES argued that the trade deficit is not a 
problem because El Salvador does not have the manufacturing output to supply the 
country’s demand for goods.  In other words, he believes that given El Salvador’s 
economy, a trade balance deficit is necessary.  He argues that El Salvador’s economy 
is the strongest in Central America in terms of macroeconomic stability.  He also 
                                                 
64 Interview with author, 7 June 2007 
65 Presentation to student delegation, San Salvador, El Salvador, May 2007 
 254
contends that financial stability and attractiveness to investors does not depend on the 
trade balance: El Salvador is one of only three countries in Latin America rated by 
Moody’s as Investment Grade.  He points out that despite the fact that El Salvador’s 
debt, largely obtained so that it can purchase the goods it needs from abroad, has 
increased by $1 billion it has still decreased by only four percent of GDP.66
Juan Carlos Rivas Najarro, with the Ministry of Economy, largely concurs.  He 
argues that most of the imports reflected in the trade deficit are due to imports of oil and 
its derivatives, which rose in the first quarter of 2007.  He presents statistics showing 
that if oil and its derivatives are taken out of the trade deficit equation, the deficit 
decreases from roughly $1.04 billion to $710 million from January to March 2007.  In 
addition, he argues there was a 4.3 percent rise in exports in the first quarter of 2007 as 
compared to the first quarter of 2006, which rises to 12.2 percent if one compensates 
for the five percent decrease in exports from the maquiladora sector.67    Despite these 
statistical sleights of hand, Navarro’s point largely mirrors Trigueros’: El Salvador must 
import goods given its lack of means of production.  One way to make up this deficit, 
therefore, is to increase production and exports by aggressively courting foreign 
investment.   
Hausmann and Rodrik (2005) make an overall argument regarding El Salvador’s 
potential for growth.  They write that factors such as savings rates, taxation, property 
rights and education cannot explain El Salvador’s low growth rate because El Salvador 
performs pretty well in these categories.  They note that growth is fueled by investment, 
but investment in traditional sectors is lagging because of fierce competition from 
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67 Interview with author, 29 May 2007 and Informe Económico Primer Trimestre 2007, Ministerio de Economia de El Salvador, 8 
May 2007, provided to author by e-mail from Senor Juan Carlos Rivas Najarro, Ministry of Economy. 
 255
outside the country.  Investment in new products is essential for El Salvador, and for its 
economy to grow it must create an environment where investment, domestic and 
foreign, is encouraged in non-traditional sectors that carry a high risk potential.  If some 
of those investments do not fail, they could position El Salvador for better growth and 
development.  Thus, they claim that El Salvador’s policies must not only encourage 
openness, they must help remove some of the risk faced by domestic and international 
investors when they invest in new products. 
 Like its neighbors, Nicaragua is a former Spanish colonial territory.  Its 
indigenous population was depleted by intermarriage with Spanish citizens and by 
relocation carried out by the Spanish empire in order to supply labor for mines in Peru.  
Unlike its neighbor El Salvador, it still has culturally distinct indigenous populations, 
such as the Miskito, which have at various times during Nicaragua’s existence as a 
state exerted their independence and autonomy. 
 Nicaragua’s economy has also largely been agriculturally based.  Coffee became 
the largest agricultural export in the country after it was introduced commercially in the 
1840s, offering businessmen export opportunities as well as prospects for foreigners to 
invest.  Industrialization proceeded rapidly with the advent of the Somoza family dynasty 
in the 1930s and especially in the 1960s and 1970s under the import-substitution-
industrialization focus of the Central American Common Market (CACM) and 
encouraged by programs sponsored by the United States under the Alliance for 
Progress and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).  
Economic hardship ensued, urbanization increased and the supply of labor outstripped 
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the available employment opportunities.  By the end of the 1970s, ordinary Nicaraguans 
had lost almost a third of their purchasing power. 
Nicaragua’s experience with alternatives to FDI is characterized by low 
investment levels, a currently low savings rate that has fallen into negative levels many 
times in the past thirty years, very high external debt, reliance on foreign aid and 
consistent trade deficits.  Nicaragua’s foreign direct investment has since 1993 
registered between 1.5 and 9 percent of GDP on an annual basis, but its GDP is the 
lowest of all the Central American countries.  Some of the economic shortcomings in the 
country are made up by remittances from Nicaraguans working in the United States, 
Costa Rica and El Salvador.  According to Jennings and Clarke (2005), remittances 
from the United States to Nicaragua are not as much as to El Salvador, and are dwarfed 
by remittances from the United States to Mexico but the numbers stand out when one 
considers that 24 percent of Nicaragua’s GDP is made up of remittances.  That number 
is greater than export earnings, equals foreign aid, and is five times higher than foreign 
direct investment. 
In 1979, after the Sandinista takeover, Nicaragua’s foreign debt was $1.6 billion 
dollars which the Sandinistas realized that they would have to assume in order to 
maintain the country’s credibility on the world markets (Booth, Wade and Walker 2006, 
77).  With the agricultural harvest lacking because of the civil war, Nicaragua was faced 
with a rising need for imports, especially basic goods, and only foreign aid to pay for 
them and service its foreign debt.  This need to borrow abroad continued in the 1980s, 
as the government continued to use loans from Western banks at high interest rates to 
pay for basic goods.  The government managed to continue to pay its foreign debt 
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obligations, and was considered such a good credit risk that Swiss banks loaned money 
to Nicaragua in 1980 (de Onis 1980).  In 1982 Nicaragua even managed to secure a 
$30 million short term loan from U.S. banks despite the U.S. government’s clear 
attempts to isolate the country (Rowe, Jr. 1982).  When the United States pressured 
multilateral institutions to stop lending to Nicaragua, the government faced high inflation, 
trade deficits and an inability to sustain its debt repayment schedule, becoming the first 
country ever to fall six months behind on its World Bank debt repayment schedule 
(Kristof 1985, Smith 1993, 244).  Nicaragua ranks high on lists drawn up for countries 
most likely to be granted debt forgiveness, and is included in the World Bank’s Highly 
Indebted Poor Countries program which makes it eligible for forgiveness of up to 80 
percent of its debt, but rampant corruption and political crises have limited these 
possibilities (Campbell 2004).  In this case, it appears that for Nicaragua, external debt 
has served less as a development strategy and more of a survival strategy. 
Foreign aid has been a large component of Nicaragua’s strategy to deal with its 
economic shortcomings, and like external debt has been more of a survival strategy for 
the country.  During the 1980s under the Sandinistas, the strategy of the United States 
was to cut off as much funding as possible to the Nicaraguan government in order to 
pursue military solutions.  However, according to Smith (1993, 283-84), the European 
Community saw the problems of Nicaragua and the region as socio-economic problems 
and saw economic support as the best way to help Nicaragua out of its difficulties and 
to keep it from falling under Soviet influence.  European aid came to Nicaragua despite 
the fact that the European countries had deep misgivings about the direction that the 
Sandinista government’s direction, and especially after Sandinista demonstrators 
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disrupted Pope John Paul II’s Mass in Managua in 1983 (Kinzer 1983).   Needless to 
say, the Soviet Union and its allies provided aid as well.  In 1987, Eastern bloc countries 
provided some $392 million in credits, $37.5 million in donations and grants, and 
600,000 tons of oil to Nicaragua (Kinzer 1987).  The Soviet Union accounted for most of 
that aid, though by 1987 they began cutting back on their aid, preferring to focus on 
their own domestic economic stimulation and exercising caution during arms talks with 
the Reagan administration.  For post-Sandinista governments, foreign aid continued to 
maintain a great importance.  In a broadcast on January 19, 1993, Presidency Minister 
Antonio Lacaya of Nicaragua singled out foreign aid as a major contributor to the well-
being of Nicaraguans, stating: 
 “Out of every dollar imported into our economy [i.e. out of every dollar's-
worth of goods imported into the economy], 60 cents comes from foreign 
aid funds, grants and soft loans. We obtain approximately 60% of 
everything we import - oil, medicine, food, non-perishable consumption 
goods, raw materials, etc. - thanks to foreign aid. For those who naively 
ask where the foreign aid goes, it is in the electricity that lights our houses, 
the food we eat every day, the medicine for the sick, loans for production 
and gasoline for cars. I must say clearly that this foreign aid has been well 
spent. The international community has told us so. If Nicaraguans were 
not using our foreign aid properly, we would not receive any more foreign 
aid. (British Broadcasting System, Summary of World Broadcasts)
 
Lacaya goes on to say that the country cannot continue using foreign aid to finance 
consumption, but must invest the aid in the creation of new jobs, production and 
economic growth.  Nicaragua can thank foreign aid from Europe for the modernization 
of its telephone and power systems in the mid-1990s (Blume 1995).  However, foreign 
aid for development has taken a back seat to other, more pressing needs.  According to 
Millett (2007, 474), Nicaragua still depends on foreign assistance for such basic 
programs as conducting elections. 
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Domestic savings for Nicaragua, like many of its Central American neighbors, 
has been difficult to maintain and therefore also not much of an alternative path to 
development.  One reason for the poor savings rate came during the Sandinista years, 
when hyperinflation caused by the Nicaraguan government’s efforts to finance itself by 
printing greater amounts of money cut into domestic savings of ordinary Nicaraguans 
and caused wealthier residents to take their savings out of the country (The Economist, 
1989).  Some of those savings spirited away began to return in the 1990s after the 
Sandinistas left power (Christian 1991).  Regardless, domestic savings declined from 
about $1.2 billion dollars in 1977, about 20 percent of the country’s GDP, to about $39 
million dollars in 2004, or about 0.95 percent of GDP.  The savings rate was negative 
for nine of the years between 1977 and 2004.   
The Nicaraguan government in the 1990s made a large push for foreign 
investment, due to the lack of domestic savings to draw upon (Coone 1990).  However, 
Nicaragua’s ability to draw foreign investment was hampered by its large foreign debt 
and its debt-servicing obligations (Germani 1991).  Thus, domestic savings has not 
served Nicaragua well as an alternative to foreign investment, nor even as a 
complement to foreign investment.  Both are lacking. 
Nicaragua’s trade deficit also contributes to concerns about the country’s ability 
to develop, and has not served as an alternative generator of investment capital.  Since 
1976, Nicaragua has not ended one year with a trade surplus.  In some years, this could 
not be helped.  For example, Hurricane Mitch in 1998 devastated the country’s main 
agricultural export crops.  In the 1980s, the departure of capital coinciding with 
Sandinista rule, along with slow production caused by the war, fueled the trade deficit.  
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Large amounts of aid from Eastern bloc countries helped cover the trade deficit for 
Nicaragua (Gasperini 1990).  However, the ongoing large trade deficits underscore 
Nicaragua’s need for productive capacity in order to boost its exports and to provide 
some of its own basic goods. 
As with El Salvador and other countries in Central America, remittances are a 
huge issue in Nicaragua.  Funkhouser (1995) estimated that in 1989 labor was the 
second largest export in Nicaragua.  Funkhouser finds that Nicaraguans behave 
differently in their remittance patterns than do Salvadorans, perhaps due to emigration 
out of political hostility or family detachment.  In examining patterns of migrants from 
four countries, Mexico, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua, Sana and 
Massey (2007) report that Nicaraguans are likely to make less trips to the United States, 
but to stay longer.  Nicaraguans also travel in heavy numbers to work in Costa Rica, 
which is their number one destination.  In 2000, remittances made up 14.4 percent of 
Nicaragua’s GDP, and remittances to the Central American area as a whole were more 
than the total of foreign aid and a third of foreign direct investment (Portes and Hoffman 
2003).  Sana and Massey report that in 2001, as much as $610 million came to 
Nicaragua in the form of remittances, or $124 per capita.  Up to 15 percent of 
Nicaraguan households receive remittances.  In 2002, remittances accounted for thirty 
percent of Nicaragua’s GDP (Booth, Wade and Walker 2006).  Remittances sent back 
by migrants from Nicaragua and other countries far outweighs official aid and is 
undiluted by bureaucratic and other obstacles, instead going directly to the poor (Clark 
2007).  Remittances are the largest source of foreign exchange for both El Salvador and 
Nicaragua, and Nicaraguans tend to place more importance on remittances because of 
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their higher skill levels than Mexico and other Central American sources of emigration 
(Rosenblum 2004). 
Remittances in Nicaragua help make up for shortcomings in the rest of 
Nicaragua’s economy.  However, in the case of Nicaragua, the growing dependence on 
remittances, at both the microeconomic and macroeconomic level, seems to serve all 
sections of society and government as yet another survival strategy rather than as an 
avenue to development and as an alternative to FDI.  Nicaragua’s fate has been to lurch 
from corrupt dictatorship to civil war to neoliberal economic policies with structural 
adjustment demands, with a sprinkling of natural disasters thrown in for good measure.  
Along the way, it has become the poorest nation in Central America (Deutsche Presse-
Agentur 1997).  The fact that Nicaragua continues to struggle with governments prone 
toward corruption does not inspire the confidence of its own people, much less foreign 
investors, and certainly does not bode well for its future. 
 What effect on foreign investment policies and FDI inflows have these economic 
realities had on the two countries?  For both El Salvador and Nicaragua, extreme 
economic disparities between the wealthy and the rest of the population, lack of 
productive investment opportunities for domestic and international investors, and 
inadequate sources of development funds have put each country in a situation where 
they must try to attract foreign investment to meet their goals.  Throughout the past 
three decades, FDI policies in both countries have reflected this need toward greater 
openness toward investment.  However, foreign investment capital at current levels 
does not satisfy the need in both countries for development and social funding.  In these 
cases, the need far outweighs the returns. 
 262
Nicaragua, El Salvador and Two-level Games 
 Nicaragua and El Salvador both can fit into the two-level games scenario.  Recall 
that the premise of two-level games was that two countries, to reach agreement over 
something, must not only negotiate with each other, but must also negotiate within their 
own domestic political environment with politically powerful groups that stand to be 
affected by any agreement reached.  Each country therefore brings a win-set to any 
negotiation.  Those countries where opposition to any agreement is strong at home will 
have a smaller win-set, or range of agreements that they can accept, whereas those 
countries that have less opposition at home have a larger win-set and therefore a larger 
range of agreements. 
 If the scenario is relaxed to allow developing countries to come to agreement 
with international firms over foreign direct investment, then we essentially have the 
same situation.  Developing countries bring their win-sets, their policies, to the table.  
Opposition to foreign investment constitutes a smaller win-set, while openness to FDI 
constitutes a larger win-set.  The result of agreement between firms and developing 
countries is reflected in the amount of foreign direct investment inflows. 
 Policies are therefore passed on the domestic level, and brought to the 
negotiating table, at the transnational level.  But policies themselves are influenced by 
not only the politics of the domestic level, but domestic environmental realities and 
factors from the international environment.  They constitute the basis by which 
developing countries reach agreement with firms.  In turn, agreements between firm and 
developing countries are indicated by FDI inflows.  However, these inflows are not only 
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affected by FDI policies, but by domestic politics, domestic economics and international 
factors as well. 
 In the cases of El Salvador and Nicaragua, FDI policies have become more 
open.  Looking at domestic politics in both countries, some growth in FDI has occurred 
with movement toward policies of greater equity openness.  El Salvador’s current 
political situation, with an investor-friendly right-wing government that is oriented toward 
the international trade and investment system, should allow for an expanded range of 
agreements that the government can accept with international firms.  Some opposition 
from the left side of the political spectrum, particularly the FMLN and its status as the 
largest party in the Salvadoran Assembly, may limit the range of possible agreement 
due to the FMLN’s ability to block some legislation if it can persuade the smaller party 
allies of the government to remain neutral or vote against the government position, but 
up to this point the government has been able to get much of what it wants.  Thus 
policies, and the government’s approach toward agreement with international firms on 
FDI, are currently very open.  Should the FMLN win the presidency in the 2009 
elections, the government’s policies could become less open, limiting their range of 
possible agreements with international firms if the FMLN looks to scale back the 
government’s involvement with FDI.  The impression of a country with a friendly 
government and open policies also widens the win-sets of international firms, further 
allowing for agreements on FDI. 
 Even so, El Salvador’s memberships in international institutions and its 
relationship with the United States will have the potential to keep FDI policies open and 
allow for more agreements with international firms, regardless of the government in 
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power.  Once international agreements are signed and countries become members of 
international institutions, it is difficult for countries to back away from them.  In particular, 
as El Salvador continues its involvement with international institutions, exercising a role 
within such organizations and making use of their services, it becomes more 
complicated for future governments if they do not wish to honor previous commitments.  
Should the FMLN take power in the next election, they might do well to heed the lesson 
of the Sandinistas over 20 years earlier: International obligations made by earlier 
governments cannot simply be ignored and often governments must continue to abide 
by them. 
 At the transnational level, where governments forge agreements with 
international firms, El Salvador’s membership in international organizations appeals to 
firms.  Such organizations level the playing field for international firms, codifying and 
strengthening baseline policies that are similar across all nations, and providing some 
guarantees of investment safety.  Therefore, these memberships broaden the range of 
agreements possible, at least from the firm perspective.  At the domestic level, such 
memberships have the potential to limit developing country win-sets if politically 
powerful groups are opposed to them, but in the case of El Salvador, this has not yet 
happened because the left has not gained enough of a position of strength to oppose 
involvement with them. 
 Domestic level economic realities may or may not open opportunities for El 
Salvador on the transnational agreement stage under the current political conditions.  It 
appears to depend on whether the next elections maintain the current political structure, 
or bring the left to power.  El Salvador’s low savings rate, a rising international debt, and 
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a negative trade balance have convinced the current government that foreign 
investment is needed to provide jobs to the unemployed and to increase exports.  Relief 
for the poor is not provided by government, but through a massive amount of 
remittances from Salvadorans working in foreign countries, particularly the United 
States.  The Salvadoran government continues to encourage this practice.  When 
viewing the same economic landscape, the left argues that the government needs to 
invest in social services to relieve poverty conditions and to encourage domestic 
business.  Such investment by the government will keep El Salvador from losing its 
people to countries with greater work opportunities like the United States.  Foreign 
investment, the left argues, must be scaled back or encouraged to work in combination 
with domestic initiatives.  So, domestic realities could widen or restrict the areas for 
potential agreement with firms on FDI depending on who controls the government, and 
in turn, convince international firms to invest or to take caution. 
Nicaragua’s political situation gives a possible indication of what the situation 
may look like in El Salvador shortly.  The parade of centrist and right-wing presidencies 
that ruled Nicaragua from 1990 up to 2006 has given way to a new presidency of 
Sandinista Daniel Ortega.  Even though he has seemingly become friendlier to FDI than 
in the past, and has voiced support for foreign investment and free trade, the possibility 
exists that even if he does not follow the recent examples of leftist presidents in Latin 
America and scale back foreign investment policies, the government’s range of possible 
agreements on FDI will be smaller.  Restricting new FDI in any case will constrict 
Nicaragua’s win-set of agreement opportunities, and foreign firms will watch Nicaraguan 
government actions and take their cue from those. 
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However, international agreements that Nicaragua is party to, and international 
institutions it belongs to, may temper any leftist plans to scale back FDI.  The 
Sandinistas learned the hard way in the 1980s that they simply could not jettison their 
international obligations simply because their enemy Somoza agreed to them.  To do so 
would have ruined their credibility, making their daunting task to get economic aid even 
more difficult.  With the United States making things difficult enough for them on the 
international stage, the Sandinistas stood by Somoza’s agreements, and played fair 
with foreign investment already committed to the country.  Nicaragua’s commitments 
have only increased under the governments following Sandinista rule, making it much 
more difficult for the current government to scale back foreign investment without 
suffering some kind of adverse international reaction.  They may be able to slow down 
new investment, but they will not be able to eliminate it altogether. 
 Of course, like El Salvador, the domestic economic situation of Nicaragua may 
make foreign investment a requirement.  Nicaragua’s dependence on a tremendous 
amount of foreign aid to accomplish goals that most other countries’ governments are 
able to fund themselves, a low savings rate, and the reliance of a large portion of the 
populace on remittances from Nicaraguans working abroad to meet daily needs is a 
clear indication that development is needed.  There is an inadequate amount of 
domestic investment to meet development goals.  On the transnational agreement level, 
the range of possible agreements with foreign firms that Nicaragua is willing to accept 
may widen due to these harsh economic realities.  Unfortunately, other factors may 
inhibit firms’ willingness to agree, including high government corruption.  Daniel 
Ortega’s readiness to embrace many aspects of the international environment’s focus 
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on free trade and investment opportunity may be less of a choice and more of a 
necessity. 
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Chapter Six 
A Summary of the Study 
The goal of this dissertation has been to explain the role of foreign direct 
investment policies in economic development in developing countries.  This area of 
research is vital for a number of reasons.  On a general scale, answers to questions 
about development in the less-industrialized countries have implications in many 
academic areas, both inside and outside political science.  On an immediate level, those 
developing countries that pursue rapid industrialization affect world markets as they 
become more and more indispensible to the international economic arena.  Their 
importance is more apparent even as it is obvious that standards of health, safety, labor 
and product quality in developing countries are not on par with the expectations of 
industrialized countries.  Recent controversies surrounding China’s usage of lead-based 
paints in children’s toys, and industrial by-products as fillers in pet foods only 
underscores the impact of such industrializing countries on the world stage and the 
trade-offs that the developed world faces now that it has become dependent on 
developing countries to mass produce goods for consumption.  Developing countries 
also affect the global environment with greater emissions of greenhouse gases from 
their burgeoning manufacturing centers, and many have irrevocably altered and even 
harmed their natural environments to meet industrial goals.  The repercussions of a few 
developing countries reaching industrialized status will have far-reaching impacts into 
the distant future.  
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The potential and actual effects of development are not only confined to 
macroeconomics.  As economic development booms or fizzles in less-developed 
countries, many people are potentially affected on the most basic levels.  Access to 
food, housing, jobs, and services hang in the balance.  Successful development could 
mean a long life for many inhabitants of the developing world. They might gain decent 
jobs, be able to put food on the table for their families, receive medical care when 
needed, and live in adequate housing.  Lack of success in development could leave 
millions, or perhaps billions, in a rapidly degrading quality-of-life cycle that promises little 
but hardship and misery. 
A greater understanding of development can shed light on questions that may or 
may not seem connected at a close look, but in wider perspective have everything to do 
with issues related to globalization.  Globalization promises development, and yet this 
promise may turn out to be empty for some.  The outcome of globalization can even 
have implications for international peace.  Successful development for a majority of the 
world’s population may alleviate some core causes of international conflict.  However, if 
development fails, the world may be reduced to several warring countries, each battling 
over access to increasingly scarce resources.  The hardships of the disenchanted and 
miserable, trying to live amid war and chaos, may be the actual effect of globalization.  
The international environment could degrade to a few countries with access to all of the 
resources they need, and other countries saddled with depleted and dying populations 
and scrabbling for the remainders. 
Scholarship about development is therefore very important.  If the world is to 
experience growth in a way that measures up to the ideals that are propounded by 
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world leaders, the unevenness of development must be studied, and every finding and 
solution discovered by researchers must be fit into its place until full understanding is 
reached.  This dissertation has been one small attempt to pose questions about one 
aspect of development, foreign direct investment, and find some possible answers that 
will enlarge the scope of knowledge on this issue. 
Review of Findings 
What do we know about FDI?  From Hymer’s first research on foreign direct 
investment until today, a number of theories of FDI have been proposed.  These 
theories have been created from a number of different perspectives.  Research on FDI 
grew from studies in economics, which explored firms’ motivations to engage in foreign 
investment.  Political science followed with its own research into political causes and 
effects of FDI.  The impact of FDI on economics, markets, politics and the natural 
environment have been tackled by researchers, as have been myriads of other factors 
theorized to enhance or inhibit FDI.  This interest in FDI has helped bring about new 
tools for researchers in the study of development.  Countries now regularly report FDI 
statistics, giving researchers new conceptualizations of FDI to test empirically in 
quantitative tests. 
I began this dissertation by putting forth some questions; pieces of the 
development puzzle that I felt needed to be addressed.  In particular, I was curious 
about two mysteries that had not been adequately explored.  I hoped to contribute to 
existing research on FDI, given its importance as a key part of development for the past 
thirty years.  However, I wanted to look at the FDI story from a different point of view.  In 
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particular, to better understand the process of FDI, I wanted to examine the role of 
policy.  I was curious about the following questions.  What is FDI policy?  What 
determines FDI policy?  What is FDI policy’s role in attracting foreign direct investment 
inflows?  I wanted to investigate these questions from the perspective of developing 
countries.  Why do developing countries use FDI policies?  If developing countries want 
to industrialize, why is there such variation of their degree of openness to foreign direct 
investment?  These were questions that I did not think had been answered fully by 
existing research from any perspective. 
Despite my role as a political scientist, I found that I needed to synthesize many 
pieces of the FDI research across disciplines.  In other words, political science has told 
an important part of the FDI story.  It has explored the politics behind FDI and 
development in general.  However, economics tells another important part of the story, 
focusing on the motivations of firms and the transactions that occur between firms and 
other actors in order to make FDI a reality.  Sociology brings a third area in play, 
highlighting effects of FDI and globalization on people.  In conducting my research, I 
have been indebted to all of these perspectives to help me bring together my own story 
of FDI. 
I told a narrative that moved across countries and over time, and encompassed 
bits of all perspectives.  The story began with theories of development in vogue at 
various times in the past decades that had influence on developing countries and their 
perspectives.  Modernization theory and the goals that it professes, despite being 
originally proposed as a way to keep developing countries in the Western camp during 
the Cold War, has maintained the hope that the world is moving inexorably toward 
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modernity and rationality.  This new world will consist of all countries, industrialized and 
enlightened, with democratic forms of government.  The hope has continued to live 
through the promises of globalization. Developing countries are guaranteed gains and 
benefits from the liberalization of international trade and finance and the free movement 
of capital around the globe.  However, dependency theory arose to challenge the views 
of modernization theory.  Dependency theory argued that countries are locked into a 
tiered system; those that are farther along in their modernization take advantage of the 
system to get the resources they need and to continue their advancement at the 
expense of other countries.  Developing countries are at best junior partners of the 
industrialized countries, and at worst economically colonized by them.  Developing 
countries give up their precious resources cheaply and receive expensive manufactured 
products that benefit only those few in their societies that can afford them.  This system 
encourages a wealthy few to repress the mass portions of the world’s population that 
are less well off, and keeps developing countries in a state of inferiority. 
I argued that these two world-views of development were emblematic of attitudes 
that developing countries displayed toward FDI, one wary and one open, and that these 
attitudes help place their policies on a spectrum that ranges from complete openness to 
complete restrictiveness.  All developing countries policies are informed by these 
attitudes, and therefore their policies fall somewhere in between these two extremes. 
I proposed a scenario where developing states look to attract investment to their 
degree of comfort.  Developing states wish to gain the benefits of FDI without giving up 
too much control in the process.  They hope to gain new avenues toward 
industrialization using the technology, managerial expertise and know-how that foreign 
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firms from industrialized countries can bring.  They anticipate, over the course of the 
relationship, to gain revenue from taxes on foreign firms’ business and to expand 
employment for their populations.  Their policies walk a delicate line between asking too 
much and not asking enough, and are conditioned by their attitudes toward foreign 
investment in general.  Some policies establish restrictions on foreign investment equity 
or entry into economic sectors, while other policies set levels of taxation and types of 
regulations on multinational firms. 
Firms seek new markets for extraction, manufacturing or their products and 
therefore they seek conditions where they can make the maximum amount of profits 
with as few costs as possible.  Developing countries are attractive because of their 
natural resources, their abundance of labor and the untapped potential of their markets.  
Multinational firms hope to get the best possible agreement from developing countries in 
return for investing there.  They want few restrictions on investment, low taxes and few 
regulations.  Therefore, developing countries’ policies are a first indication to 
multinational firms of whether foreign investment in a particular place fits with their 
global strategies.  If policies are more restrictive, the number of firms willing to invest will 
be lower.  If policies are more open, more firms will be willing to take the risk of 
investment. 
As I presented in Chapter Two, the relationship between firms and states can fall 
into a scenario like that proposed by Putnam.  Putnam outlined the logic of two-level 
games in negotiations between states.  States negotiate agreements that are affected 
on two-levels.  Agreements are affected by political negotiations on the domestic level 
which establishes a win-set, or a range of possible agreements, which each state can 
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accept.  When there is overlap between the win-sets, agreement has a greater 
probability depending on the size of the overlap.  Agreements are also affected on the 
international level by the international environment and circumstances during 
negotiations.  States may need to update domestic groups on the progress of the talks 
and field those groups’ reactions.  In our case, the negotiating parties are not two 
developing states, but a developing state and a firm that operates on the transnational 
level.  I expanded Putnam’s theory, arguing that states not only negotiate with states, 
but with firms as well. 
States typically face political negotiation with powerful groups that will be affected 
by FDI domestically.  The results of these political dealings manifest themselves in 
policies of FDI.  These policies are then brought to the transnational level to serve as 
the basis of agreement.  Policies thus represent the win-set of the developing state as it 
tries to reach agreement with the firm.  Firms have their own win-sets as well – which  
were not addressed in this dissertation – and if their win-sets overlap with those of the 
developing states, there is a greater possibility of agreement.  There is probably less 
interaction between the domestic and transnational levels in FDI negotiations than in 
international arms agreements, but the principle is the same.  The eventual success or 
failure of agreements can be observed by the amount of FDI inflows to each state.  
Greater inflows mean more success in agreement. 
In the opening chapter, I introduced some perplexing examples.  Why do China, 
Mexico and Brazil get so much investment despite the restrictive nature of their FDI 
policies?  Why do Niger, Gabon and Swaziland get so little investment despite the open 
nature of their policies?  The answer is that firms find the potential of investment in 
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China, Mexico and Brazil to be profitable and to their benefit.  Most likely, those 
countries would gain more investment if their policies were more open.  In Niger, Gabon 
and Swaziland, firms are not as impressed by what those countries have to offer, or 
how those countries fit into their global strategies.  That does not mean that the open 
policies in these countries have no effect – they would probably be at a greater 
disadvantage in terms of FDI without them.  Open policies allow those countries that 
want to gain more FDI to have a better chance of doing so, and restrictive policies allow 
other countries to maintain some control over the flow of foreign investment. 
The theory that I proposed explained FDI utilizing Putnam’s logic of two-level 
games, and tested the relationships in two models.  In the first model, the policy model, 
I introduced the factors that influence a set of policy outcomes in developing states.  
The policies I describe, FDI equity policies, do not constitute the whole range of FDI 
policies but are a very important factor in the restrictiveness or openness of developing 
states to foreign investment.  I treat developing states as collectivities of political actors 
act in a unitary fashion through policies when dealing with multinational firms.  However, 
even though developing states operate in a unitary manner, the influences on 
developing states when they construct their policies are many, and come from a range 
of sources at both the domestic and international levels.  I proposed that policies are 
mainly influenced by domestic politics, international political and economic influences, 
domestic economic realities, and past experience with FDI. 
I found that elements of all of these factors have some influence over FDI 
policies.  On the domestic politics side, democracies are more likely to pass open 
policies, and nationalist governments are also more likely to be open to FDI.  
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Democracies are widely seen to be more open and transparent, more willing to promote 
and engage in open markets and free trade, and more willing to protect property rights 
and extend other protections to foreign investment than authoritarian governments.  
Nationalist governments on the other hand, are usually associated with protectionism 
and a zero-sum outlook on international economic relations.  They are linked with 
attitudes that exhibit wariness toward foreign investment, and prefer to foster national 
business rather than allowing foreign firms in the market.  The finding that nationalist 
governments appear to favor policies restricting foreign direct investment is therefore 
not surprising.  What is surprising is that government ideology does not appear to play a 
part in determining FDI policies, because policies from governments on the left and right 
showed no difference from each other.  However, more studies on ideology and FDI 
policies will need to be conducted because of problems with the data classifying 
governments into a left-center-right spectrum. 
I also found that developing countries’ memberships in international institutions 
based on trade and foreign investment contributed to open policies.  These institutions 
demand agreement with certain principles of foreign investment as a condition for 
membership, and failure to abide by those rules carries the risk of implicit or explicit 
sanction.  This risk constitutes pressure on developing countries to abide by the rules of 
the institution.  In addition, proximity to developed countries also appears to carry some 
weight in pushing developing countries toward greater openness to foreign investment.  
Industrialized countries that are contiguous along borders or economic zones with 
developing countries may want to extend the reach of their firms and therefore urge 
their neighbors to open to investment.  A prime example is the United States – Mexico 
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relationship, where U.S. firms have, in great numbers, located south of the U.S. border 
with Mexico to take advantage of the labor supply and lower wages. 
Some potential alternatives to FDI were found.  Domestic savings appears to be 
an alternative to FDI in that it can provide investment capital for home-grown 
businesses and therefore reduce the need to utilize foreign investment for development.  
Countries that have higher savings rates can therefore afford to set more restrictive 
policies on FDI.  External debt appears to be important in countries that rely upon FDI or 
where FDI makes up a larger portion of their economies.  Larger external debt leads to 
more open FDI policies in developing countries, because it may increase the need for 
FDI to help bring in greater revenues to service debt payments to lenders.  Also, many 
developing countries have followed policies of privatization of state-owned industries, 
and new foreign investment complements the debt already built up when governments 
created those industries or nationalized existing ones. 
Market size also appears to play a role in FDI openness with larger market sizes 
contribute to more open policies.  There may be some regional differences in openness 
to FDI, but only a little.  All regions except perhaps East and South Asia in the estimated 
sample were significant and more open to FDI compared with the comparison category, 
so the regional differences may be small. 
Given the influences that lead to more restrictive or more open policies, what 
countries represent open or closed policies?  Guided by the estimations performed in 
Chapter Three, the least open countries should have authoritarian and nationalist 
governments.  They should have a low degree of membership in international 
institutions, and not share a border or an economic zone with a developed country.  
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They should have a high savings rate and low external debt.  Such a scenario describes 
Zimbabwe in the late 1980s and Syria in 2003-2004, where policies restricted foreign 
investment to minority status. 
A very open developing country should have the opposite characteristics.  It 
should have a democratic, non-nationalist government.  It should have a high degree of 
membership in international institutions, and be in close proximity to the developed 
world.  It should have a low savings rate and high external debt.  These characteristics, 
except for proximity to developed countries, are shared by many countries.  Argentina 
from 2000-2001, Gambia from 1983-1993, Ghana from 1996-2004, Guyana from 2002-
2004, Madagascar from 1996-2003, Nicaragua from 2000-2004, and Zambia from 
1992-2000.  No countries that were in proximity to developed countries met the other 
criteria.   
Do developing countries’ policies make a difference in firm decision-making 
about investment there?  In other words, do policies affect foreign direct investment 
inflows?  This question was addressed in the second model.  It is certain that FDI 
policies have an effect on FDI inflows.  Developing countries that are most open to 
foreign equity appear to gain more FDI as a percent of their GDPs than those 
developing countries that put restrictions on foreign equity.  Those countries that want 
or depend on FDI as a development tool therefore will gain more foreign investment if 
their policies are more open. 
Open policies are not the only determinants of FDI inflows.  Countries that are 
nationalist gain more FDI inflows as a percent of GDP.  The explanation may lie party 
because the size of nationalist countries in the sample tend to be smaller countries, and 
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possibly because nationalist governments cannot ignore the world economy even if they 
would prefer to be less involved in it.  Once again, surprisingly, the ideological 
orientation of the government appears to have no impact on FDI inflows, indicating that 
foreign direct investment flows to developing countries regardless of whether they 
espouse leftist or right-wing ideologies.   
International institutional membership also has a positive effect on countries’ FDI 
inflows.  Countries that belong to more international institutions that are concerned 
about international trade and investment receive more inflows of FDI as a percent of 
GDP.  This could indicate that institutional membership strengthens the positive 
impression that multinational firms have of developing countries.  International 
institutions promote norms and rules that level the playing field for potential investors, 
and provide protections against government actions that could be inimical to foreign 
investment.  As firms decide whether to invest in developing countries, membership in a 
greater number of international institutions may set some countries apart from others 
and increase the potential range of possible agreements that firms are willing to accept. 
Countries that have more income per capita tend to get less FDI as a percentage 
of GDP.  This suggests that firms are attracted to lower income countries because they 
can cut costs on wages.  A low-wage structure could strengthen some countries’ 
bargaining positions if they have alternatives to FDI for development, but could leave 
other countries with few other alternatives in weak bargaining positions.  Corruption 
appears to dampen FDI inflows, indicating that developing states that control corruption, 
regardless of whether they depend on FDI for development, will gain more FDI inflows.  
FDI also is attracted to larger developing countries, indicating that larger markets are 
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important to firms.  Finally, regional differences play a part in the amount of inflows of 
FDI that developing countries receive.  If a developing country is in Latin America, it 
appears that it has a better chance of receiving more FDI than countries in other 
regions.  This may be due to the United States factor, which has taken a special 
economic interest in Latin America, which it considers as its own back yard, and has 
negotiated a number of trade and investment deals favorable to U.S. companies. 
The findings suggest that those developing countries that are democratic, 
nationalist, have open FDI policies, belong to more international institutions, have a low 
income per capita, and control corruption will gain more FDI as a percent of GDP than 
other countries.  In my dataset, Argentina from 1995-2004 (mean inflows 3.3 percent of 
GDP), Guyana from 1995-2002 (mean inflows 7.96 percent of GDP), Lesotho from 
1995-1998 (mean inflows 29.44 percent of GDP), Malaysia from 1992-2004 (mean 
inflows 1.01 percent of GDP), and Trinidad and Tobago from 2003-2004 (mean inflows 
7.84 percent of GDP) fit this description.  Those countries receiving the least inflows as 
a percent of GDP, Algeria from 1994-1996 (mean inflows 0.19 percent of GDP), 
Bangladesh from 1981-1983 (mean inflows 0.02 percent of GDP), Ethiopia from 1989-
1991 (mean inflows 0.07 percent of GDP), Gabon from 1989-1995 (mean inflows -1.37 
percent of GDP), Haiti from 1977-1987 (mean inflows 0.57 percent of GDP) and from 
1993-1994 (mean inflows -0.09 percent of GDP), Indonesia from 1977-1979 (mean 
inflows 0.47 percent of GDP), Iran from 1982-1990 (mean inflows -0.08 percent of GDP) 
and from 1993-1997 (mean inflows 0.02 percent of GDP), Nicaragua from 1977-1979 
(mean inflows 0.32 percent of GDP) and from 1982-1990 (mean inflows 0.01 percent of 
GDP), and the Philippines in 1980 (inflows -0.33 percent of GDP), all had non-
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democratic, non-nationalist governments ranking high in corruption and fewer 
memberships in international institutions concerned with trade and investment.  In this 
category especially, there were also some countries that had somewhat higher inflows 
as a percent of GDP despite their characteristics.  Chad (1992-1998), the Dominican 
Republic (1977-1978), and Guatemala 91977-1983) were all examples of countries that 
did not quite match predictions. 
What are recommendations that can be made to policymakers regarding FDI 
policies in developing countries?  Policymakers are the subject of many pulls and tugs, 
both domestically and internationally.  Domestic politics and international pressures are 
largely out of policymakers’ control.  After all, policymakers do not decide whether their 
countries are democratic or authoritarian, nationalist or internationally focused, leftist or 
rightist.  Domestic politics determines these particular characteristics.  Policymakers 
should fashion policy according to their country’s characteristics, playing up its strengths 
and downplaying its weaknesses. 
For example, if a country wants to reduce FDI or reduce its reliance on FDI, it 
can do a number of things.  First, it can restrict FDI through taxation, regulation and limit 
its entry into the market by passing more restrictive FDI policies.   Second, it can build 
up reasonable alternatives to FDI and tap those for development purposes.  
Encouraging savings, for one, helps build up domestic sources of capital and reduces 
the need for the country to have open FDI policies.  Paying down external debt and 
putting the extra capital into national development is another possible, though not easy, 
way reduce reliance on FDI.  The highly indebted poor countries (HIPC) that are in line 
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for significant debt forgiveness in the next few years may be able to benefit from the 
advantage of a lower external debt. 
Remittances from nationals of developing countries that work in the developed 
world are also a significant source of capital, and these remittances can be channeled 
into productive capital for investment, as long as the population can be encouraged to 
refrain from spending them on wasteful forms of consumption and if governments can 
encourage entrepreneurship.  In El Salvador, for example, recipients of remittances 
tend to spend them on consumer goods, such as shoes, clothes, and televisions.  That 
money ends up in the pockets of a few wealthy business owners whose interests do not 
necessarily coincide with those of the poorer populace. 
On the other hand, if a developing country wants to increase its FDI prospects, 
such as increasing its importance in the economy or simply increasing the flow of FDI 
into its market, there are a number of actions that policymakers can take.  First and 
foremost they should pass policies that open the economy.  Open policies serve as an 
indication that a country is interested and serious about foreign investment.  If a 
developing country is democratic it is already likely to have open FDI policies, but 
autocratic governments show more variation in their openness to foreign investment.  
Second, reducing corruption in government serves as a sign of encouragement to 
foreign investors.  Foreign investors do not like cutting through red tape or paying bribes 
to set up business, and will prefer to deal with those countries that are more efficient 
and transparent in their processes and procedures. 
These actions do not guarantee that developing countries can reduce or enhance 
their prospects for FDI, but such actions will not hurt their chances of achieving 
 283
development goals.  The main thing for policymakers to remember, however, is that 
policies have repercussions on FDI prospects and on development projections in 
general.  Policymakers in the developing world are in a position to take the resources 
that globalization offers them, or to reject them, but ultimately their policies have an 
impact on the path their country takes toward development.  Globalization may be a 
source of pressure on policymakers, but ultimately developing countries can encourage 
or discourage globalization.  Their economic paths are in their own hands. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
The process of creating theory, testing hypotheses, and achieving results that 
both fit and defy prediction are rewards in themselves, but are meaningless if future 
research does not add to and expand on what was learned in earlier research.  In the 
hope that this dissertation has created a worthwhile avenue for future study, I would like 
to offer some thoughts and suggestions about possible future research based on this 
avenue of exploration, and the findings that have proceeded from it. 
There are still many avenues to explore.  I have argued that FDI policy consists 
of restrictions on foreign equity, regulation of foreign operations once the investment is 
made, and taxation.  I introduced a measure of foreign direct investment policy, the FDI 
Equity Index, to serve as a measure of FDI policies.  This measure is one-dimensional 
and only measures restrictions on foreign equity.  It does not take regulation of foreign 
investment or taxation of foreign firms into account, but in the absence of measures of 
foreign direct investment it marks an improvement in the ability to test theories on FDI.   
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The next challenge for researchers is to provide alternative, and perhaps more 
complete, measures of foreign direct investment policy.  Taxation has been quantified.  
Are there measures of corporate taxation rates for a large number of countries over a 
reasonable number of years?  This information is available widely for the developed 
world, and for some developing countries, but not all.  Categories of business 
regulations are spelled out in existing research, but can we quantify this information 
across countries and time so that additional studies that meet acceptable standards of 
validity and reliability can be performed? 
Such information would be most helpful it were available over time.  It is possible 
to learn much about FDI from a static snapshot of one or two years, and we have 
gained unique insights from such studies.  However, as I hope has become clear in this 
dissertation, foreign direct investment is a dynamic process.  Attitudes toward FDI alter, 
and flows of FDI move in cycles.  Collective mind-sets toward FDI have become more 
open in the past twenty years, but they may not always be that way.  Recent 
nationalizations in Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador by leftist governments, for example, 
could indicate that the cycle is turning back toward restrictiveness of FDI in Latin 
America.  The cyclical nature of economics and politics argues for more studies of the 
FDI process over time.  The longer the dataset and the greater the number of 
observations over time, the more understanding will be gained from research. 
The overall relationship between firm and state needs further development.  
There are a few causality questions that could be explored.  Do policies lead to FDI, or 
does FDI lead to policies?  I’ve tried to model the causality question of policies by first 
indicating that policies influence FDI inflows, but that past inflows then influence new 
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FDI policies.  This circle of causation, however, does not truly uncover the dynamics of 
the interrelationship.  At earlier points in time, some developing countries did not have 
laws that addressed FDI; instead restrictions and regulation of FDI was administered 
through bureaucracies and bureaucratic interpretation of leadership attitudes.  Do these 
methods of dealing with FDI constitute “policy” as we know it?  The Dominican Republic 
did not codify its investment law until 1978, Honduras until 1992, Panama until 1994 
and Lesotho still does not have a law specifically on foreign direct investment on the 
books.  Why have not some developing countries decided to codify their laws, and what 
effect does this have on openness to FDI? 
Another issue I’ve not explored, but have suggested in my analysis of the 
agreement scenario between firms and states, is that developing countries’ policies 
could serve as a signaling mechanism to firms about their development intentions.  
Signaling is a concept that has been researched in the international relations field.  
Might the signaling literature be explored and adapted into theory that can fit FDI?  Do 
states signal their intentions to firms through their policies?  Do firms respond to 
signaling?  There is much in this area that can be investigated. 
More study on the role of FDI policies should be undertaken, in particular the 
economic factors that contribute to FDI policy formation.  I proposed that openness to 
FDI that makes its way into policy responds to the existence of alternatives to FDI.  
These alternatives are avenues to development that can reduce the reliance of 
countries on foreign direct investment.  The support I found for domestic savings as an 
alternative shows that there is at least one other avenue that developing countries can 
explore.  The others I proposed, external debt, foreign aid, and a positive trade balance, 
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did not appear to constitute an alternative.  Are there other options that inhibit or 
encourage FDI?  Are there other ways to measure these concepts?  My case studies of 
Nicaragua and El Salvador suggest that remittances from migrant workers to families 
back in home countries may be a potential alternative to FDI.  More research on the 
relationship of remittances to FDI needs to be conducted, and data gathered that will 
support this research. 
In particular, the role of debt and FDI policy needs to made clearer.  In proposing 
external debt as an alternative to FDI, my thought was that external debt was an avenue 
to industrialization because states used loans to invest in national businesses and to 
establish state-owned industries.  This would allow policy-makers to reduce their 
reliance on FDI and therefore allow them to restrict FDI.  However, the findings indicate 
that higher external debt and open policies are associated.  Why might this be?  I 
suggest that higher external debt creates more demands on the state in the form of 
repayments.  In times when states are cutting back on social programs to simply make 
payments on their debts, FDI becomes essential if states are to continue to industrialize.  
Their ability to develop themselves has thus been severely compromised by their debt 
repayments, and they must turn to FDI as a mechanism for continued development.  
However, more research into the link between these two concepts will be important. 
Regional differences in FDI policies should also be studied to a greater extent.  I 
found regional differences to be largely absent, except perhaps Central Asia.  However, 
it appears that Latin America receives more FDI inflows as a percent of GDP than other 
areas.  Why does Latin America receive more inflows, despite the fact that its policies 
do not stand out among other regions?   Does investment there from the United States 
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significantly affect the total amount of FDI inflows?  Do European countries invest more 
predominantly there than in other regions?  Why this disparity? 
I also encourage more research on individual countries using the model I have 
proposed for FDI.  I conducted case studies of two countries in Central America, but 
further case studies on other countries will further shed light on the role of FDI policies 
in particular economies, and continue to add to the breadth of research on development 
issues.  The countries I chose, while having differences and similarities on many levels, 
are two small markets.  There is much variation that can be explored.  Large markets 
versus small markets, proximity to developed countries versus non-proximity, civil 
conflict versus peace, democracy versus authoritarian.  Of particular interest would 
those countries that did not get into my statistical analysis because of lack of macro-
data on various factors of interest.  Do they follow the model I propose, or do they vary 
in some way? 
Finally, I made a conscious choice to limit my investigations to developing 
countries.  This decision was made because I argue that developing countries need to 
be studied separately lest some of the elements that affect only them get lost in the 
larger picture of foreign direct investment, globalization and development.  This 
research was undertaken in the full knowledge that the bulk of the world’s FDI occurs 
between developed countries.  That leads to two possible avenues of research.  First, 
does the model I proposed also apply to FDI between developed countries?  If not, are 
there elements of the theory that can be modified to explain foreign direct investment in 
the developed world?  The second avenue depends on the first.  If such a model can be 
applied to the developed world, does it give rise to the possibility that foreign direct 
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investment can be explained for the world in general?  Or, is there some line that has to 
be crossed, some set of factors not yet understood that will eventually transform certain 
developing countries (such as China, Mexico, India, and Brazil) into developed 
countries through FDI? 
We end where we started.  The first chapter proposed some mysteries.  Why do 
some countries that restrict FDI, such as China, Brazil and Mexico, still seem to get so 
much, while others that have maintained a very open stance toward foreign investment, 
such as Gabon, Niger and Swaziland, get very little?  Certainly China, Brazil and 
Mexico are attractive to foreign investment, and they could get more if they were to 
open their policies.  Gabon, Niger and Swaziland are not as attractive to foreign 
investment, but where would they be if their policies were not as open?  Foreign direct 
investment does not simply depend on the resources countries have, or the markets 
they offer, or the quality and expense of their labor.  As developing countries consider 
courting foreign firms, their economic advancement not only depends on their 
attractions, but also on policies that indicate how wide they are willing to open the 
doorways to development. 
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Appendix A 
Countries Used in the Study 
Algeria Kenya 
Argentina Lesotho 
Bangladesh Madagascar 
Bolivia Malaysia 
Brazil Mexico 
Cameroon Morocco 
Chad Mozambique 
Chile Nicaragua 
China Niger 
Columbia Nigeria 
Costa Rica Oman 
Cote D’Ivoire Pakistan 
Democratic Republic of Congo Panama 
Dominican Republic Papua New Guinea 
Ecuador Peru 
Egypt Philippines 
El Salvador Senegal 
Ethiopia Sri Lanka 
Gabon Swaziland 
Gambia Syria 
Ghana Thailand 
Guatemala Trinidad & Tobago 
Guyana Tunisia 
Haiti Turkey 
Honduras Uruguay 
India Venezuela 
Indonesia Zambia 
Iran Zimbabwe 
Jordan  
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Appendix B 
 
Descriptive Statistics – FDI Policy Estimations 
 
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
FDI Equity Index 1633 1.4868 1.0302 0 3 
Category 0 Dummy 1653 0.1760 0.3810 0 1 
Category 1 Dummy 1653 0.3345 0.4720 0 1 
Category 2 Dummy 1653 0.2232 0.4165 0 1 
Regime type 1649 0.1025 7.0089 -10 10 
Nationalism 1426 0.1950 0.3963 0 1 
Left 1653 0.2601 0.4388 0 1 
Center 1653 0.0557 0.2293 0 1 
Other 1653 0.4785 0.4997 0 1 
International Institutions 1653 0.7621 0.2615 0 1 
Proximity 1653 0.1633 0.3698 0 1 
Savings/GDP 1629 16.2427 15.0069 -92.7636 72.9801 
ODA/DAC*+ 1650 1.3249 0.2407 0 2.5685 
Trade Balance/GDP 1550 -0.0517 0.3896 -1.6962 6.09 
Debt/GDP* 1630 -0.0765 0.8702 -2.9326 2.6984 
FDI inflows/GDP (5 yr 
avg)*+ 1634 2.0085 0.2531 0 3.4925 
Population* 1653 16.4355 1.5983 13.1174 20.9827 
Sub-Saharan Africa 1653 0.3158 0.4650 0 1 
East Asia 1653 0.1053 0.3070 0 1 
Latin America 1653 0.3509 0.4774 0 1 
South Asia 1653 0.0702 0.2555 0 1 
North Africa 1653 0.1579 0.3648 0 1 
* Variable logged for estimation + Variable right-shifted   
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Appendix C 
Descriptive Statistics – FDI Inflows Estimations 
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
FDI inflows/GDP* 1642 2.7158 0.1747 0.3337 4.0881 
Regime Typet-1 1594 -0.0163 7.0114 -10 10 
Nationalismt-1 1411 0.1970 0.3979 0 1 
Leftt-1 1596 0.2632 0.4405 0 1 
Centert-1 1596 0.0558 0.2295 0 1 
Othert-1 1596 0.5326 0.4991 0 1 
Durabilityt-1 1596 14.3346 14.5292 0 83 
Internal Wart-1 1596 0.2024 0.4019 0 1 
External Wart-1 1596 0.0320 0.1759 0 1 
International 
Institutionst-1
1596 0.7556 0.2629 0 1 
Proximity to Developed 
Countries 1653 0.1633 0.3698 0 1 
Agriculture Value-added 
/ GDPt-1
1540 21.1174 11.7337 1.1694 63.8267 
Manufacturing Value-
added/GDPt-1
1466 16.0423 7.2324 0.4863 40.7060 
Extractives Value- 
added/GDPt-1*+
1466 3.4905 0.3012 1.6289 4.4893 
Services Value-
added/GDPt-1
1540 48.4456 9.9135 16.4766 78.5302 
Category 1t-1 1576 0.3496 0.4770 0 1 
Category 2t-1 1576 0.2475 0.4317 0 1 
Category 3t-1 1576 0.2056 0.4043 0 1 
GNI/Capitat-1*+ 1632 6.6986 1.0293 3.6990 8.9997 
Corruption 1653 -0.4487 0.5297 -1.5504 1.3578 
Property Rights 1653 46.4279 14.7983 10 90 
Populationt-1*- 1596 16.3043 1.7647 10.8579 20.9763 
Sub-Saharan Africa 1653 0.3158 0.4650 0 1 
North Africa 1653 0.1579 0.3648 0 1 
Latin America 1653 0.3509 0.4774 0 1 
East Asia 1653 0.1053 0.3070 0 1 
South Asia 1653 0.0702 0.2555 0 1 
* Variable logged for estimation + Variable right-shifted - Variable left-shifted 
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Appendix D 
The Foreign Equity Index 
The original intent behind this study was to create a variable which employed a 
number of different dimensions of FDI policy.  Not only was the variable envisioned to 
measure equity, but also tax breaks, duty exemptions, screening, and profit and capital 
repatriation.  However, two things became apparent as the content analysis 
commenced.  First, the information in the Exporters Encyclopedia had some gaps.  All 
countries were not covered equally, and even ranges of years within some countries 
were not covered adequately.  Second, except for foreign equity restrictions, which were 
often reported when they changed, there was a lack of “negative” information on the 
other components of FDI policy.  Tax breaks and customs duties, for example, were 
often reported when they existed, but no mention of them was made in other years, and 
it could not be assumed that they did not exist in those times.  Likewise, the same 
situation appeared for screening, and for repatriation. 
In the case of foreign equity restrictions, however, it was apparent that long 
stretches of an unchanged description of a country’s FDI policy meant that its equity 
restrictions also were most likely unchanged.  If it was learned, for example, that in 1976 
a country only allowed foreigners a minority stake in its domestic businesses, and then 
in 1983 a new policy was introduced that allowed 100 percent equity investment for 
foreigners in some sectors, it could be assumed that the equity restrictions in 1976 
stayed unchanged until 1983.   In many cases, there were gaps that made determining 
whether a policy changed unclear, and so corroborating information was sought on the 
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Internet.  A number of sites were helpful in filling gaps in the data or corroborating 
existing information from the Exporter’s Encyclopedia, including sites belonging to the 
State Department, The Heritage Foundation, regional trade organizations and official 
government websites. 
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Appendix E 
Specification of the FDI Policy Estimations 
 
A multilevel generalized linear model follows the following specification: 
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where , allowing for a random intercept at each level.  By omitting the random 
terms, the equation for a two level generalized linear mixed model becomes: 
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Following this, fitting the gllamm to an ordered probit is accomplished: 
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where  = discrete categories of the FDI equity index for observation i in country j, *ijY
 ijν = the generalized linear mixed model for observation i in country j 
 ijε = a random error term, assumed to follow a standard normal distribution. 
 The observed and coded discrete dependent variable, , is determined from the 
model as follows: 
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where the kμ ’s represent thresholds to be estimated along with the parameter vector 
β . 
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 Probabilities associated with the coded responses of this ordered probit model 
are as follows: 
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where i is an individual observation, j is the level of observation, e is the FDI equity 
policy alternative, is the probability that the policy is e, and is the standard 
normal cumulative distribution function. 
)( eYP ij = ) (Φ
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